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Abstract 
 
 
The period between 1953 and 1957 saw Bahrain at the zenith of the political 
struggle between Sir Charles Belgrave, the British Adviser to the Government of 
Bahrain appointed by the Ruler, and the local nationalist movement.  The Adviser 
had exercised considerable influence and had managed various facets of 
government administration since his arrival in 1926.  The Movement sought to limit 
Belgrave’s authority through a set of demands for reform.  These demands were to 
develop into a call for his dismissal.  The Movement arose during the time that 
nationalism regionally (and in particular its Egyptian brand) was on the rise in the 
Arab World.  This era was also marked by an awakening of the Soviet Union’s 
interest in the Middle East and its resources as it established a foothold in the region 
through Egypt.  The conflict in Bahrain represented a model of the global events of 
the Cold War as it threatened the cohesiveness of the Baghdad Pact and was among 
a series of events that fed into Britain’s road to the 1956 Suez War. 
This thesis offers insight into the political struggle as it traces the 
development of the nationalist movement; the major drives that steered it, 
particularly that of nationalism in Egypt; the role of the Adviser and whether his 
actions facilitated British policy or affected it negatively.  It also explores British 
policy which sought to strike a balance between the Ruler, who wished to retain his 
Adviser, and the nationalists while preserving British interest in the region.   
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Preface 
 
 
A little less than fifty years ago, Sir Charles Dalrymple Belgrave left Bahrain 
and went back to his home country, Britain.  However his name will always be 
linked with the history of Bahrain.  Some of the older generation of Bahrainis hold 
fond memories of Belgrave, the British Adviser to the Government of Bahrain from 
1926 to 1957.  My late grandmother used to describe how she would see Belgrave 
riding his horse in the early hours of the morning in the streets of the capital of 
Manama near his house waving to Bahrainis as he inspected the streets.  Although 
he worked under the title of Adviser to the Government of Bahrain, his work was 
more comprehensive as he actually managed the affairs of the local Administration.  
During his stay in Bahrain he successfully created ‘one of the best administrated 
states in the Middle East’, as the former British diplomat to the Middle East Sir 
William Rupert Hay, noted.1   
His contributions affected the development of all aspects of Bahraini life and 
transformed the sheikhdom into a modern state.  ‘He Said Forward!  To the 
Backward’ declared Life magazine’s reporter James Bell, as he documented the 
Adviser’s work.  Bell also added that the Adviser had ‘made ancient Bahrain a model 
for a new Western policy in [the] Middle East’.2  It was also Belgrave who 
                                                        
1 W.R. Hay, ‘The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms’, Middle East Journal, 9.4, 
(1955), 361-72 (363). 
2 J. Bell, ‘He Said Forward!  To the Backward!’, Life, 17 November 1952, 157-74 (157). 
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‘established law thus preventing subjugation and exploitation’, commented Bahraini 
writer and poet Hassan Kamal.3  
His contributions were overshadowed, inter alia, by his centralisation of 
power, the public’s demand for reform, the rise of regional nationalist powers (in 
particular Egypt’s Free Officers’ Movement), and the exploitation of nationalists by 
the major powers during the Cold War.  These global factors fed into a local political 
crisis in Bahrain.  The nationalist movement that had arisen in Bahrain came to be 
known as the Higher Executive Committee, later renamed as the National Union 
Committee (or Committee of National Union).  The Party is colloquially known in 
Bahrain as Al-Hay’eh (The Committee).  The Movement offered a short-lived political 
modus vivendi between Muslim Sunnis and Shi’ites. 
The fond memories that some in Bahrain held of the Adviser turned into 
anger aimed against him and Britain, as the country came under its protection.  I 
vividly remember my mother recalling demonstrators in the capital Manama 
shouting slogans: ‘go home Belgrave!’, ‘down with Eden!’, and ‘down with Lloyd!’ 
during the Suez War.  The last two were in reference to Sir Anthony Eden, the 
British Prime Minister and Sir Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary.  
Furthermore, I remember conversations from my childhood as I accompanied my 
late grandfather to local men’s Majlis (lounge) where they discussed their memories 
of events from that time period.  I particularly remember the stories about the 
stoning of Lloyd’s car procession by demonstrators in Bahrain in March 1956.  
Although the exact details of the discussions escape me, I have clear images of the 
                                                        
3 H. Kamal, ‘Belgrave Al-Insan’ [Belgrave the Person], Kurasat Charles Belgrave 1926-1957 [Charles 
Belgrave’s Booklet], (Muharraq: 2008), 17-19 (17). 
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events from that time which were given to me through the memories of many 
Bahrainis from that generation.  It was apparent that not only Belgrave left a mark 
on Bahrain’s political scene but so did the members of the nationalist movement, in 
particular Abdul-Rahman Al-Bakir and Abdul-Aziz Al-Shamlan.  Unfortunately many 
of those who survived that era -- regardless of their political inclinations -- have 
died without documenting their memories or perspectives of that crucial time in 
Bahrain’s modern history.   
Nothing captured my imagination more than my mother’s story of her uncle 
and brother discreetly looking from the arabesque window of the family’s old 
residence in Fareej Al-Fadhel (Al-Fadhel neighbourhood) in Manama in the early 
hours of 6 November 1956 as they witnessed the arrest of the leader of Bahrain’s 
nationalist movement, Abdul-Rahman Al-Bakir, who lived in very near to the 
family’s home.  The arrest signalled the fall of the nationalist organisation.   
As an adult, these second-hand memories of the events surrounding the 
conflict that had unfolded in Bahrain from 1953 to 1957 remained with me.  I was 
curious to know more and I started to look for what had been published about them.  
I was also intrigued by the words of Bahraini journalist Saeed Al-Hamad in February 
2012 as he commented in an article published by Bahrain’s Al-Ayam (The Days) 
newspaper mourning the death of a supporter of the Movement.  He said: 
Documentation and writing about history is not part and parcel of our 
Arab culture.  Despite the fact that many new generations studied in 
Western schools and universities, they did not learn how to 
implement it and are not influenced by this important Western 
quality.  The history of our men and women from the national 
movement is scattered and under threat of being lost.4 
                                                        
4 S. Al-Hamad, ‘Jassim BuHiji Wada’an’ [Farwell to Jassim BuHiji], Al-Ayam, 28 February 2012, 21. 
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These words of Al-Hamad and the encouragement of Bahraini historian and friend 
Dr Abdul-Hamid Al-Mahadeen to research further into Belgrave’s life and influence 
re-kindled an interest that had been sparked in me as a child.  This provoked me to 
research the struggle for power that engulfed the Bahraini Administration, managed 
by Belgrave, and the nationalist movement. 
The conflict in Bahrain was not a mere internal political dispute but one that 
was influenced by regional changes with international repercussions overshadowed 
by the Cold War and a battle for supremacy by the superpowers in the Middle East.  
It baffled Britain and left its policy makers between the Scylla and Charybdis of how 
to handle the crisis and its fast-paced developments.  The situation became so 
critical that it caused Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador to Iran, to declare 
that ‘The Bahrain issue may well prove to be a chink in the armour of the Baghdad 
Pact which its enemies may seek to exploit’.5  The so-called Baghdad Pact was in 
reference to the name given to the Western alliance brokered by Britain to defend 
the Middle East from possible Soviet aggression.  Since the Bahraini nationalist 
party had aligned itself with Egyptian regional policy that stood in opposition to the 
Pact, this will be highlighted in this thesis. 
Not only were the events of the political struggle in Bahrain a mystery to me, 
but so was the British policy towards the Movement throughout the Party’s 
development.  A sense of distrust existed regarding Belgrave’s actions even after his 
death.  Bahrain’s former weekly newspaper Al-Adwha’a (The Lights) whose Editor-
in-Chief was Mahmood Al-Mardi, one of Belgrave’s opponents and a supporter of the 
                                                        
5 The National Archives (TNA), FO 371/120545, Roger Stevens to FO, 30 March 1956. 
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nationalist movement,  declared in its obituary of Belgrave in reference to the last 
years of his tenure: 
History will tell whether the source of the decisions, judgments, and 
policies he implemented was himself and his diligence or were 
dictated to him from above or in line with the local situation prevalent 
during his tenure.6 
 
Thus this thesis comes to address the political struggle between Belgrave 
who acted as the head figure of the Bahraini Administration on behalf of the 
Ruler and the nationalist movement of that era.  This has required access to a 
wide range of primary sources. 
Initial research was conducted on the Records of Bahrain: Primary Documents 
1820-1960.  The records included republished correspondences, reports, and letters 
vis-à-vis Bahrain from the India Office Records (IOR) and the Foreign Office (FO).  
Other similar republished volumes of documents were inspected such as the Ruling 
Families of Arabia: Bahrain: the Ruling Family of Al-Khalifah and Arab Gulf Cities: 
Manama.  The volumes were either divided chronologically or by topic.  These were 
used to identify relevant papers, names, and files during the process of research as 
they only included a selected number of documents.  The next stage explored 
documents at The National Archives (TNA) at Kew, Richmond.  The research method 
was based on exploring Bahrain’s local events and also aimed at viewing the greater 
picture of developments regionally and globally.  The research included, inter alia, 
names of personalities in relation to the thesis, location, departments, time period, 
British policy in Bahrain and the Middle East, and archives of the British Residency 
and Political Agency in the Gulf.  Furthermore the documents explored at TNA 
                                                        
6 ‘Wafat Al-Sir Charles Belgrave’ [The Death of Sir Charles Belgrave], Al-Adwha’a, 6 March 1969, 3. 
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included, inter alia, letters on policy from the Foreign Secretary, correspondences 
between the Residency and the Eastern Department of the FO, letters from the 
Agency to the Residency (and vice versa), a collection of proclamations by the Ruler 
of Bahrain and correspondences, circulars, pamphlets, letters and petitions by the 
nationalist movement, letters forwarded by Belgrave to British officers in Bahrain, 
Ministry of Defense’s Chiefs of Staff (COS) memoranda, the treasury’s imperial and 
foreign division files, and Prime Ministerial notes and minutes of conversation.7  It 
should be said en passant that not all files from the period under study had dealt 
only with the political affairs of Bahrain.  Some focused on other matters, such as 
court hearings and social life.  It must also be noted that a number of FO folders on 
the Bahraini conflict at TNA included some repeated correspondences and 
instructions on British policy.  For example the following folders: FO 1016/467, FO 
371/120547, and FO 371/120573 included repeated documents among them.  
Britain’s stance on Egypt, the Glubb Pasha issue, and the Baghdad Pact were 
additionally viewed.  The British Cabinet papers at TNA were also explored which 
paid special attention to the Bahraini conflict after the Lloyd incident in March 1956.  
Overall, the documents at TNA provided a detailed insight onto the issue in Bahrain 
and illustrated how Britain’s FO and the Residency handled the islands’ political 
developments and internal strife as will be revealed in the thesis as events unfold.  
Documents at the IOR were also viewed but only to provide the necessary 
                                                        
7 If two or more correspondences from one party to another in the same folder and dated on the 
same date, the despatch number or other reference number of the correspondence was used to 
distinguish between the two. 
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background to the topic as the records of the archive do not cover the time period of 
the thesis. 
The Government of Bahrain’s annual reports republished in a number of 
volumes under the title of Bahrain Government Annual Reports 1924-1970 were 
explored in the preparation of this thesis.  The Residency’s monthly and annual 
administration republished reports on the Gulf region were also scrutinised.  These 
included the Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf and the Persian Gulf Administration 
Reports.  
Another category covered was the memoirs and diaries of personalities 
directly related to the research.  The memoirs of those concerned include Belgrave’s 
memoir on Bahrain entitled Personal Column that offered a general sketch of the 
development of the crisis in Bahrain with little detail.  Al-Bakir’s account in From 
Bahrain to Exile in the Arabic language stands as the only published description of 
events from a member of the nationalist movement.  There are a number of issues 
with the memoir.  First, it provided only slight insight into the inner politics of the 
Movement.  Second, two dominant gaps can be found in the memoir as little 
information is provided, the first was evident in 1955 and the second was during the 
period of Al-Bakir’s departure from Bahrain between the end of March and 
September 1956.  The third issue is Al-Bakir’s incoherent narrative flow.  He shifts 
from a topic to another one totally unrelated to it.  In addition to Al-Bakir’s memoir, 
a long speech he presented in Arabic in 1956 to the Kuwaiti Studentship Union 
entitled The Political Situation in Bahrain and its Recent Events, republished in 2007, 
was also reviewed. 
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Memoirs of other personalities who lived through the period under review 
were also consulted.  For example, the memoirs of Resident Bernard Burrows 
Footnotes in the Sand and Diplomat in a Changing World and the memoir of Ivor 
Lucas A Road to Damascus: Mainly Diplomatic Memoirs from the Middle East who was 
employed at the Residency and established contact with the Movement was 
examined.  Memoirs of British Cabinet and international policy makers were also 
observed.  Additionally, memoirs by British employees in Bahrain and travellers to 
the island were obtained.  Two key memoirs provided a rare insight into the various 
stages of the Bahraini conflict.  The first was by a former employee at the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company (BAPCO), HV Mapp who extended a rare insight into the work 
and views of Al-Bakir as he developed a close friendship with him in late 1952 and 
early 1953 as observed in his publication Leave Well Alone! Where Oil Shapes 
Dynasties and Destinies.  The other memoir The Golden Bubble: Arabian Gulf 
Documentary was by the traveller Roderic Owen who claimed to be an eyewitness to 
the stoning of Lloyd’s car convoy. 
The known memoirs of the Free Officers’ Movement, Egyptian politicians, 
and journalists were also investigated.  These memoirs proved a disappointment in 
this regard as no information was available on their policy in Bahrain.  Three 
memoirs that dealt with the life of two of the eight frontline members of the 
Movement by their sons or relatives were published in Arabic in Bahrain.  These 
included the memoir of Abdul-Karim Al-Alaiwat son of Abd-Ali Al-Alaiwat entitled 
Bahrain… My Memoir from the Committee to Independence.  The other two memoirs 
were also published by a son and a relative respectively of Al-Syed Ali Kamal-el-
 © Hamad E. Abdulla xii 
Deen, the first by Ebrahim Kamal-el-Deen entitled A Nation’s Memory and the 
second by Hassan M Kamal-el-Deen entitled On the Nation’s Shores: The Scholarly 
Reformer Al-Sayed Ali Al-Sayed Ebrahim Kamal-el-Deen.  The three publications did 
not provide any new information on the topic. 
Published and unpublished diaries and papers were also studied.  This 
included the personal diary of Belgrave found at the University of Exeter’s Special 
Collections.  The diary offered some insight into the conflict from the Adviser’s 
perspective.  However although Belgrave mentioned his encounters with British or 
Bahraini personalities involved in the crisis, he rarely offered details of those 
encounters.  Additionally Selwyn Lloyd’s papers and diary at Churchill College 
Cambridge were searched which proved to be a disappointment as little information 
is provided on the affair.  This is in addition to the published diary entries of Sir 
Evelyn Shuckburgh (the Foreign Secretary’s Principal Private Secretary 1951-54 
and the FO’s Under-Secretary overseeing Middle Eastern affairs 1954-56) known as 
Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-1956: Evelyn Shuckburgh and his unpublished work at 
the University of Birmingham.  Shuckburgh’s work provided insight onto Eden’s 
reaction to events as they unfolded.  An account of a diary in Arabic kept by Al-
Shamlan, a frontline member of the nationalist party was collected and published in 
Arabic by the late Bahraini journalist Khalid Al-Bassam.  The diary entitled Exile 
Diaries: Abdul-Aziz Al-Shamlan in Saint Helena 1956-1961 was collected from Al-
Shamlan in the 1980s but was only published in 2007 by Al-Bassam.  The published 
diary started in late December 1956 and ended in March 1959 though the title might 
give a prima facie case that it lasted until 1961 since the editor filled the gap years 
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with general information.  The diary focused primarily on events following the 
Party’s downfall and presented little information of the events under review here.  
Other personal archives of British personalities who impacted the 
nationalists, were involved in and/or adopted the campaign to free its exiled 
members such as Barbara Ann Castle, Nevill Barbour, VA Wight-Boycott, Reginald 
Paget, and Donald Chesworth’s, were observed.  These did not contain any new 
information of value.  Additionally, Hansard’s record of debates at the House of 
Lords (HL) and House of Commons (HC) were searched.  The debates provided an 
insight on how some British politicians viewed the conflict in Bahrain.  However 
most of the debates occurred during the final months of the Movement and 
following the exile of three of the Party’s members.  Documented oral projects on 
the Suez War or with British diplomats that included interviews with personalities 
who offered insight on the Bahraini conflict, such as Churchill College Cambridge’s 
The British Diplomatic Oral History Programme and King’s College London’s Suez 
Oral History Project, 1956, were also reviewed.   
Newspapers from the era under study were examined.  First, the archive of 
nationalist press from the 1950s which consisted of articles by members and 
supporters of the Bahraini Movement that included the magazine known as Sawut 
Al-Bahrain (The Voice of Bahrain) and biweekly newspapers such as Al-Qafilah (The 
Caravan), Al-Watan (The Nation), and Al-Mizan (The Scale).  The archives of those 
publications are available at Isa Cultural Centre (ICC) in Bahrain.  Second, archives 
of international press, including The Manchester Guardian/The Guardian, The Times, 
The Observer, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, The Spectator, Reynold’s News, the New 
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York Times, Chicago Sun-Times, and The Economist were consulted.  International 
press interest in the conflict was dominantly noticeable following the stoning of 
Lloyd’s car and the subsequent events. 
Rare interviews and articles on the Movement and its personalities were also 
inspected from modern Bahraini out-of-print or existing newspapers post the 1950s 
that were collected personally or were available at the ICC or in the Abdullah Al-
Zayed House for Bahraini Press Heritage and Extension in Bahrain.  In relation to 
the court hearings on the exiled members of the Movement in St Helena, available 
information was viewed from the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for 
England and Wales, the British and Irish Legal Information Institute, and FO and 
Colonial Office (CO) papers at TNA.  The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting’s 
papers included detailed information on the proceedings themselves.  The FO’s 
papers concentrated mostly on the political aspect of the case and the CO’s papers 
focused mostly on details of the proceedgins, with repeated information on the 
Movement’s background, arrests in Bahrain, and deportation to St Helena.  
Additionally the CO’s papers included affidavits for witnesses related to the case. 
 Correspondences among Western policy makers were also investigated 
either through TNA’s archives or from published ones, such as The Churchill-
Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955 and The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 
1955-1957.  Finally, republished government documents from the British Documents 
of the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) were also examined vis-à-vis British policy and 
activities in the region during the period under review.  Other documents relating to 
regional events and policy were also searched at TNA.  Additional republished 
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international documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
series and Documents on International Affairs 1956 were inspected.   
 The transliteration of Arabic names in the thesis is adapted from modern 
usage.  An effort was also made to use the accepted transliteration of family names 
as adopted by each family’s descendants in Bahrain.  In addition, personalities 
mentioned here are referred to by their last names.  However common usage 
declares that sometimes certain figures in the Arab World are referred to by their 
first names (e.g. ‘Nuri Al-Saeed’ as ‘Nuri’).   
 It is intended that this thesis will fill in the gap of public knowledge about the 
political struggle that took place in Bahrain from 1953 to 1957.  It must be said that 
this has been a long quest to find substantive answers to the questions raised 
around this complex moment in the long history of Bahrain.  
It would not have been possible for this thesis to have been brought to light 
without the assistance, support, and guidance of numerous people.  I extend my 
gratitude to my supervisor Professor John Charmley for his support and direction.  I 
also offer my appreciation to Professor Cathie Carmichael for her support and the 
University of East Anglia for awarding me a studentship during my period of study. 
 I would also like to thank a number of universities, archives, and institutions 
for their assistance in retrieving documents necessary for my research.  I am deeply 
grateful to the following individuals: Dr Rosie Llewellyn-Jones, Archivist at the Royal 
Society for Asian Affairs; Paul Hastings and Helen Yates at the Incorporated Council 
of Law Reporting; Catherine Martin, Martin Killeen, Helen Fisher, and Vicky Clubb at 
the Cadbury Research Library in the University of Birmingham.  Further, I extend 
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King’s College London; and Tina and Nicholas Hampson for their archival assistance 
at The National Archives in Kew, Richmond.  
 I also extend my gratitude and appreciation to Dr Abdulla Al-Sulaiti for 
allowing me to access his personal collection.  The following institutions have also 
generously allowed me access to their archives and libraries.  I thank the staff 
working at The National Archives, British Library, University of Exeter, University of 
Cambridge, Churchill College Cambridge, Imperial War Museums, Isa Cultural 
Centre in Bahrain, and the Bahrain Petroleum Company’s Library.  Finally, I would 
like to thank my family for their patience, their confidence in me, and their financial 
support over the years. 
 
 
 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla xvii 
     The islands of Bahrain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced from Charles Belgrave, Personal Column (Beirut: 1972) 
 
 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The political struggle between Bahrain’s Administration, represented by the 
person of the British Adviser Sir Charles Belgrave, and the political movement of the 
1950s offered a unique look into Britain’s role and policy in a state under British 
protection.  Regional political transformations and fear of the Soviet expansion that 
led Britain on the road to the Suez debacle cast shadows on the internal politics of 
Bahrain.   
The driving force behind Bahrain’s mid-twentieth century nationalist 
movement of the 1950s was that of an esprit de corps based on Arab unity and 
nationalism.  The British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir 
William Strang in a letter to Sir Thomas Lloyd as early as June 1952 noted his views 
on ‘The problem of nationalism’.  Strang defined nationalism  
as the emotions of a people or group of people primarily in backward 
or ‘new’ countries seeking to assert their national aspirations.  These 
can often but by no means invariably be fulfilled only at the expense of 
the older Western Powers. 
 
He further added that nationalism centered on ‘internal discontent and the need to 
find a scapegoat or distraction’.8  The scapegoat and person the nationalists would 
lay their wrath on in Bahrain would become the person of the Adviser. 
                                                        
8 British Documents of the End of Empire (BDEEP), Series A, Part I, vol. 3, ‘The Conservative 
Government and the End of Empire’, 1951-1957.   Doc. 4: CO 936/217, [The problem of nationalism]: 
letter from Sir W Strang to Sir T Lloyd, Enclosure: FO Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee paper, 
21 June 1952.   
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In order to understand the nature of Bahrain’s political scene in the mid-
twentieth century, it is imperative to provide a brief overview of Bahrain, its social 
composition, British-Bahraini relations, British representation in the region, how 
the position of the Adviser developed as occupied by Belgrave, and the rise of 
regional nationalist elements that provided the perfect environment for the rise of 
the nationalist movement of the 1950s. 
  The archipelago consisting of the islands of the modern Kingdom of Bahrain 
lies in the heart of the Arabian Gulf.9  Bahrain consists of thirty-three islands.  The 
main and largest island in the archipelago is named as Bahrain and is home to the 
country’s capital city of Manama.  The islands’ geographically neighbours are Saudi 
Arabia to the West and Qatar to the Southeast.  
The country is home to a diverse population of Arabs (Muslim Sunnis), 
Baharna (Arab Muslim Shi’ites), Hawala (Arab Sunnis who were in constant 
migration and travel between the two sides of the Arabian Gulf shores) and Persians 
(majority of whom are Shi’ites).  Bahrain is also home to a minority of Jews and 
Christians.  Sunni-Shi’ite relations, marked by occasional tensions between the two 
sides, are a significant feature of the era in Bahrain’s political scene of the period 
under study in the thesis.10   
The ruling family in Bahrain is the Al-Khalifas who originated from the Nejd 
in the Arabian Peninsula and were among a group of Sunni families known as the 
                                                        
9 Throughout the current thesis, ‘Arabian Gulf’ is adopted in reference to the Persian Gulf. 
10 The closest census conducted in relation to the time period of the thesis was in 1950.  According to 
the census the population of Bahrain including foreigners was 109,650.  The census did not assess 
the Sunni to Shi’ite ratio.  See ‘Government of Bahrain: Annual Report for Year 1369 (October 1949-
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Utobs.  The Al-Khalifas conquered Bahrain, which was then governed by Nasir Al-
Mathkoor, in 1783 under the command of Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa, 
known by all in Bahrain as Ahmed Al-Fateh (the Conqueror).11   
Britain’s incursion into the Arabian Gulf came through its establishment of a 
residency for its East India Company in 1763 for the purpose of trade.  The 
harassment of British ships in the Gulf’s waters encouraged it to impose its 
authority on the region by the use of force and through a series of treaties with the 
Arab sheikhdoms.12  From 1820 to 1971 Bahrain was bound by treaties with Britain, 
the first, signed in 1820, was known as the General Treaty and was also signed by 
various sheikhdoms in the region.  It included, inter alia, the outlaw of piracy, the 
establishment of peaceful relations between the sheikhdoms and the British 
Government, and the registration of ships.13  The second treaty was signed in 1861 
and was made directly between the Ruler of Bahrain and the British Government.  It 
called on Bahrain to abstain ‘from the prosecution of war, piracy, and slavery by sea’ 
and was tied to a British offer to protect the islands from external aggression.  The 
treaty also granted the special treatment of British subjects, trade, and it specified 
tax duties.14  A new agreement, which restricted Bahrain’s foreign relations, was 
                                                        
11 M. Gazal, Tarikh Al-Utob Al-Khalifa fi Al-Bahrain min 1700 ila 1970 [The History of Al-Utobs Al-
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12 W.R. Hay, The Persian Gulf (Washington: 1959), 11-12; and P. Risso, ‘Cross-Cultural Perceptions of 
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Eighteenth Century’, Journal of World History, 12.2, 293-319 (314-15). 
13 India Office Records (IOR)/L/PS/20/C158D, General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian 
Gulf-1820, 23 February 1820. 
14 IOR/L/PS/20/C158D, Terms of a Friendly Convention Entered into between Shaikh Mohamed bin 
Khalifah, Independents Ruler of Bahrain, on the Part of Himself and Successors, and Captain Felix 
Jones, Her Majesty’s Indian Navy, Political Resident of Her Britannic Majesty in the Gulf of Persia, on 
the Part of the British Government, 1861. 
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signed in 1880.  The treaty forbade Bahrain from holding treaties with foreign states 
without the British Government’s prior approval.  In addition, Bahrain was not 
allowed to let any other state establish a consulate without British consent.15  The 
treaty was followed by another in 1892 that added a further clause in which Bahrain 
would forbid the sale or occupation of its property to other foreign states, apart 
from Britain.16  
With these treaties Bahrain became part of Britain’s informal empire, a 
phrase traced to Dr CR Fay in the Cambridge History of the British Empire in 1940.  
The phrase was further explored and developed by historians John Gallagher and 
Ronald Robinson in their article The Imperialism of Free Trade in 1953.  Gallagher 
and Robison believed that Britain’s industrialisation ‘necessitated linking 
underdeveloped areas with British foreign trade’ with a policy of extending power 
to these regions ‘informally if possible and formally if necessary’.17  Informal empire 
as viewed by historian Ian Brown can be 
characterized as a deliberate attempt on the part of a metropolitan 
power to determine the economic policies of another state in its own 
interests by any means short of out-right annexation.18   
 
The Persian Gulf Residency administered the affairs of the Arab Gulf States 
under British protection.  The head of the Residency (the Resident) oversaw the 
operation of his representatives in the Gulf and handled with His/Her Majesty’s 
                                                        
15 IOR/L/PS/20/C158D, Translation of Agreement Signed by the Chief of Bahrain, 22 December 
1880. 
16 IOR/L/PS/20/C158D, Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the British Government, 
13 March 1892. 
17 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review, 6.1, 
(1953), 1-15 (7 and 13).  
18 I. Brown, ‘British Financial Advisers in Siam in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn’, Modern Asian 
Studies, 12.2, (1978), 193-215 (214). 
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Government’s (HMG) policy in the region.  The representatives who reported to the 
Residency were known as Political Agents and each maintained his own personal 
staff headquartered in the Political Agency.  The Agents interacted with the rulers, 
each responsible for his designated region.  The Agency was also responsible for the 
affairs and wellbeing of the people who came under HMG’s responsibility.  The 
Residency’s offices moved from Bushire in southwest Persia to Juffair in Bahrain in 
1946.19  According to former Resident Sir William Rupert Hay, the Residency 
following India’s independence in 1947, was considered to be ‘subordinate to the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London’.  The Resident enjoyed the status of 
that of an ambassador.20  Both the Residency and Agency would later play a role as 
mediators between the Bahraini Administration and nationalist movement.   
A report despatched by the British Resident in the Gulf Stuart G Knox to Sir 
Denys de S Bray, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, elaborated 
further on the circumstances and steps taken towards political reform in Bahrain 
that led to Belgrave’s appointment.  Reform was initially imposed following a fight 
that broke out between a group of Nejdis, dominantly Sunnis originating from the 
centre of the Arabian Peninsula, and Persian Shi’ites on 10 May 1923.  The fighting 
developed alarmingly into a Sunni-Shi’ite quarrel throughout the islands that 
demanded British interference on the ground three days later.  It was estimated that 
five died during the clashes.  The incident provided a pretext to the Residency to 
force the seventy-five-year-old Ruler of Bahrain His Highness (HH) Sheikh Isa bin 
Ali Al-Khalifa to step down and allow his son to take over for the purpose of 
                                                        
19 TNA, FO 371/98459, A.D.M. Ross at FO, 26 March 1952. 
20 Hay, The Persian Gulf, 19. 
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introducing reform.  As a result of British pressure, the Ruler’s eldest son HH Sheikh 
Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa became the new head of the Sheikhdom in 1923.  Knox 
believed that with this new and young leadership, ‘Bahrain should not be left 
without a good Englishman in charge’ who ‘should be prepared to stay’ and 
understand how matters function on the islands.21  Early reform was sought in the 
capacity of management of the country’s finances, the reorganisation of customs, the 
establishment of government offices in Manama, and a survey of the islands as 
proposed by Bahrain’s Political Agent Clive Kirkpatrick Daly.22 
The Residency contemplated on the position, title, and overall 
responsibilities of the Englishman to be in charge of affairs in Bahrain.  One of the 
initial proposals was to hire an assistant to the Political Agent.  Daly proposed that 
the assistant be paid directly by Bahrain, a view that was not encouraged by 
Resident Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur P Trevor.23  The idea of an assistant to the 
Political Agent never materialised as an initiative from the Residency.  However in 
1925, it took on a different form when the Ruler of Bahrain Sheikh Hamad asked 
Daly to assist him to recruit a British officer to work for his Government in the 
capacity of Financial Adviser.  The idea for the position was possibly inspired by an 
earlier experiment in which the Englishman Bertram Thomas was hired by the 
Sultan of Muscat and Oman to administer the Sultanate’s finances, as Resident 
Francis B Prideaux noted.24  To aid the process of searching for the right candidate, 
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an advertisement in the ‘Personal Column’ section of The Times of London was 
placed in 1925.  The advertisement sought the services of a man aged between 
twenty-two and twenty-eight with minimum education to work for an unspecified 
eastern state.  The advertisement caught the attention of Charles Belgrave, a thirty-
one-year-old British officer who was in London at the time on leave from service in 
East Africa and he decided to forward his résumé.25   
Belgrave was called to an interview in London by the Gulf’s Resident 
Prideaux.  The Resident confirmed to the India Office’s Political Department that 
Belgrave was on leave from Tanganyika in East Africa.  He also noted some of 
Belgrave’s skills that included a command of Arabic, Swahili, and French.  Belgrave 
was chosen as the most suitable candidate for the job and was informed by Prideaux 
that he was to be posted and would come under the pay of Bahrain.26  There seemed 
to have been some confusion in relation to Belgrave’s age, since the advertisement 
required a man in his twenties while Belgrave was in his thirties.  The confusion 
deliberate or not was justified by Belgrave to Prideaux in a letter dated 11 
September 1925.  He apologised for what had apparently been a misunderstanding 
on his part about his age, as he said that he had thought he was twenty-eight years 
old but when he got a hold of his birth certificate it was apparent to him that he was 
born in 1894.27   
Belgrave’s résumé presented with his application provided an overview of 
his career prior to his appointment in Tanganyika.  For his education, Belgrave 
                                                        
25 C.D. Belgrave, Personal Column, (Beirut: 1972), 7-9. 
26 IOR/R/15/2/128, Residency to India Office Political Department, 15 September 1925. 
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attended Bedford School and was later enrolled at Lincoln College, Oxford, for a 
semester.  He was unable to further his education as he enrolled to serve his country 
in the 1914-18 First World War.  Belgrave joined the Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
in February 1915 and received training until August when he was assigned to the 
British Camel Company in Sudan.  In early 1917 he was stationed in Egypt and 
Palestine.  After the war he was appointed to his first administrative post in 1920 as 
a Political Officer and Judicial Officer in the Siwa Oasis in the west of Egypt.28  
Belgrave was the son of a barrister-at-law named Dalrymple James Belgrave who 
died on 2 May 1922.29   
 A draft of the agreement to appoint Belgrave was created to be signed 
between him and the Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Hamad.  The initial period of 
employment was for four years.30  Prideaux outlined to the Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India what responsibilities Belgrave was required to undertake.  
Though the official title of Belgrave would be the Financial Adviser to the 
Government of Bahrain, he would ‘work as Personal Assistant to Shaikh Hamad’.  He 
would further be instructed to supervise administrative work of the state.31   
Before his departure from London for Bahrain, Belgrave married through his 
family’s association Marjorie Lepel Barrett-Lennard, a Baron’s daughter, in early 
1926.32  Her brother, Sir Richard Barrett-Lennard, served as a Director of Norwich 
Union insurance company and who (through Belgrave and a Bahraini merchant) 
                                                        
28 IOR/R/15/1/362, Belgrave’s Résumé. 
29 ‘Obituary: Dalrymple James Belgrave’, The Times, 4 May 1922, 1. 
30 IOR/R/15/1/362, Memorandum of Agreement between the Ruler of Bahrain and Belgrave. 
31 IOR/R/15/2/128, Residency to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 10 October 1925. 
32 Belgrave, Personal Column, 11. 
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helped to establish representation to the company in Bahrain.33  Belgrave and his 
newly-wedded wife arrived in Bahrain on 31 March 1926.34  The official 
appointment of Belgrave by the Government of Bahrain addressed to the Political 
Agency was dated 12 April 1926.35  Belgrave borrowed the name of The Times 
advertisement section as the title for his published memoir on Bahrain, Personal 
Column. 
 The initial contract of four years in service to Bahrain’s Government became 
three decades.  Belgrave’s presence was felt early as was documented by the 
Political Agent in Bahrain, Captain CG Prior, to the Secretary to the Resident in 1929.  
Reforms undertaken by Belgrave in the first three years of his service were 
summarised by Prior into the following points: his control of expenditure; the 
reorganisation of customs; the reformation of courts; the organisation of the pearl 
industry; the establishment of a Land Department with a survey of Bahrain in the 
process of completion; the development of the Police Force (the Adviser also 
assumed the title of Police Commandant); the development of a Public Works 
Department (with the intention of installing electricity soon); the organisation of 
Waqfs;36 the establishment of a municipality on Muharraq Island; and the 
establishment of the first girls’ school.  With the rate of developments that took 
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place turning Bahrain from a sheikhdom to a modernised state, Prior believed ‘that 
it will be impossible to dispense with Mr Belgrave’.37    
 Before the discovery of oil in commercial amounts in 1932 in Bahrain, the 
state was known mainly for its pearl industry and the employment of its youth in 
the trade.  Bahraini pearl merchants sold their wares in, Mumbai, London, and Paris.  
The development of the oil industry, the arrival on the market of cultured pearls 
from Japan, the modernisation of Bahrain, and the establishment of foreign 
companies caused the pearl industry to decline and gradually to close.38 
 Belgrave’s management of the Administration led to centralisation of power 
and the title he adopted in government correspondences was the Adviser instead of 
the Financial Adviser.  This centralisation earned him titles like the ‘de facto Prime 
Minister’ of Bahrain and its ‘chief executive’.39  His tight grip on the state’s affairs 
and Administration resulted in discontent as early as 1934 and was noticeable in 
early 1935.  It was the Baharna who voiced their disapproval of some of the 
Administration’s policies as Belgrave outlined to the Political Agent Colonel Loch.  
Two figures from among the protesters would later become frontline members of 
the nationalist movement of the 1950s: Abd-Ali Al-Alaiwat and Mohsin Al-Tajir.40  
Their demands centered on three issues, the first being the reform of courts, 
‘Proportional Representation on the Municipal Councils’ of Manama and Muharraq, 
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and improved education facilities, as summarised by Resident Lieutenant-Colonel 
Trenchard Fowle.41   
 Although the demands of the mid-1930s faded as they were poorly 
supported, they returned in a different form in 1938.  Again the Baharna issued a set 
of demands that included the establishment of a Legislative Committee, reform of 
the Police Force, reform of courts, the termination of the services of the Education 
Department’s Inspector, dismissal of two Shi’ite Sharia (Islamic law) judges, and the 
declaration of Sheikh Salman as heir-apparent, as the Ruler had yet to publically 
proclaim a successor.42  In the same year, a movement from among the Sunnis rose 
in Bahrain.  It was led by Ali bin Khalifa Al-Fadhel, Ebrahim bin Abdulla Kamal, 
Ahmed Al-Shirawi, and Saad Al-Shamlan.  The last member was the father of Abdul-
Aziz Al-Shamlan, the frontline member of the political movement of the mid-
twentieth century.  According to Belgrave in Bahrain’s annual government report 
for the year 1938, the Sunnis had unsuccessfully attempted to unite Sunnis and 
Shi’ites in a single political front.  The Shi’ites, however, ‘were not drawn into the 
affair’ as the Adviser declared.  The demands centered on, inter alia, the formation of 
a Legislative Council, reform in the judiciary system, and the establishment of a 
committee to supervise the education department.43  The nationalists of the 1950s 
were to echo these demands.  The Movement was overpowered by the 
Administration and its ringleaders were arrested.    
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Britain’s Political Agent Hugh Weightman noted to the Residency the 
possible causes for the rise of the Movement.  He highlighted the rise in nationalism 
among newly-educated Bahraini youth though its ideals had arrived late to the 
islands, the formation of a Legislative Council in Kuwait and disturbances in Dubai 
both in 1938, the reduction in size of BAPCO’s local labour force, the collapse of the 
pearl industry, and the subsequent bankruptcies among merchants.44  In addition to 
the demands publically presented (according to the Political Agent’s unnamed 
informant) the supporters of the Movement in 1938 did not wish to see Belgrave 
remain in Bahrain or, if he did so, for his duties to be limited to the financial aspect 
of the Administration.45 
 The period of the 1939-45 Second World War and shortly after witnessed a 
time of internal political stability in Bahrain.  Sheikh Hamad the Ruler of Bahrain 
died at the age of seventy on 20 February 1942.46  His eldest son, HH Sheikh Salman 
bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, had been declared his successor by his father and he was 
recognised as the Ruler of Bahrain by HMG.47  The role of the new Ruler would 
become significant during the rise and fall of the political movement in the 1950s, as 
will be made clear later in this thesis.   
The decision in 1947 by Britain to withdraw from Palestine and the 
subsequent United Nations’ (UN) partition of Palestine had an effect on Bahrain and 
demonstrations ran rampant.  Trouble in Bahrain occurred on 4 and 5 December 
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1947.  A group of men who labelled themselves as the Popular Front, a majority of 
whom were Sunnis, played a role in the events that were associated with the 
disturbances in support of the Palestinian cause.  Others in Bahrain joined the 
demonstrations that turned into a riot.  In relation to the disturbance at least three 
of the organisers named by Belgrave became prominent or founding members of the 
later nationalist movement.  They were Abdul-Aziz Al-Shamlan, Mahmood Al-Mardi, 
and Mohammed Qassim Al-Shirawi.48   
British officials in Bahrain considered as early as 1946 the position of 
Belgrave.  Resident Hay noted to EP Donaldson at the India Office that Belgrave 
would turn fifty-five years of age in late 1949 and that Britain’s policy ought to 
‘ensure that he goes then if nothing has induced him to retire earlier’.49  Further, 
Hay sensed that Belgrave had intended to have his only son James Hamad Belgrave 
groomed to take over his responsibilities as Adviser.50  Although the Resident 
credited Belgrave for masterminding the development of Bahrain, he believed that 
Belgrave had failed to keep up with the changing times and was too deeply attached 
to the ancien regime.51   
 In Bahrain, 1950s saw the return from Qatar of Abdul-Rahman Al-Bakir who, 
in the view of this thesis, became the principal orchestrator of the nationalist 
movement.  Al-Bakir was born in Bahrain in 1917.  From there he traveled to 
various places, including Qatar, Dubai, and Africa and worked as an employee at 
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BAPCO in 1936.52  In his memoir Al-Bakir claimed that after a short stay in Bahrain 
in the late 1940s he returned to Qatar in 1949 to participate in the establishment of 
a construction company there.  He would visit Bahrain on a monthly basis until 1952 
when he settled back there.53  He did not elaborate further on the reason of his 
permanent departure from Qatar.  Al-Bakir’s work and activities prompted Charles 
Gault, the then Political Agent in 1956, to search through his records.  Gault revealed 
that Al-Bakir before his return to Bahrain had actually worked as an ice merchant in 
Doha, Qatar.  During his stay in Doha a sharp dispute arose between him and a 
member of the Qatari ruling family in June 1952, as Al-Bakir refused to sell more ice 
than the allocated portions assigned during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.  
Angered by his own relative’s conduct, the Ruler of Qatar banished the royal 
miscreant to Saudi Arabia and Al-Bakir fled to Bahrain.54  In Bahrain, Al-Bakir 
immediately engaged himself in political activity, initially seeking to form a labour 
union.  The sectarian clash of 1953 in Bahrain between Sunnis and Shi’ites gave Al-
Bakir the perfect opportunity to unite both fronts and establish a politically-
oriented party.  
 The internal situation in Bahrain was ripe for such an organisation to appear 
as regional transformations were taking place.  Dr Mohammed Mosaddegh, the 
Prime Minister of Iran, nationalised Iranian oil in 1951 and the Free Officers’ 
Movement in Egypt launched a coup d’état that overthrew King Farouk in 1952.  The 
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United States’ (US) intelligence services came in contact early with some of the 
members of the Free Officers even before the King’s deposition.  It included a 
meeting conducted between Kermit Roosevelt the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) Head of Middle East Operations and Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the principal 
mastermind of the Movement.55  Jefferson Caffery, the US Ambassador to Egypt, 
referred to the officers as ‘his “boys”’.56  Initially the officers’ selected Major-General 
Mohammed Naguib as the Movement’s figurehead.57  Nasser and Naguib would later 
quarrel over power, as outlined in this thesis, and Bahrainis followed with interest 
the outcome of the Egyptian struggle.  
Further, confessions on the nature of the ties between the two sides were 
revealed through the published work of former American intelligence operatives 
like Miles Copeland, Wilbur Eveland, and Archie Roosevelt.58  As Egypt experienced 
political instability following the Second World War and the 1948-49 First Arab-
Israeli War, the coup’s goals, inter alia, were to stabilise Egypt, reduce the landlords’ 
influence, reduce the influence of the Parliament that featured candidates supported 
by the US, Britain, and the Soviets, and to reduce the influence of radical elements 
from Egyptian society that included the theocratic Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
Movement and Communists.  Furthermore, Copeland added that the Americans 
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aimed to create a ‘Moslem Billy Graham’ who would hold immeasurable powers that 
would enable him to execute ‘unpopular decisions’, one of which would be peace 
with the Israelis.59   
According to the Egyptian writer and novelist Tawfiq Al-Hakim, Nasser 
claimed to have been influenced by his novel The Return of the Spirit published in 
1933.  The novel was set during the Egyptian revolution against the British in 1919.  
It revolved around the search for a hero or a saviour for Egypt.60  Similarly it was Al-
Hakim who labeled the Free Officers’ Movement following Farouk’s overthrow as 
the ‘blessed movement’.61  As Nasser solidified his position, other nationalist 
movements in the Arab World came under the influence and support of Egypt.  Sir 
Bernard Burrows, the Gulf’s Resident from 1953 to 1958, who played a role in 
Bahrain’s internal conflict during the rise of the 1950s movement noted: 
the themes of Arab unity and liberation from Western imperialism 
carry some mystical power among the younger and more idealistic 
members of society and command at least lip service from the rest.62 
 
During the period under study Nasser avoided ‘direct aggression’ with other Arab 
States but adopted a policy of ‘infiltration and sudden revolution’.63     
In Wilbur Eveland’s view Britain linked K Roosevelt’s cooperation with 
Nasser as the CIA aided him with finances to initiate trouble in the Arabian Gulf 
States.64  In an interview with Nasser, British Ambassador to Egypt Humphrey 
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Trevelyan claimed that Nasser had informed him that ‘that the accusations about his 
activities against the British in Aden and Bahrain were groundless’.  Trevelyan did 
not accept Nasser’s views, as he believed that ‘Representatives of extremist parties 
in both were received in Cairo and we believed that they were given material 
support’.65  The thesis will examine the relation between the Bahraini nationalist 
movement and Nasser’s Egypt to explore the extent of the support (if it existed) and 
if the Party really was influenced or its activities were dictated by Cairo.   
Nasser was soon to turn to the Soviets for support, gradually ending his 
honeymoon with the Americans, as he adopted a policy of ‘positive neutrality’ in the 
Cold War.66  Egypt’s turn towards the East was felt and admired through nationalist 
press, circulars, and actions in Bahrain, as this thesis presents.  With the 
materialisation of the West’s Northern Tier concept to defend the Middle East from 
Soviet aggression into the Baghdad Pact arena, divisions intensified regionally as 
Egypt opposed the Pact that included Iraq.  Whilst Bahrain aimed to strengthen its 
Police Force with the recruitment of Iraqi officers, the political party strongly 
opposed the decision as this thesis illustrates.   
A lot was at stake for Britain as it tried to deal with its own ally’s (the US) 
intrigues, Soviet penetration into the Middle East, and nationalist forces.  All three 
threatened Britain’s position in the Middle East arena.  In Sir Edward Grigg’s view, 
the Middle East was ‘a region of life-and-death consequence for Britain and the 
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British Empire’.67  Further, the strategic importance of the Middle East to Britain is 
summarised into four points: its air bases; the production and supply of oil; serving 
as ‘a centre for communications’; and serving as a defensive barrier against Soviet 
penetration into Africa.68  Eden believed during the peak of trouble in Bahrain in 
March 1956 that Britain’s position in the Middle East and policy was to be ‘founded 
on the need to protect our oil interests in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf’ as it was 
clearly coming under threat and exploitation.69  
 This thesis explores the background, development, and fall of the nationalist 
party and seeks to answer a number of questions: what was British policy like 
throughout the different stages of the Movement?  During the crisis was Belgrave an 
instrument for the British or did his actions harm Britain?  How were relations 
between the nationalist movement and the British in Bahrain?  Was the Movement 
inspired or driven by Nasser’s Egypt? 
 To answer these questions, this thesis is accordingly divided into four parts 
in chronological order of events.  Each part consists of two chapters with the 
exception of the first part which consists of three.  The thesis is designed such that 
the events that took place in Bahrain are discussed in parallel to macro-events that 
occurred during the same time period as it influenced developments in Bahrain.  
These global events included the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the formation of the 
Baghdad Pact and its repercussions, the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal, Egypt’s move 
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towards the Soviet sphere, the Suez Crisis, and the Cold War.  As the title of the 
thesis suggests, the thesis covers the time period highlighted by sectarian tensions 
and the earliest political initiatives by the nationalist movement’s founder in 1953 
to address certain grievances until the departure of Belgrave in April 1957.  
Additionally, an overview of the proceedings that involved three exiled members of 
the Movement was also presented in the thesis. 
Chapter One discusses the background and sectarian tensions of the 1950s in 
Bahrain setting the scene for the major conflict of 1953.  This is followed by an 
examination of Al-Bakir’s earliest initiatives and political manoeuvring driven by his 
desire to form a trade union in addition to his attempted interaction with British 
politicians visiting Bahrain as early as January 1953.  Details of the sectarian Sunni-
Shi’ite clash of September 1953 are presented as they provided Al-Bakir with the 
pretext to endeavour to unite both Sunni and Shi’ite fronts and turn a social 
movement into a politically-oriented one.  Chapter Two surveys the growth of 
nationalist agitation against foreign-owned-or-operated companies and the attack 
on Bahrain’s Police Fort by demonstrators.  The nationalists aimed to strengthen 
unity amongst Bahrainis putting their disputes aside and a petition by locals for 
reform was forwarded to the Ruler.  Chapter Three traces the spark that led to a 
public gathering by Bahrainis that resulted in the founding of the nationalist 
movement.   
 In Part Two of the thesis, Chapter Four covers a time period characterised by 
the formation of regional defensive pacts and the formation of government 
committees in Bahrain.  Additionally, Eden’s brief visit to Bahrain and early British 
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policy towards the Movement is revealed.  Nasser’s unexpected stop off in Bahrain 
when returning from the Bandung Conference in March 1955 signalled the 
commencement of an era highlighted by the Soviet penetration into the region as 
the chapter highlights.  The alignment of the Bahraini nationalists with Nasser’s 
ideals and turn to the East was characterised by their call to raise funds in support 
of Egypt’s purchase of arms from the Soviets, as Chapter Five presents.  
 Chapter Six of Part Three of this thesis explores the nationalist movement’s 
peak as it decisively won the Education Council’s elections.  The chapter also reflects 
on the dismissal of Sir John Bagot Glubb Pasha as Head of the Arab Legion in Jordan 
and the ramifications this had for Bahrain, including the stoning of Lloyd’s car 
convoy which followed.  Moreover, demands were made calling for Belgrave’s 
dismissal.  Chapter Seven investigates how a trivial dispute in Manama’s vegetable 
market turned into a major riot, an indication of the level of tension in the country.  
The incident was followed by a strike and official recognition of the political party 
by the Government of Bahrain.  This time period, featured in Part Three, offers a 
unique look at how the British Cabinet dealt with the nationalists and how they 
approached the Belgrave question.   
 Chapter Eight of Part Four explores how British policy makers pressed 
Bahrain towards creating a dignified exit for the Adviser.  This incident was 
followed by Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.  Al-Bakir’s absence 
from Bahrain and comments to the press was closely monitored as the chapter 
assesses.  Furthermore, the Party’s decision to form a paramilitary organisation in 
the form of a Scouts movement is examined as it alarmed British officials in Bahrain.  
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The riots that began with the start of the Suez War led to a state of widespread 
chaos throughout the islands.  British forces intervened, and supporters of the 
Movement were arrested.  The final chapter in the thesis covers the trials of five 
frontline members of the Party in Bahrain, the exile of three to St Helena, their 
appeals for a habeas corpus, and Belgrave’s departure.    
 
 
Historiography 
The history and development of the crisis that unfolded between Bahrain’s 
Administration represented in the person of Belgrave and the nationalist movement 
of the 1950s has not received thorough attention in light of the greater Cold War 
narrative in the Middle Eastern arena.  This might be attributed to other concurrent 
events that had foreshadowed it such as the rise of Nasser and the Free Officers’ 
Movement, the evacuation treaty between Egypt and Britain, the Egyptian-Israeli 
border tensions, the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal, the sacking of Glubb Pasha in 
Jordan, and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.   
It must also be said that Bahraini and Arab historians who have investigated 
the conflict failed to link local developments to the wider context of the Cold War 
and turned the topic instead into a purely local development inspired by Egypt.  
Consequently, British policy in Bahrain seemed either ambiguous or based on the 
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historians’ own assumptions and/or political orientation as this Historiography 
presents.70   
Another error in which historians in Bahrain and the Arab World fall into 
when recounting events is based on their reliance on only three sources: those being 
the memoir and diary of Belgrave; Al-Bakir’s memoir; and (to a lesser extent) on 
selected republished FO documents.  In some cases, although little information on 
the conflict was presented, Al-Bakir’s memoir was heavily utilised and his claims 
were presented without questioning their validity.  Those historians have, therefore, 
denied themselves access to a wealth of information on the topic found in other 
sources, such as the FO documents at TNA including inter alia British Cabinet 
papers, memoirs and diaries of British Cabinet members and officials in Bahrain, 
memoirs of travellers, and international newspapers. 
Some of the earliest traces of the foundation and influences on the Movement 
in Bahrain have been covered, in particular the rise of nationalist activities such as 
Mosaddegh’s nationalisation of Iranian oil.71  As a consequence of this action Britain 
suffered, as historian Douglas Farnie puts it, its ‘greatest blow ever inflicted on the 
British economic empire in the Middle East’.72  Bahrainis’ fascination with 
Mosaddegh was evident as he was viewed as a saviour and ‘in the early part of 1953 
pictures of him could be seen in many shops in Manamah’, observed Arab-American 
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historian Fahim Qubain.73  But it was the Egyptian coup d’état of 23 July 1952, later 
named as the Revolution of 1952, that ‘took the British by surprise’, which gradually 
inflamed nationalist aspirations throughout the Arab World.74  These two events -- 
Iran’s nationalisation of its oil industry and the Egyptian coup -- ‘shaped Middle 
Eastern developments’, as Diane Kunz perceived and Bahrain was no different.75   
A key event in the evolution of the nationalist movement in Bahrain was a 
sectarian clash that occurred between Sunnis and Shi’ites in September 1953.  
Western historians had ignored the details of this event when tracing the history 
and development of the nationalist party.  Bahraini and Arab historians failed to 
investigate it thoroughly.  Despite the little information presented about this event, 
some were quick to blame British policy for it.  Bahraini historian Rashid Al-Jassim 
pointed the finger at the British for igniting sectarian tensions and claimed that, 
‘imperialism and its aides spread agitation and intrigue’ during the month that the 
conflict had unfolded.76  Arab historian Noor-el-Deen Hajlawi reiterated a similar 
view and reckoned that ‘the British benefited from the sectarian tensions to their 
gains, in order to undermine any nationalist movement’.77   
Iraqi historian Ebrahim Al-Aubaidi laid the blame on the Bahraini 
Administration.  He contended that the ‘ruling regime did not stand still but rather 
sought to seek revenge by igniting sectarian tensions again so as to distract those 
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 © Hamad E. Abdulla 24 
with unimportant matters’.  Al-Aubaidi further argued that ‘Belgrave personally 
took part and encouraged such events’.78  The accusations of blaming the British 
policy or Belgrave for a long-standing dispute like Sunni-Shi’ite quarrels were 
displayed as facts without providing strong evidence.  The idea of placing the 
foreigner as the scapegoat brings to mind Trevelyan’s assertion that, ‘It was an old 
saying in the Arab world that when two fish were fighting in the sea, the British 
were behind it’.79  The current thesis explores the nature of the British policy 
towards the political situation in Bahrain and whether Britain, Belgrave or both had 
an active role in inciting both Muslim sects.  
When the Movement was formed in 1954, Qubain believed that for the first 
time in recent Bahraini history both religious groups worked together as an entity, 
and as ‘members of an economic group’.80  The short-lived cohesiveness of this unity 
was put to question by Bahraini historian Abdulla Al-Ghanem, who alluded to the 
disputes that had risen between the senior members of the Party.  He argued that 
Sunni members of the Party sought ‘reform’, while the Shi’ites aimed towards ‘a 
complete overhaul of the regime’.81  The Sunni-Shi’ite structure within the 
Movement is explored in this thesis. 
Although the effect of Nasser’s Egypt on the Movement was noted, the nature 
of the ties between the Party and the Egyptian Government were never explored.  
According to Arab historian Majid Khadduri, one of Nasser’s nationalist foreign 
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policy goals was the ‘support of revolutionary movements in other Arab 
countries’.82  The American historian of Palestinian origin, Rosemarie Said Zahlan, 
confirmed the influence of Nasser via the utilisation of various media channels and 
especially the radio in Bahrain saying:  
His call for the loosening of imperial control throughout the Arab 
world struck a resonant note in Bahrain where thousands listened 
regularly to Sawt al Arab [Voice of the Arabs], the Egyptian radio 
station.83   
 
Further, Nasser’s portraits were commonly seen in Bahrain and the Gulf, ‘hung for 
years on almost every commoner’s wall, side by side – whether for reasons of 
loyalty or of discretion – with that of the local ruler’, Glen Balfour-Paul, former 
British diplomat and historian noted.84  As no further details as to the relationship 
between the two sides was provided, this thesis aims to explore the nature of the 
ties between the two.   
Rashid Al-Zayani, a Bahraini historian and businessman, in his short analysis 
of the Movement, raised a number of unanswered questions.  He viewed British 
policy towards the Movement to be unclear and asked, ‘were they really behind 
agitating the Committee?  Or were they against the Adviser, Belgrave?  Or with 
him?’85  This raises the need to examine British policy in Bahrain and its stance 
towards Belgrave, the Movement, and general reform – a much-neglected topic in 
published work on this era. 
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Following the dismissal of Glubb Pasha in Jordan, Bahraini protestors 
attacked Selwyn Lloyd’s car convoy during his short visit to Bahrain on 2 March 
1956.  Western historians such as Anthony Verrier, Barry Turner, DR Thorpe, 
Erskine Childers, Keith Kyle, Peter Wilby, and W Scott Lucas, touched on the topic, 
however, without providing much detail on the incident or the origins of the conflict 
in Bahrain and instead noted the event as part of the proceedings that led Britain 
towards the Suez War.86 
One of the exceptions to the above amongst Western historians is Miriam 
Joyce who provided in a short article further details to the stoning of the convoy and 
the legal battle that ensued over the three Bahraini political exiles following the fall 
of the nationalist movement.  Details of what came before to the stoning incident 
were not presented.  Joyce claimed that it was the Ruler of Bahrain ‘Shaykh Salman 
[who] ordered the arrest of the leaders of the Committee of National Union’.87  That 
claim by Joyce will be examined further in this thesis.  Another exception is seen in 
the work of Simon Smith, who brought to light the dilemma that overtook the British 
Government on the topic of Belgrave, following the Lloyd incident.  He believed that 
Eden insisted on ‘Belgrave’s retention’, contradicting both ‘British officers in the 
Gulf, and within the Foreign Office itself’.  Meanwhile, the Gulf Residency had 
already ‘informally’ told the Party that Belgrave’s tenure would be coming to an 
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end.88  Similar to Joyce, Smith omitted the beginnings of the Movement going 
straight to the stoning incident and what followed. 
On the stoning of Lloyd’s car, Bahraini and Arab historians mention little 
detail of the incident.  For example, Al-Ghanem and Falah Al-Mudairis both skip the 
incident as a whole and jump to the events that followed.89  Al-Aubaidi, however, 
provided a summary of the incident by using only two sources to recall the event, 
those being the Government of Bahrain Annual Report of 1956 and Belgrave’s 
memoir.90  The incident and details of the stoning of the Foreign Secretary’s car will 
be examined in this thesis as this event could well be considered as a crucial 
moment in the conflict and one that involved British Cabinet members directly in 
Bahrain’s affairs. 
In addition to the historians who wrote about the events that  unfolded 
between Belgrave and the nationalists, there have been attempts by Bahrainis to 
translate selected passages from Belgrave’s memoir, diary, and other publications 
while offering some commentary.  The first attempted translation was published by 
Mahdi Abdulla entitled The Memoirs of Belgrave, the Former Adviser of the 
Government of Bahrain in 1991 and the second was by Sheikha Mai Al-Khalifa in her 
book Charles Belgrave Biography and Memoirs 1926-1957 in 2000.  Other 
publications that had covered the nationalist movement of the 1950s in Bahrain 
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included Mohammed Al-Jassim and Sawsan Al-Shaer’s Bahrain… The Story of 
Political Struggle 1904-1956 and Ahmed Hamidan’s The National Union Committee in 
Bahrain.91  These publications have also limited themselves to selected sources.   
In his PhD dissertation entitled Social and Political Change in Bahrain since 
the First World War awarded in 1973 by Durham University, Mohammed Ghanim Al-
Rumaihi from Kuwait touched on the rise and development of the Movement in 
Bahrain as part of tracing the socio-political changes that swept Bahrain following 
the First World War.  A basic sketch of the conflict was covered; Al-Rumaihi relied 
mainly on the memoirs of Belgrave and Al-Bakir to explain the events of the 1950s 
in Bahrain.  Additionally he utilised the Bahraini Government’s annual reports, the 
nationalist movement’s circulars, nationalist press, and some international 
newspapers.  His usage of the limited sources is understandable since TNA’s archive 
on Bahrain and the situation in the 1950s was not made public in the 1970s.92 
                                                        
91 M. Abdulla (ed.), Muthakrat Belgrave: Mustashar Hakumat Al-Bahrain Sabiqan [The Memoirs of 
Belgrave: Former Adviser to the Government of Bahrain] (Beirut: 1991); M. Al-Khalifa (ed.), Charles 
Belgrave Al-Sira wa Al-Muthakarat 1926-1957 [Charles Belgrave Biography and Memoirs 1926-1957] 
(Beirut: 2000); M. Al-Jassim and S.A. Al-Shaer, Al-Bahrain Qisat Al-Sira’a Al-Siyasi 1904-1956 
[Bahrain… The Story of Political Struggle 1904-1956] (2000); and A. Hamidan, Hayet Al-Itihad Al-
Watani fi Al-Bahrain [The National Union Committee in Bahrain] (Beirut: 2004).  There are other 
publications that dealt with certain phases of Belgrave’s life that excluded the time period of this 
thesis.  For example, Mahdi Al-Tajir’s work entitled, Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the 
Administration (1987) examined the introduction of modern government systems in Bahrain that 
aided in the process of transforming the islands’ from a sheikhdom to a modern state.  The 
publication also highlights how the steps of modernisation affected Bahrainis, with a particular focus 
on the development and relations of the Arab Shi’ite community with the Government of Bahrain.  
Furthermore, another attempt in documenting a different phase of Belgrave’s life is found in Charles 
Belgrave under the Shades of Siwa Oasis (2012), by Hamad E. Abdulla.  The publication researched the 
former Adviser’s experience in his first administrative post in Egypt from 1920 to 1922.  See M. Al-
Tajir, Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the Administration (New York: 1987); and H. 
Abdulla, Charles Belgrave fi Thilal Wahat Siwa [Charles Belgrave in the Shades of Siwa Oasis] 
(Manama: 2012). 
92 M.G. Al-Rumaihi, ‘Social and Political Change in Bahrain Since the First World War’ (Durham 
University: 1973). 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 29 
Another PhD dissertation that touched on the topic of the thesis was by 
Bahraini historian Saeed Khalil Hashim entitled The Influence of Iraq on the 
Nationalist Movements of Kuwait and Bahrain 1920-1961, awarded in 1984 by the 
University of Exeter.  The thesis was divided into two parts, one on Kuwait and the 
other on Bahrain with a time period that extended from 1920 to 1961; limited 
information was presented in relation to the topic of this thesis.  Though Hashim did 
utilise documents from TNA, it was mostly used to cover the time period prior to the 
early 1950s.  Events that took place following the early 1950s might have not been 
available to Hashim to assess.  In order to explain the events of the 1950s in Bahrain, 
Hashim heavily relied on Al-Bakir’s memoir.  Additionally nationalist newspapers 
were explored and some interviews with surviving members of the Movement at the 
time were conducted.93  
Moreover, the Iraqi historian Tayebah Al-Anzi wrote a Master’s thesis at the 
University of Basra in Iraq in Arabic entitled Charles Belgrave’s Role in Bahrain 
between 1926-1957 in 2010 covering Belgrave’s work in Bahrain.  The research 
relied heavily on secondary sources to reconstruct events and allocated only a 
limited portion of the work to the 1950s conflict.94  
Finally, an attempt was made by Belgrave’s nephew and former diplomat 
Robert Belgrave, who launched a project that aimed to document the life and times 
of his relation.  Unfortunately, the project now known as The Papers of Robert 
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Belgrave did not see the light of day as he died before completing his work.  The 
documents collected by Robert Belgrave and his work, which he seems to have only 
just started, are currently located at the archives of the University of Exeter.  The 
documents available there give an overview of Belgrave’s life and work, particularly 
in Bahrain.  In a journal article in Bahrain’s Al-Watheekah in 1985, Robert Belgrave 
announced his intention to publish a biography of Belgrave, which he was working 
on at the time.95 
All the works presented thus far offer only a short overview of the political 
crisis from the mid-twentieth century.  Therefore, this thesis aims to draw on a wide 
range of available Arabic and English sources to better understand and fill in the 
details of the developments that unfolded in Bahrain against the backdrop of the 
greater Cold War scenario. 
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Part I: The Search for a ‘Hero’: the Rise of the Nationalist Movement 
 
Chapter One 
Background to Bahrain’s Sectarian Tensions,  
Trade Unions, and the Sunni-Shi’ite Clash of 1953  
January 1953 to February 1954 
 
 With nationalistic fever on the march in the Middle East, the search for 
Bahrain’s version of a nationalist ‘hero’, as in Tawfiq Al-Hakim’s novel The Return of 
the Spirit, was on.  As soon as Al-Bakir returned to Bahrain he began to involve 
himself in political activity aimed at the establishment of trade unions.  A perfect 
opportunity presented itself in September 1953 when the Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian 
clash erupted.  This part of the thesis will explore how the conflict offered the 
prospect of establishing a détente between the two opposing sides, utilising the void 
the crisis had created and the need for a saviour, while at the same time turning the 
Movement into a political entity.  The conflict that had unfolded surprised British 
officials in Bahrain who tried to seek an explanation for the events.   
Evidence of disunity and a lack of trust between Bahrain’s Sunnis and Shi’ites 
were clear from an earlier stage.  The clash of 1953 was not the product of a sudden 
spur of the moment, but rather a result of a long-held deep distrust between the two 
communities that eventually manifested itself.  In order to understand the nature of 
the tensions of 1953, it is important briefly to examine the background and anxieties 
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that led to the crisis as well as providing an overview of developments in Egypt in 
order to trace the latter’s influence on the Bahraini movement.  
 Before 1953 tensions between the two largest religious communities in 
Bahrain (Muslim Sunnis and Shi’ites) were growing alarmingly.  Sawut Al-Bahrain, 
the island’s only magazine at the time, portrayed the level of distrust in Bahrain in 
1950 in an article entitled, ‘Sectarianism is our biggest problem’.  The author, Ibn 
Thabit, believed that a single community did not exist in Bahrain ‘but rather 
opposing societies and groups which are full of grudge for one another and seek to 
conspire against each other’.96  The author will almost certainly have used the nom 
de plume Ibn Thabit to hide his or her identity for fear of being criticised or even 
harassed by their own community. 
 Hay, the British Resident from 1946 to 1953,97 recorded the growing 
tensions between the two communities in a report in 1951 forwarded to GW 
Furlonge at the Eastern Department in the FO, as he summarised events in the 
Arabian Gulf.  In relation to Bahrain he said: ‘Although there have been no incidents, 
ill feeling between the Shias and the Sunnis is stronger than usual’.98   
Signs of a coming crisis were revealed in the summer of 1951 vis-à-vis the 
Manama Municipal Committee.  The Committee consisted of twenty-four persons; 
twelve elected and twelve nominated.  Although elections for the Committee the 
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previous year went smoothly, frustration amongst the Baharna was quickly 
manifested.  The Baharna had won only two seats on the Committee, one of which 
was held by Abd-Ali Al-Alaiwat who would later become a frontline member of the 
nationalist movement, and the Government had nominated only three Baharna.  The 
Arab Shi’ite community believed that they were due more representation.  The 
Resident considered that their failure to gain more seats was due to their ‘very poor’ 
electioneering.  Later, a dispute within the Committee arose and was based on a 
third attempt by a Sunni member to award compensation to a demolished local shop 
in Manama for the purpose of expanding the neighbouring street.  The majority of 
the Committee’s members accepted the proposal in its third attempt of passing.  The 
Baharna members [two elected and three nominated], however, rejected the 
decision to compensate and resigned from the Committee.  The incident led the Arab 
Shi’ite community to air further grievances, one of which was the increase in 
property rent at the vegetable, fish, and meat markets.  The property was rented to a 
majority of Baharna and owned by the Ruler and his brother Sheikh Duaij Al-Khalifa.  
The landlords blamed the increase in rent on the expenditure involved in 
constructing and maintaining the market.  The Government attempted to persuade 
the five members to retract their resignations, but to no avail.99   
Trouble in the Manama Municipal Committee continued the following year 
when the Baharna threatened to boycott the elections due to be held in October 
1952 unless the Committee was to be comprised of equal Sunni to Shi’ite 
representation.  The Ruler accepted the demands and said that the Committee 
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should consist of six Sunnis and six Shi’ites.100  This was not well received by some 
Sunnis on the grounds that the Baharna were never previously awarded with ‘much 
representation’, and this impasse resulted in the Government’s indefinite 
postponement of elections to the Committee.101 
On the regional scene, Britain was in the process of negotiating its troops’ 
evacuation from the Suez Canal Zone.  The idea of the withdrawal appealed to Eden 
who aimed to convince Prime Minister Winston Churchill that by withdrawing 
British forces from Egypt it would attract the Egyptians to enter into an anti-
Communist Middle Eastern defence alliance, which was known in its infant stage as 
the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), propagated significantly following 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.102  However the British COS believed that 
‘it was unlikely that General Neguib would be prepared to commit Egypt to 
participation in MEDO until he had reached a firm agreement with us about 
evacuation’.103  Egyptians resisted entry into any alliances before and during 
Naguib’s presidency.104  As a result it was in Britain’s interest to evacuate from the 
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Suez Canal Zone in the hope that Egypt would ease its stance towards MEDO and as 
a sign of goodwill.  Eden also believed that reaching an agreement with Egypt would 
improve Britain’s relations with the rest of the Arab World.105  Although the 
stationing of troops in the Suez Canal Zone was of vital importance to the British 
during the First and Second World Wars, the coming of the hydrogen bomb 
‘transformed the military situation’ as it limited the need for ‘conventional forces’.106  
Moreover, the cost of maintaining the base in Egypt with approximately 80,000 
personnel was seen in Britain as a burden.107 
Britain’s foreign policy’s demarches in the Middle East at the time can be 
summarised into the following four points as presented by Field Marshall Sir John 
Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).  First was denying Communists 
from having the Middle East fall under their sphere of influence.  Second was to 
protect the oil resources of the Arabian Gulf region.  Third was the protection of the 
southern parts of Turkey.  And fourthly to secure the safety and freedom of sea 
passage via the Suez Canal.108 
In Bahrain in the beginning of 1953, Al-Bakir was involved in the early 
attempts to give voice to various grievances.  This included a demand to establish a 
trade union in Bahrain.  No such organisation existed at the time nor was approved 
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of by the Administration.109  One of his earliest known attempts to have his ‘voice 
heard’ was during a visit that was carried out by six British Members of Parliament 
(MPs) to Bahrain in early 1953.  The incident was noted in HV Mapp’s memoir and 
he sympathised with Al-Bakir’s demand for a trade union.  The MPs were on a tour 
of the Middle East organised by Lebanese MP and businessman Emile Bustani.  
Mapp considered the visit to be a ‘flop’ as he unsuccessfully attempted to arrange a 
meeting between the MPs and Al-Bakir.110   
It is unclear why Al-Bakir chose to adopt the idea of establishing trade unions 
in Bahrain, which later turned into an early formal demand by his Movement.  He 
had recently worked as a self-employed merchant and was not part of any labour 
force.  A possible explanation is that trade unions offered a form of unification 
between Sunnis and Shi’ites under the flag of improving working conditions.  Most 
importantly a trade union can be exploited as a political entity able to paralyse the 
state through strikes, if political demands were not met.  The threat of strikes and its 
implementation as a weapon against the Administration became a feature of the 
Bahraini nationalist movement of the mid-twentieth century, as this thesis will 
describe.    
The visit of the six British MPs to Bahrain started on 20 January 1953.  
Barbara Castle mentioned it in her memoir.  It consisted of three Labour MPs: Castle, 
John Freeman, and Jimmie Johnson; and three Torie MPs: Burney Drayton, Stephen 
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McAdden, and Terry Clarke.  Castle did not mention details of the visit, nor did she 
proffer any comments on her stop in Bahrain.111  Her diaries also included no 
information on her trip to Bahrain but just gave general information on the 
islands.112 
Sawut Al-Bahrain featured the news of the arrival of the MPs in a one-page 
article.  The magazine sent an unnamed representative to brief the delegation and 
said that  
When someone tried to get into contact with them [the British MPs] 
from Bahrain’s men to explain to them the case of the Bahraini 
populace, they pretended to be tied with pre-arranged appointments!   
 
The magazine also noted that a set of queries was presented to the delegation but 
got no answer.  The questions focused on local and regional affairs that included the 
wish to be allowed by the Administration to form trade unions.113   
 The British Resident echoed the complaint that Bahrain did not have a trade 
union in a report in 1951.  Hay pointed to receiving ‘an anonymous circular’ with 
abusive language towards Belgrave and the Government of Britain.  One of the 
demands (the only one mentioned in Hay’s account) was ‘the formation of trade 
unions’.114  It is probable that the source of the demand was Al-Bakir, himself.  The 
demand to establish a trade union in Bahrain became the first grievance adopted for 
action by Al-Bakir in 1953.  The demand would be echoed later by his Movement 
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and would eventually lead to the establishment of a Labour Law in Bahrain as the 
thesis highlights later.  An early Egyptian incursion in Bahrain came with the first 
official visit of members of the Egyptian military regime following the coup when 
Major General Mohammed Ebrahim, the Egyptian Army’s Chief of Staff, arrived on a 
short visit to Bahrain en route to Pakistan in February 1953.  Ebrahim was 
accompanied by a delegation of sixteen officials.  A welcoming ceremony was 
organised for the guests at Bahrain’s Al-Ahli Club.  Regarding the visit, Bahrain’s 
nationalist newspaper Al-Qafilah declared that Bahrainis had met the Egyptian 
officers, ‘as if they had met [the whole] of Egypt’.  It continued in admiration, 
‘Looking at the faces of those heroes, one could see the expression of hope of what 
one aspires to obtain through Egypt from grace and renaissance’.115  In addition to 
Ebrahim’s visit, Mustafa Amin owner of Egypt’s Akhbar Al-Youm (The News of 
Today) newspaper and CIA agent (unknown to be one at the time), paid a visit to 
Bahrain as part of his tour of the Arab World.116  The British Residency sensed a 
level of agitation fomenting against the person of Belgrave and his centralisation of 
the administration in 1953.  In a letter from Hay to the FO, the Resident believed 
that agitation was mainly a result of editorialisng in Bahrain’s nationalist press.117  
The Egyptian Free Officers’ Revolution Command Council (RCC), which was 
established to manage the affairs of the country, announced on 18 June 1953 the 
foundation of the Egyptian Republic and the official abolishing of its monarchy. 
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Naguib, the figurehead of the RCC, was its first President.118  In the same year Nasser 
published his infamous book The Philosophy of the Revolution, a vade mecum for 
young and aspiring Arab nationalists in the Middle East.  In reality the publication 
was an ‘adolescent document’ as Jean Lacatoure, the French historian described it.  
It was made up of the memoirs and visions of this ambitious Egyptian military 
officer.119  Sir Anthony Parsons, Britain’s Political Agent in Bahrain from 1965 to 
1969, commented on Nasser’s work, saying that it ‘must be either for children or for 
foreigners with limited knowledge of Arabic’.120  The publication prompted Sir 
Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State, to suggest to Nasser he avoid writing 
any further books.121  Eden, on the other hand, compared the work to ‘Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf’.122  According to Copeland’s assertion the actual author of Nasser’s book was 
his friend, journalist, and historian Mohammed H Heikal.123  The book was a means 
for Nasser to introduce himself to Egyptians and the Arab World, preparing the way 
for his takeover of power and the eclipse of Naguib.   
July 1953 marked the start of the Cairo-based Sawut Al-Arab (Voice of the 
Arabs) radio station broadcast to the Arab World.  The Egyptian Ahmed Al-Saeed 
was to become the leading voice of the network and its Director.  He believed that 
part of the purpose behind the station ‘was to inform Arabs of their own 
governments’ sins’.  The name, Sawut Al-Arab, was borrowed from a short broadcast 
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by Naguib on 4 July that carried the name, later turning it into a radio station 
complete with its own range of programming.124 
The creation of what would become a popular radio station among the Arabs 
came at the height of the then Egyptian-CIA cooperation.  The CIA’s Kermit 
Roosevelt recruited people such as Paul Linebarger ‘the greatest “black” 
propagandist’ to advise and train the Egyptians on how to utilise their press and 
radio facilities.  When it came to the radio, the aim was to set up ‘the most powerful 
[station] in the entire Middle East’.  The Egyptians would release reports that 
seemed to promote the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) but caused more 
harm than good to the overall image of the Soviets.  In contrast they would issue 
news reports against the US but that had a reverse effect.125 
Non-Arab owned media participated in agitating Bahrainis.  Moscow Radio, 
for example, labelled Belgrave a ‘Dictator’!126  Mapp who was in Bahrain added in 
his memoir that whenever the Russian radio called out the Adviser, the Ruler 
‘chuckles’.127  The American President Dwight D Eisenhower understood the rise of 
‘virulent nationalism’ in the Middle East and considered the Russians to be taking 
advantage of the situation.  To him ‘the evidence of Communist meddling was 
evident’.128  The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 marked a new turning point in Soviet 
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foreign policy followed by the gradual emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as the new 
Soviet leader.  According to Khrushchev, Stalin avoided any major interference in 
the Middle East as ‘he realistically recognized that the balance of power wasn’t in 
our favor and that Britain wouldn’t have stood for our interference’.  But the new 
Soviet leadership saw in the Egyptians a possible penetrating point into the Arab 
World in order ‘to weaken the influence of English colonialism in the Near East – 
and that was in the interest of the Soviet Union’.129  It was at this time, in the 
summer of 1953, that the Russians conducted their first successful test of the 
hydrogen bomb, only four years after developing the atomic bomb.130  
In September 1953, the annual two-day Shi’ite religious festival of Ashura 
was due.  The festival is observed by Shi’ites worldwide on 9 and 10 of the month of 
Muharram of the Islamic Hijri lunar calendar, and that year it fell on 19 and 20 of 
September.  The occasion marks the martyrdom of Hussain, Prophet Mohammed’s 
grandson.  The rituals were not limited to Ma’tems,131 but took on the form of 
processions marching down the streets and parading.  Usually crowds of people 
(including Sunnis) gathered on the roadside as curious observers.  These parades 
featured men beating their chests in sorrow, others beating their back and 
shoulders with chains as a form of self-flagellation, a display of black flags, and at 
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times men cutting their foreheads with knives and swords.  These occasions are 
usually charged with religious emotions from both sides, as the Shi’ites recalled 
stories relating to the death of Hussain whereas the Sunnis viewed the practices of 
the celebration as a religious bida’a.132   
 Although the Bahraini Administration did not expect a massive conflict 
between Sunnis and Shi’ites during the coming festival, Bahrain’s then Political 
Agent JW Wall in a report to the newly appointed Resident Sir Bernard Burrows,133 
claimed that security measures were carried out locally to prevent any possible 
disturbance amongst the Shi’ites of Persian origin.  The reason for the concern was 
the growing feud between supporters of Mosaddegh and those of Fazlollah Zahedi 
and the fear was that it might be carried onto the streets of Manama.134  Zahedi 
organised a coup d’état aided by pro-Shah demonstrators to overthrow Mosaddegh 
and counter communist infiltration in a covert operation with the CIA and Britain’s 
Military Intelligence, Section 6 (MI6) known as operation AJAX.135  
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 Bahrain’s newspaper Al-Qafilah expressed its support for Mosaddegh 
following his removal from power in an article entitled ‘Iran Lost Mosaddegh’.136  
The newspaper, in the same edition, also attacked an unnamed British doctor who 
had named his dog in a derogatory sense after ‘the savior of Iran’, Mosaddegh as Al-
Qafilah noted.  The report was designed to inflame public opinion against the 
British.137 
 Consequently by the coming of the anniversary of the Shi’ite festival in 
September 1953, emotions were running high on both the local and regional levels.  
It was only a matter of time before a clash was bound to take place and the 
opportunity presented itself in Muharram.  Though the first day of the festival 
passed without any cited trouble, the second day on 20 September proved 
catastrophic.  According to Bahrain’s Government Annual Report for 1953 a 
procession of Bahraini Shi’ites was marching down Belgrave Road in Manama in 
close proximity to the British Political Agency.138  The procession was headed in the 
direction it was agreed upon with the local authorities and under police protection.  
Suddenly a dispute erupted between two men who claimed to lead a specific group 
amongst the procession.  Some of the onlookers who were Sunni jumped into the 
argument.  It did not take long before a fight broke out between the Sunnis and 
Shi’ites as the spectators clashed with the procession.  Fighting developed more 
aggressively and stones, wood, and bottles were thrown; people from their own 
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rooftops also participated in the action.  Sixty people in total were reportedly 
injured.139   
 Wall, the British Political Agent, offered in a account forwarded to the 
Residency an illustration of the events on that day based on a British eyewitness 
named as ‘Mr. Wallace’ who claimed from his viewpoint that a member of the 
procession got into an altercation with the spectators threatening them and ‘starting 
excitement among the crowd’.  Before any further developments took place, the 
police intervened to arrest the agitator and peace was restored.  Nonetheless, a 
group of Shi’ites appeared determined to free the accused agitator; consequently, 
control of the crowd was lost.  During the imbroglio some of the demonstrators 
headed towards the Political Agency’s headquarters and the Agency’s guards fired 
shots in the air to disperse the approaching crowd, according to the Bahrain 
Government Annual Report.  Wall, however, claimed uncertainty as to who first 
fired the shots, whether it was the police or the Political Agency’s guards.  Later, 
according to the Political Agent, ‘Peace was finally restored during lunchtime 
following the arrival of police reinforcements headed by Belgrave personally’.140  
Tensions between the two sects continued well into the following day.  
Rumours spread amongst both communities as stories were carried of clashes 
between the two groups.  One of the rumours that spread was an attack by the 
Baharna of Arad village on Sunnis in Muharraq.  Sunnis were determined to march 
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into the village of Arad but Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the Ruler’s uncle, 
convinced them not to do so.  He also wisely placed his cars with armed personnel of 
his own, to block any penetration by angry Sunni mobs into Arad.  Finally a curfew 
was imposed on the night of 21 September from 8.30 pm to 5.00 am.  A ban on the 
assembly of six or more people was also imposed.  On 23 September, the curfew was 
lifted and the ban on local assembly was also lifted six days later.  The incident and 
what had followed highlighted the need to improve the training of local police in 
dealing with large riots, as Wall identified.  He also believed that there was ‘a real 
need for more British officers’, in Bahrain’s Police Force.141  In a discussion recorded 
by Burrows with Belgrave, the need to better equip and develop Bahrain’s police 
was mutually agreed on.142   
By the end of September the Bahraini Administration was unfortunately slow 
in reacting to the sectarian crisis.  A state address should have been issued 
immediately after the outbreak of the riot.  The end of the eventful month of 
September, although no deaths were recorded, only saw the arrest of two to three in 
relation to the disturbance.  In Wall’s view the Administration’s strategy was to ease 
tensions within the community and let emotions settle down.  In an effort by the 
British to explain the unforeseen events, the Political Agent presented the Resident 
with a number of possible theories.  One was the spread of agitation by Shi’ites 
coming from Persia, Iraq, and Al-Hassa in Saudi Arabia to Bahrain.  The other 
possibility was tied to the greater picture of regional developments as he said: 
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through increased contact with the rest of the Middle East and 
through the influence of irresponsible and inflammatory publicity of 
the sort that keeps the idle crowds of the great Arab towns in a state 
of excitement, are losing the languor and placidity that seem to have 
characterized them since the pacification of the Gulf in the last 
century.143  
 
 Burrows shared a similar view to that of Wall’s second theory which he 
expressed in a message posted to His Majesty’s (HM) Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Sir Anthony Eden, that although he was glad that the disturbance 
was of an internal nature and did not single out Britain as a target, he feared  
that the existence of this tension must be in some ways related to the 
general heightening of nationalistic and religious fervour spread 
throughout the Middle East by the Arabic press and radio.144 
 
Al-Bakir shared a different and rather a controversial point-of-view and he 
blamed the sectarian riots on the British.  He reflected in his memoir that the British 
feared the rise of youth in Bahrain.  Therefore, he claimed, they used Belgrave 
whose orders and plans were executed through agents provocateurs to instigate 
sectarian hatred between the Sunnis and Shi’ites.  The conflict, he argued, would 
keep the two sects occupied with their own personal affairs and thereby divert them 
from interfering in other, greater, issues.145  Al-Bakir went on further to claim in 
1956 in a speech to the Kuwaiti Studentship Union in Cairo that sectarianism in 
Bahrain was the Adviser’s own creation and that ‘it [sectarianism] was unknown 
until that time period’.  However Sunni-Shi’ite tensions existed prior to Belgrave’s 
arrival as was presented in thesis introduction (cf the clash of 1923 between Nejdis 
and Persians that transpired into a sectarian conflict).  Moreover, Al-Bakir failed to 
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provide evidence to support this charge.146 
 The tactic of using the British (or a British personality) as a scapegoat 
immediately following the event was also reflected in Bahrain’s nationalist 
newspaper Al-Qafilah whose editorial team included Al-Bakir.  Interestingly there 
was no censorship of articles documented for the newspaper until the publication of 
its issue of 2 October 1953, which was the first issue to be published following the 
riot.  The first page alone included a total of five articles that were completely 
censored by the Administration.  Nothing was left intact from the articles except the 
titles, for the journalists wanted to show what the topics were.  The titles that were 
published gave an understanding of what might have been the possible content of 
the censored articles as it seemed that the writers attempted to blame the British for 
being behind, or involved in, igniting the clashes.  The titles of the five censored 
articles were, ‘Beyond the Tragedy’, ‘Tears and Smiles’, ‘What a disappointment’, 
‘The Hand’, possibly in an attempt to hint at the involvement of a foreign power in 
recent events, and ‘This Crisis is caused by…’ also hinting at foreign intervention.147 
No British FO documents survive today that support Al-Bakir’s theory of a 
plot to start sectarian tensions in Bahrain among FO papers vis-à-vis Bahrain nor in 
the personal memoirs and diaries of officials including that of Belgrave.  Al-Bakir 
also does not present a pièce justificative as proof to support his argument which is 
based mainly on speculation.  He attempted to lay the blame on the foreigner for the 
country’s own misfortunes instead of acknowledging that there was an inherently 
                                                        
146 A.R. Al-Bakir, Al-Awath’a Al-Siyasiyah fi Al-Bahrain wa Al-Ahdath Al-Akhirah fiha [The Political 
Situation in Bahrain and its Recent Events] (2007), 48, hereafter The Political Situation in Bahrain. 
147 Al-Qafilah, 2 October 1953, 1.   
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 48 
deeply-rooted problem in the society that was in need for healing, reflection, and 
recovery in a possible attempt to lay people’s differences behind, and gain public 
support for a new and upcoming movement.  
Al-Bakir also claimed in his memoir that he was asked to leave Bahrain for 
Lebanon by the Administration as persona non grata for four months following the 
riot.  The only explanation provided by Al-Bakir as to the reason behind his 
departure was that he had made a number of phone calls and met with various 
members of Sunni and Shi’ite communities following the riot.148  However there are 
no FO documents to be found at TNA in relation to the reason behind Al-Bakir’s 
departure. 
 In early 1954 major developments in Egypt were taking place as a struggle 
for power ensued among members of the RCC.  This contest came to light following 
the resignation of Naguib on 25 February 1954 in protest at his authority being 
undermined by other members of the RCC.149  In Bahrain local nationalists exerted 
an effort to reconcile the broken Sunni-Shi’ite relations.  Unified grievances against 
foreign-owned-or-operated business establishments in Bahrain became the focal 
point of their attacks.  Nothing can unify conflicting parties like rallying against a 
greater foreign enemy.  The systematic attacks on these establishments manifested 
themselves in a conflict that occurred in the premises of Bahrain’s petroleum 
company.   
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Chapter Two 
Bahrain’s ‘Suez Canal Companies’ and the attack on the Police Fort 
March to September 1954 
 
Foreign-operated-or-owned companies stood as a symbol of oppression and 
exploitation to the nationalists in Bahrain.  They viewed them as malicious entities 
and an extension of colonialism out to deprive locals of their national resources 
while enslaving employees in what could be described as Bahrain’s own Suez Canal 
Companies, in reference to Egypt’s Suez Canal Company.150  In Bahrain there were 
systematic attacks by the nationalist press targeting BAPCO and other organisations 
with accounts of events in those companies, some of which were presented as facts 
backed by cursory investigative reporting.  The aim of these reports was to build a 
case by which nationalists could air their protests, blaming their frustrations on 
British influence.  Moreover, it was in the nationalists’ vade mecum, Nasser’s manual, 
where he stressed the importance of Arab oil as he illustrated that ‘Half the proved 
reserves of oil in the world lie beneath Arab soil’.151  The focus of nationalists on 
Bahrain’s oil company was of no coincidence since oil was an element of crucial 
importance to Britain from a financial perspective and for its overall strategy to 
defend the Middle East.  A COS memorandum reviewing British strategy in the 
Middle East stressed the importance of retaining ‘the countries of the Middle East 
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within the Western orbit’, as its oil requirements were ‘of great importance’ to 
Britain.152   
The events that unfolded in 1954 turned Bahrain, in Belgrave’s eyes, into a 
‘very different place to what it was when I had first known it’.153  The grievances 
that were aired that year led to further conflict as it manifested itself in a fight at the 
petroleum company, an attack on Bahrain’s Police Fort that turned into a bloody 
demonstration, strikes, and a state of fearful anticipation.  All these events further 
moved the Sunni-Shi’ite communities to join forces.  Local developments 
accompanied Bahrainis’ reaction to Egypt’s leadership crisis and a new visit by one 
of Nasser’s aides.  
Regionally the month of March 1954 was a turning point in the history of 
Egypt and subsequently the Arab World as changes there helped to shape the 
country’s new leadership with Nasser becoming victorious in the fight for Egypt’s 
leadership.  The competition between Naguib and Nasser for power turned into a 
crisis within the state’s military in the spring of 1954, in what could be labeled as 
the ‘Crisis of March’, as Gammal Hammad, a member of the Free Officers noted.154  
The struggle ended with Nasser’s victory and with Naguib returning to the 
Presidency by public demand and from the military.  However his authority was 
reduced to the mere title of President and Nasser successfully dismissed Naguib’s 
high-ranking military aides.  Nasser’s rise reshaped the political field in Egypt as a 
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new totalitarian regime started to take shape and this period is best described as 
‘the fall of liberalism in Egypt’.155   
Bahrain’s Al-Qafilah captured the local fascination with the developments 
and division over whom to support as the newspaper had reported a fight that 
erupted between two men at a local coffee shop as a result of a heated debate over 
the matter.  One debater supported Naguib whom he described as a ‘supporter of 
freedoms’, the other supported Nasser described as ‘the Revolution’s man’.156 
 The centre point of nationalists’ attacks, BAPCO, witnessed important 
transformations in the early 1950s as it signed its new fifty-fifty agreement with the 
Bahraini Government, guaranteeing equal shares with the company for the first time 
since its establishment in 1929.  The deal was inspired by a similar understanding 
made by the Venezuelans followed by the Saudis.157  The Ruler’s initial agreement to 
the new deal was signed on 18 April 1950.158  
BAPCO, in the 1950s, offered a number of services and consisted of different 
divisions.159  One of the company’s functions was the refining of Saudi Arabian crude 
oil.160  In the aftermath of the Iranian oil crisis, Bahrain had built one of the largest 
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oil refining centres in the region.161  Although the company was registered in 
Canada with its shares owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and the 
Texas Oil Company, the majority of its management was British and its status was 
that of a British-operated company.162 
From a global perspective and in light of the Cold War, Bahrain and its oil 
fields were of a strategic importance to the British in view of the threat of Soviet 
advance into the region as a COS memorandum from April 1952 revealed.  The 
British had devised a plan to protect Bahrain, its oil fields, refinery, and oil passage 
from any dreaded Soviet penetration into the area.  For the defense plan twenty-
four frigates and thirty-four minesweepers, one infantry division, and ten squadrons 
were allocated.  The plan was devised with the assumption that both Iraq and Iran 
had fallen into the hands of the enemy.  
The plan was broached with Mosaddegh still in power as it was feared that 
the Soviets might wish to take advantage of the situation in the Gulf.  The 
memorandum estimated that the Soviets could reach Bahrain’s oil fields within sixty 
days after gaining complete control of both Iraq and Iran.  Furthermore the 
importance associated with Bahrain’s oil fields was attached to the anxiety that 
Kuwait’s oil fields (also under British protection) would capitulate following Soviet 
annexation of Iraq and Iran.  Hence the next line of defence for Britain would be 
Bahrain and its oil fields.163    
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A campaign against BAPCO was launched by Sawut Al-Bahrain and Al-Qafilah 
through a series of articles.  In the campaign the company was named as ‘Tyrannical 
BAPCO’, ‘a small state’, and ‘the colonialist company’.  Claims were also made of 
arbitrary dismissals, locals were said to have been abused by their foreign 
superiors, employees insisted that they suffered with ‘decayed brains’, others said 
they had lost their legs, and some claimed to have mysteriously acquired 
tuberculosis.164   
 The treatment of Bahrainis by foreigners (even with non-employees) was 
highlighted in Al-Qafilah which published a letter in English from a Bahraini to the 
Editor regarding his experience with his BAPCO Club member friend.  He claimed 
that he was asked to leave the club’s dining hall by an Englishman for no reason but 
mere racism.  The author of the letter warned in modest English, 
Those Britons who have stinking ideas about Asians do not seem to 
possess enough sense to realize that by have such attitude they are 
only boiling our blood, but digging their own graves.  It is time WE 
struggled for our rights, because now we are living in the age of 
TWENTIETH CENTURY.  Long Live Bahrain.165   
 
The letter was published in its original form of English and translated into Arabic.  
The incident may have been only apocryphal, or have been an unfortunate ‘one-off’ 
incident and not part of the British or BAPCO’s policy at the time.  However it was 
used to generate further bad feeling against the company and, in particular, its 
British element. 
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 The Bahraini press also launched a campaign around the simple matter of 
shortening working hours during the month of Ramadan, turning it into a religious 
affair and describing BAPCO as a company that ‘mocks everything in relation to 
their beliefs’.166  Al-Bakir went on to claim that Bahrain was losing some of the 
benefit due from oil production mainly ‘due to the conspiracies, its strings were 
weaved by the British Government’s men in Bahrain and their associates from the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company’.  He then blamed BAPCO when Bahrainis opted to 
leave their jobs at BAPCO for other regional jobs in the petroleum industry citing the 
company’s tight budget and without elaborating on the issue.  Al-Bakir claimed that 
of a total of 12,700 employees at the company only 2,700 were locals and the rest 
were foreigners.  Al-Bakir produced these figures in an address to the Kuwaiti 
Studentship Union in Cairo in 1956.167 
 However the data presented by Al-Bakir was misleading.  According to the 
former Resident Hay in a journal article published in 1955, the approximate number 
of local employees at BAPCO was 5,000.168  Other sources, -- the Political Agency’s 
annual report of 1954 and the New York Times in 1955 -- published more detailed 
figures of the oil company’s employees in Bahrain, saying that the number of 
employees totalled 8,532, of which 5,829 were Bahrainis.169  In addition, a report 
from BAPCO found at the company’s library and close to this time period dated 31 
December 1950 detailing the nationalities of the employees of the company, with 
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figures being close to that of the New York Times’ range.  It gave the total number of 
employees as 7,299, of which 4,303 were Bahrainis.170  There were no layoffs of 
local employees in Bahrain during this time to support Al-Bakir’s statement.   
 The ideas the local press produced were held by some individuals in Bahrain, 
as a British traveler Roderic Owen documented in his memoir on how locals 
attacked BAPCO’s policies as they questioned him on the topic: ‘Why should 
Europeans get paid one rupee more than Bahrainis?’, ‘Why doesn’t BAPCO do more 
for Bahrain?’  Comparisons were made with the Arabian-American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) of Saudi Arabia in terms of employee benefits.  Underlying all this was a 
belief that ‘All the oil belongs to the Bahrainis’.171  
 Although Bahrain’s petroleum company employed a substantial amount of 
Bahrainis, none of its senior employees at the time were locals, mainly due ‘to the 
lack of educated Bahrainis’ in the field.  Furthermore, a considerable number of 
Bahrainis failed to complete their education after acquiring basic educational skills 
at the secondary level.  It would take years for locals to reach a level that would 
enable them to compete for higher managerial posts.  Europeans earned higher 
wages in comparison to locals to compensate them for moving from the comfort of 
their technologically-advanced environments to Bahrain.  Comparing BAPCO’s pay 
and benefits to that of ARAMCO was unfair, as the Saudi company’s production and 
revenues way surpassed that of Bahrain’s BAPCO.172  
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Other companies in Bahrain, such as the trading house Gray Mackenzie, were 
also attacked in the nationalist press.  Gray Mackenzie was accused of offering 
financial bonuses only to its non-Bahraini employees.173  The British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAC) also suffered its share of attacks when it was accused 
‘of bringing the largest amount of Indians to this island’, awarding them with jobs as 
drivers, a profession in which Bahrainis can easily be recruited instead, Al-Qafilah 
proclaimed. 174  
 Meetings between Sunnis and Shi’ites to bring about a détente were 
underway, according to Al-Bakir.  The only source available for these meetings is Al-
Bakir’s memoir; hence caution must be exercised as we lack supporting evidence.  
Al-Bakir said that, by May 1954, efforts were being made to agree on official political 
representation from both communities following his return to Bahrain from 
Lebanon.  The initial arrangement consisted of seven Sunnis who planned to reach 
out to the Shi’ite community.  The Sunnis included: Abdulla Al-Zain, Yusuf Al-Saie, 
Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Ghaffar, Abdul-Aziz Al-Shamlan, Ali Al-Wazzan, and Al-Bakir 
himself.  A contact with a representative from the Shi’ites was made and an 
arrangement to meet for the first time was made.  The meeting was conducted at 
Hassan Al-Aradi’s house in Ras Al-Ru’man in Manama on 7 May.  From the Shi’ite 
side the following attended: Al-Sayed Ali bin Ebrahim Kamal-el-Deen, Mohsin Al-
Tajir, Abd-Ali Al-Alaiwat, Abdulla Abu Dheeb, Abdulla Abu Hindi, and Hassan Al-
Aradi.  The first meeting brought little progress but a second meeting was scheduled 
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for three days later and with fewer representatives.  The second meeting was more 
fruitful as both parties agreed to a general meeting in which both would invite as 
many from each community as they wished.  The new meeting was to take place on 
18 May in the Al-Ju’mah Mosque in Muharraq.  Al-Bakir later declared that the 
meeting was put off after the Ruler got wind of it and expressed his objections to 
it.175 
The rumours of Sunni-Shi’ite meetings had reached the Ruler were 
confirmed by Belgrave’s diary of 17 May.  He noted that the Ruler believed that the 
objective of the meetings was not to reach reconciliation between the two but was 
rather driven by the Sunnis to put forth to the Administration sets of political 
demands.  Belgrave did not hide his feelings towards the affair.  ‘I personally am 
against it’, he said.176   
Burrows, in a message to Eden, underlined his awareness of a number of 
Sunnis and Shi’ites who had conducted meetings in Bahrain to ease sectarian 
tensions.  Burrows highlighted the local Administration’s wariness of the possibility 
of political demands which might follow the Sunni-Shi’ite dialogue.  Furthermore, 
the Residency voiced its suspicion of this group’s motives.  They advised the Ruler to 
take measures to ease local tensions.   
One of the ideas presented to the Ruler was the formation of a committee 
representing both sects to investigate the previous year’s events.  But the Ruler 
believed that a suggestion to form an investigative committee made no sense as its 
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authority would be challenged by the ‘agitators’ as such a body would be seen  to 
represent the Government.  Furthermore, the appointed committee members might, 
the Ruler felt, view themselves equal in authority to the Government and could then 
push for demands, such as the Adviser’s dismissal, a move which was rarely 
mentioned but much feared.  According to Burrows, the Ruler feared that such 
measures ‘would betray the Adviser’, in order to satisfy ‘a gang of ignorant self-
seekers’.177   
The 15 May was marked by a visit from an unnamed Egyptian Brigadier 
which Belgrave noted in his diary.178  The Brigadier was probably Mohammed Fuad 
Galal as he was recorded as having presented a talk on Arab nationalism around that 
time at the Al-Urubah Club [The Pan-Arab Club] in Bahrain.179  Galal was an aide of 
Nasser who was introduced to the Egyptian leader via Heikal.  He was appointed as 
a member in the State’s Services Council responsible for the development of public 
projects derived mainly from the confiscated wealth of the former King.180  He was 
also appointed Minister of Social Affairs in Egypt from 7 September 1952 to 18 June 
1953.181    
 Prior to and following the second anniversary of the Free Officers’ revolution 
in Egypt, the nationalist press in Bahrain celebrated the occasion.  Ali Sayyar, a local 
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journalist and future member of the Party, advised Bahrainis to travel to Egypt as 
only then would they ‘realise to what extent Egypt loves Bahrain’.  He also praised 
the work of Abdul-Latif Al-Baghdadi, a prominent member of the Free Officers 
responsible for municipal affairs at the time,182 whose work had successfully ‘turned 
Cairo’s huts into palaces’.  The journalist later compared Al-Baghdadi’s work to 
housing conditions in Bahrain, in an attempt to undermine the efficacy of Belgrave’s 
Administration.183  
 The anniversary of the revolution also marked the introduction of a new tone 
in the nationalist press aimed at justifying the Egyptian regime and Nasser’s 
suppression of freedoms.  Al-Qafilah criticised those who called ‘upon a fictitious 
democracy’, and viewed democracy as a method to ‘exploit the labouring people’.  
The newspaper also viewed democracy as ‘an elegant word that hides within it 
venomous poison’.184  It is unknown if these claims truly represented the views of 
those nationalists who later became leading figures within a reformist movement 
that called upon a form of democratic representation.  Maybe the writers were 
influenced by Egyptian propaganda.  Or it could have been that the concept of 
democracy seemed vague and unclear to them.   
 Despite attempts to reconcile Sunnis and Shi’ites in Bahrain, sectarian 
tensions were running high in the summer of 1954.  On 2 June an incident occurred 
in Muharraq between two cattle fodder sellers, one being Sunni and the other a 
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Shi’ite.  An argument between the two developed resulting in the accidental death of 
the elderly Sunni when he was knocked to the ground.185   
 A more serious disturbance occurred at BAPCO’s drum plant in Sitra, an 
island dominated by its Shi’ite population, as tensions generated in the local press, 
regional developments, and sectarian anxieties spread to the company’s employees.  
A dispute between Sunnis and Shi’ites over bicycles on 15 June turned ugly.  
According to the memoir of Abdul-Karim Al-Alaiwat, the fight that took place 
between the two parties developed as a result of a practical joke played by two 
Shi’ite employees who deflated the tyres of bicycles owned by two Sunnis.  As soon 
as the fight occurred, and news of it spread, relatives of the Sunnis involved rushed 
to the scene to aid their family member.  Shi’ites from a neighbouring village also 
arrived to take part in the fight, headed by a man identified as Hassan Marzook.186  
 Following the disorder in BAPCO, Al-Bakir claimed that he was asked to leave 
Bahrain once again for a period of three months on 28 June and this time went to 
Egypt.187  Eleven Bahrainis were swiftly put on trial on 30 June due to the recent 
disturbance at the oil company, three of whom were Sunnis and eight were Shi’ites.  
The trial took place at the Police Fort in Manama, a poor choice of location.  The site 
had been chosen with the aim of providing a larger space for individuals concerned 
with the trial and for security reasons.  However the selected location seemed to 
have later agitated the crowds outside as they feared that the venue would not give 
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the Shi’ite defendants a fair hearing.  Moreover the appointed judges were Sunnis 
from the royal family and the Shi’ites feared that they would be given an unfair 
hearing.  The final verdict reached in the trial sentenced one of the accused Shi’ites 
to a one-year in prison and a fine, three others to two years imprisonment and a 
fine, and a fourth to a one-month jail sentence.  The three Sunnis received only a 
one-month jail sentence.  Burrows explained what might be misread according to 
him as unfair verdicts between the two sects, was due to the Shi’ite crowd who had 
arrived from a village in close proximity to BAPCO’s station to take part in the 
fight.188    
 As soon as the verdicts were read out, according to Belgrave who himself had 
announced the sentences, chaos erupted as Shi’ites opposed to the court’s decision 
declared their objection.  Crowds ran into the Manama Souq (market) calling on 
shopkeepers to close their stores.  Later a crowd of demonstrators assembled at the 
British Political Agency, although no serious rioting was recorded.189 
 Burrows despatched to the FO on the same day a sketch of the events and 
added that the demonstrators who had gathered at the Agency’s headquarters 
managed to meet the Political Agent and insisted on their demands to have the 
British intervene to nullify the sentences and for British protection.  The number of 
demonstrators was estimated to be approximately one hundred.  The angry crowd 
made it clear to Wall their desire to stay until all their demands were met.  
Nevertheless, the Agent managed successfully to disperse them.190 
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 The following day was marked by further trouble.  It started when a crowd of 
some two hundred agitated Shi’ites gathered at 10.00 am in the Mu’min Mosque 
very near to the Manama Police Fort.  The crowd armed themselves ‘with bits of 
wood, iron piping and leaves of motor-car springs’ and marched towards the fort.  
The purpose was to break through the fort and free the sentenced Shi’ites, 
presuming that they were held there.  The police shot at the crowd after two 
revolvers were fired from the demonstrators’ position, without receiving orders to 
do so.  The immediate result was that three demonstrators were killed and three 
others wounded.  Following the attack a number of rioters rushed to the public 
Hospital in Salmaniya, Manama, near to the Agency, and took away the bodies of the 
three fallen protestors.  The sight caused more excitement among the crowds, some 
of whom rushed into the Agency itself and seized a British flag.  Burrows claimed 
that the Political Agent persuaded the mob to leave the premises of the Agency after 
the arrival of the bodies of the fallen.  The Agent stated that the demonstrators 
demanded ‘British protection, backed by British troops in the town’.  Further, they 
threatened that if their demands were not met it would make them ‘determined to 
overthrow the ruling family’.  Nevertheless Burrows underlined to the FO (using 
Wall’s information) that none of the Shi’ite community leaders were part of the 
recent disturbances and that those who led the recent disorder were men ‘of no 
great repute or intelligence’.  The Agent also ordered the disarmament of all Agency 
guards for fear of crowds attempting to overcome the Agency in the future and that 
the Agency’s guards would be unable to restrain themselves.  Immediately following 
the spread of the news of the day’s events, the Ruler contacted the Political Agent 
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asking for his advice.  The Agent put forward a policy of pacifying the angry crowds 
and suggested the creation of a committee to investigate the disturbance and its 
immediate announcement.  The Ruler followed the Agent’s advice and the order to 
establish a ‘Commission of Enquiry’ by the Ruler was announced officially by noon 
on that very day.  Burrows also alerted the FO to the Ruler’s suspicion of British 
policy in Bahrain which he expressed during a meeting with Wall, saying that a 
rumour made its way to him that the Agency was urging Bahraini Shi’ites to rebel 
against the Government.191   
On the following day, 2 July, Sir Ralph Stevenson, the then British 
Ambassador to Egypt, responded to a report requested by TE Bromley to present his 
views in countering Egyptian influence.  Stevenson said that he had viewed reports 
from various Arab cities such as Benghazi, Beirut, Khartoum, Amman, Damascus, 
Jeddah, and Baghdad in order to form an understanding of how these cities were 
influenced but he had yet to receive a statement from Bahrain.192  The reason for 
Stevenson not receiving information was possibly the Residency’s occupation with 
the current disturbances.  
 As a consequence of the events, a strike was declared by the Shi’ite 
community, according to the Bahrain Government’s Annual Report, and some of 
those who wished to work were allegedly intimidated and forced not to do so.193  It 
was at that point that the Political Agent met with the Ruler on 3 July to advise him 
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about taking further steps to ease the current civil strife.  One of the steps proposed 
was to announce the hiring of a Judicial Adviser acting as Chief of Justice.  The 
second was to appoint a British officer to oversee the Police Force instead of 
Belgrave.  Third was to increase the police budget.194  That date coincided with 
spread of pamphlets that announced the formation of a Sunni-Shi’ite front.  The 
front that named itself as the ‘People of Bahrain’ had also forwarded its set of 
demands to the Ruler, the Political Agency, and to the Residency.  The demands 
consisted of seven points as follows: the election of an ‘Advisory Council’ with 
identical Sunni-Shi’ite representation; the formation of a committee specialising in 
drafting ‘a code of laws’ for Bahrain; the appointment of judges holding degrees in 
law; the formation of elected councils representing the municipalities, health, and 
education; the reform of the Police Force in addition to placing responsibility of any 
misconduct by the police on its superviser; the compensation of victims of various 
disturbances since the sectarian riots of 1953; and the punishment of the policemen 
responsible for firing on demonstrators on 1 July.195  The identities of those involved 
in the pamphlet and who or what they actually represented was unknown.  There 
was no mention of any demand that affected the position of Belgrave.  But the first 
five demands listed all affected the Adviser’s status in a direct and indirect way and 
if they were accepted they would nullify his position in controlling a number of the 
Administration’s departments.   
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With the ongoing strike, Sunnis described by Burrows as ‘tribesmen’ on the 
night of 6 July headed to the Ruler’s palace offering their services in order to force 
the reopening of the local souq.  Instead, the Ruler sent a police force of seventy-five 
men to the market place, their presence encouraged locals to reopen their stores 
safely without others forcing them to close.  The souq finally opened and life 
gradually returned to normal.196  BAPCO’s oil refinery was also affected by the strike 
but after the 10 July employees returned to work.197 
The Commission of Enquiry announced by the Ruler consisted of a British 
judge as its adviser, Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Abdul-Latif bin Mohammed 
Al-Sa’ad, and Abdul-Hussain Hilli.  The last two being a Sunni and a Shi’ite Sharia 
judges respectively.  However the two judges later refused to take part in the 
commission and were replaced by the Ruler with Ahmed Fakhroo, a Sunni 
businessman, and Mansoor Al-Arrayed, a well-known senior Shi’ite.198   
The Commission of Enquiry swiftly convened and met from 7 to 10 July, 
basing its findings on interviews it published in its report and presented it to the 
Ruler.  The Commission interviewed a number of eyewitnesses and had reached out 
to Al-Alaiwat to assist in the process of locating the eyewitnesses who wished to 
participate with their testimonies to the Commission.  The Commission stated that 
the rioters had hidden the number plates of the buses that had brought the 
demonstrators to the Mu’min Mosque.  They had also armed themselves after 
breaking into Turani’s Scrapyard in Manama.  An officer from the fort named Hamad 
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bin Rashid, struggled to persuade the crowd to disperse but with little success and 
from then on shots were heard being fired from the crowd, the police lost control 
and fired back.  The report also specified that four people in total had died, three 
arrived dead to the hospital, and one died later of his wounds.  Two British 
volunteers donated blood for three of the wounded rioters thereby saving their 
lives.  The Commission concluded that, although the crowds were in an ‘aggressive 
and threatening mood’, the police should have used less lethal methods to disperse 
of angry mobs.199   
At least three of the four fallen demonstrators lived outside of Manama and 
three of the four were younger than twenty-one.200  In this matter Burrows stated in 
his monthly Residency report of the Arab Gulf States under British protection that in 
memory of the four killed, photographs of the four were printed in Lebanon, around 
1,500 copies, sold at one-eighth of a Rupee per copy to the locals.201 
In the Resident’s view, the Bahraini sectarian tensions should be attributed 
to the general attitudes and regional tensions as ‘influence percolates even here 
through the Egyptian press and the various Arab radio broadcasts’.202  Following the 
recent trouble the Adviser received a letter from the Ruler on 19 September 
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ordering him to close Sawut Al-Bahrain for an ‘indefinite period’.203  The magazine’s 
last publication were issues nine and ten of its fourth year in July and August of 
1954.  Although the action did not yield any immediate results, its repercussions 
were later felt, as it will be presented in the following chapter. 
After a relatively peaceful period, troubles returned to Bahrain when the 
Administration imposed a law forcing vehicle owners to subscribe to a third-party 
insurance scheme.  The reason for implementing the law was that some drivers 
responsible for vehicle accidents were not financially capable of covering the cost of 
damage they had incurred to others and this resulted in their imprisonment.  Hence 
there was a need to implement a law forcing all parties to at least cover themselves 
by third-party insurance.  Taxi and bus drivers made their opinion publically known 
against the new law by going on strike on 25 September.  A new proposal to counter 
the Government’s plan was made with the idea of establishing a Sanduk [a Box] a 
kind of ‘local insurance plan’.204   
 On 26 September Belgrave’s diary entry reported on the visit of three 
Bahrainis who wanted to mediate in this the new crisis.  They were Jabir Al-
Musallem, Mansoor Al-Arrayed, and Khalil Al-Moayyed.  The three proposed to the 
Adviser the idea of forming the box as a Bahraini insurance fund scheme in which 
drivers can subscribe to as an alternative to engaging an insurance company.  
Belgrave in return informed the three that the Administration would not take part 
in this arrangement, although he did not provide them with a definite answer as to 
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whether he had accepted or rejected the proposal.205  Al-Bakir returned to Bahrain 
during the taxi and bus drivers’ strike.  He claimed that the idea of creating the box 
was his own as he had proposed it earlier to two of the three men who had met 
Belgrave.  Following a deadlock between the Administration and the strikers, an 
agreement was reached to accept the formation of a local Cooperative 
Compensation Fund and Al-Bakir was elected as its Secretary.206  Khalil Al-Moayyed 
was elected as its Chairman, Mansoor Al-Arrayed was appointed member, and 
Abdulla Fakhroo was nominated Treasurer.207   
Apart from Belgrave’s diary entry and Al-Bakir’s memoir, British officials 
recorded little information on the taxi and bus drivers’ strike.  However the monthly 
report by the Residency for November declared that the third-party insurance 
scheme was postponed by the Administration until 1 January 1955 and that the 
drivers ended their strike on 1 October.208 
 Superficially the situation might have seemed a purely local affair, its 
complexities can be tied to the overall sense of grievances against foreign-owned-
or-operated companies, for insurance companies established in Bahrain at the time 
were all foreign.  The general frustration towards these companies can be viewed in 
the larger local and regional context of attacks on foreign-owned-or-operated 
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companies, which -- in a sense -- became Bahrain’s own version of Egypt’s Suez 
Canal Company. 
 The disturbances of the year did not end at this point, as later a decision 
made by the Bahraini Administration against Al-Bakir developed into an 
overwhelming support for the latter.  The result was the creation of the nationalist 
party coinciding with the Anglo-Egyptian evacuation treaty and Nasser’s tightened 
grip on Egypt’s rule.  
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Chapter Three 
The Formation of the Nationalist Movement  
October to December 1954 
 
In order to better understand the background against which Bahrain’s 
nationalist party was born, it is important to first recognise the global context and 
the surrounding atmosphere that helped to engender its appearance.  The events 
that unfolded in the Middle East in the years 1955-56 could not have taken place if it 
was not for those of 1954 as these prepared ‘the stage’ for them.209  Bahrain was no 
exception to this, as the events that had unfolded throughout 1954, and in particular 
during its final three months, set the political scene for the next two years. 
On the global stage alliances and negotiations were being struck to further 
solidify Western advantage over Russian influence.  The first step involved a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a global alliance against 
the USSR originally established in 1949.  Its founding members were the US, Canada, 
Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Britain, France, and 
Portugal.210  The member concerned was Turkey, which achieved membership of 
the alliance in late 1952.211  A new proposed alliance between Turkey and Pakistan, 
based on the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ suggestion, materalised when 
both countries came to terms on 2 April 1954.  The signing of the new treaty was 
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followed by another -- an initial agreement between Egypt and Britain on 27 July for 
the latter to evacuate militarily from the Suez Canal Zone.212  
The deal to evacuate was backed by Prime Minister Churchill, who had 
initially declined the approach to withdraw.  But the formation and gradual link 
between Western-aligned pacts in the East and the West and the subsequent 
reduction in expense encouraged him to finally agree to the concept of 
withdrawal.213  Following the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 between 
Western and Communist states,214 the idea of organising a defensive alliance in East 
Asia was pushed forward.  Hence came the creation of the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) when an understanding was reached on 8 September in 
Manila between the organising states being the US, Britain, France, Australia, New 
Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines, giving way to the formation of the 
Pact.215  With Pakistan already in an alliance with Turkey, the West had successfully 
linked the two defensive pacts together.216   
The Middle East remained pactless and under the threat of a possible direct 
or indirect Soviet incursion.  To counteract that the concept of the Northern Tier 
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states was approached, abandoning the previous idea of MEDO with Egypt at its 
centre.  The Northern Tier meant that the reliance on other states, such as Turkey, 
Pakistan and (later) Iraq needed to become the cornerstones of a defensive bulwark 
for the region.217   
When Nuri Al-Saeed returned to the post of Prime Minister in Iraq in August 
1954 he set about his mission to have Iraq become part of the grand Western 
alliances directed against the ‘Soviet menace’.218  Nuri’s initiative provided a scheme 
that not only acted as a defensive methodology against the Soviets but offered to act 
as a bridge between the alliances in East Asia and Europe, SEATO and NATO.219  Nuri 
envisioned Iraq becoming part of that alliance network even before being offered 
the Premiership for the seventh time in Iraq as he had discussed the matter with 
Lloyd and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh as early as July 1954.220  His vision was 
encouraged in part by the Turco-Pakistani alliance that stimulated him to get in 
contact with the Turks on the possibility of expanding the alliance.221  Not only did 
the pacts act as a defensive deterrent against Soviet-Communist expansion, they 
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brought awareness to the populations of the countries involved that the Soviet 
threat was alive and well.222   
A delegation of Egyptian diplomats led by Major Salah Salem, the then 
Minister of National Guidance, arrived in Baghdad on 13 August to open discussions 
with the Iraqis on the Arab World’s future policy.  The Egyptians objected to 
entering into any form of an alliance that included Turkey or Pakistan.223  It was 
followed by Nuri’s attempt to personally convince Nasser of the alliance in Cairo. 
The two leaders had met face to face for the first and last time in September 1954.  
The Iraqi Prime Minister’s failure in Cairo took him to London and Eden decided to 
adopt Baghdad as the new cornerstone of a Western-oriented Middle Eastern 
alliance.224  
The evacuation treaty was signed between Egypt and Britain on 19 October.  
Sir Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State, negotiated the final detail of the 
treaty with Nasser.225  The Agreement inter alia laid down that British troops should 
withdraw in twenty months, the maintenance of the base during peacetime by 
technicians, and the use of the base in case of emergency by Britain if an attack on 
any other Arab State or Turkey occurred.226  The signature of the treaty was 
followed by an attack on Nasser’s life on 26 October in Al-Ma’nshiya Square in 
Alexandria.  The perpetrators were radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
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they were quickly put on trial and six were sent to the gallows.227  The incident also 
resulted in the arrest and removal of the powerless Naguib from the Presidency, 
accused of conspiring with the extremists.  Naguib was imprisoned on 14 November, 
never to return to political life.228 
Most importantly, the signing of the treaty created the opportunity of 
pushing towards an Egyptian-Israeli settlement, and so Plan Alpha was conceived.  
Francis Russell of the American State Department and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh the 
then Under-Secretary in the FO overseeing Middle Eastern affairs were both 
assigned by Eden and Dulles to develop the Plan.229  However a great stumbling 
block was placed early in negotiating a settlement between the two sides as the 
Israelis resisted the idea of offering land repatriation, gained from the First Arab-
Israeli War, to the Arabs.  The concessions involved, as Harold Macmillan noted: ‘the 
establishment of a sovereign Arab right-of-way across the Negev’, linking Egypt with 
Jordan.230   
In this confused and eventful regional environment, two events in Bahrain 
hastened the creation of a unified nationalist front.  The first being the closure of 
Sawut Al-Bahrain (cf Chapter Two).  The second was the withdrawal of Al-Bakir’s 
passport by the Administration following the creation of the Cooperative 
Compensation Fund.  No explanation was provided in Belgrave’s diary or memoir, 
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the Bahrain Government Annual Reports, or British papers as to why such a 
measure was taken.  Al-Bakir, however, offered his own explanation as he related it 
to his work at the Cooperative Compensation Fund.  He claimed that he was bribed 
with 50,000 Rupees by an unnamed representative from a competing foreign-
owned agency to leave his post at the Fund.231  On the grounds of his claim, a 
question arises as to why was he the only one offered a bribe to abandon his post? 
Why was there not a similar approach to other senior members of the Fund?  Al-
Bakir later tied the issue to his passport status as he asserted that the withdrawal 
came as a result of foreign companies’ pressure on Belgrave to do so.  
A series of meetings were coordinated between Sunnis and Shi’ites following 
the news of Al-Bakir’s passport withdrawal but the first initial meetings did not grab 
the attention of British officials in Bahrain.  It was not until the third meeting 
between members of the two communities that the Movement was noticed.  The 
first meeting was held on 6 October at the Khamis Mosque in Manama and aimed to 
confront Belgrave’s ‘dictatorship’.  The initial meeting agreed to organise another, 
bigger, gathering at Bin Khamis Ma’tem in Sanabis, a village in Manama, on 13 
October.  This was the birth date of the Movement and it was decided in the meeting, 
according to Al-Bakir, to establish a unified political front that consisted of one 
hundred and twenty founding members.  The Party’s general assembly consisted of 
eight members: four Sunnis and four Shi’ites, the Sunnis being: Abdul-Aziz Al-
Shamlan, Ebrahim Ibn Musa, Ebrahim Fakhroo, and Al-Bakir.  The four Shi’ites were: 
Abd-Ali Al-Alaiwat, Al-Syed Ali Kamal-el-Deen, Abdulla Abu Deed, and Mohsin Al-
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Tajir.  Al-Bakir was elected the Movement’s General Secretary.  The new Movement 
was named the Higher Executive Committee (HEC).232   Belgrave mocked it: ‘Higher 
than what?’ he said.233  To him the name might have seemed intimidating, giving it a 
higher authority to that of the Administration and of the Ruler.  
 A new gathering at the Mu’min Mosque in Manama on 18 October finally 
caught British attention.  The date chosen for the gathering marked a Shi’ite 
occasion celebrating forty days since the passing of the anniversary of Hussein’s 
martyrdom, thus guaranteeing a large audience of mourners.  Wall posted an 
account of the meeting’s proceedings to the Residency.  The message declared that 
the dynamo behind the Movement’s creation was Sunni journalists from Al-Qafilah 
and Sawut Al-Bahrain.  Wall highlighted his surprise about the success the group 
had achieved ‘in rallying the two communities to adopt a common political 
programme’.234  News of the gathering reached Belgrave, as he noted in his diary 
and he reported rumours he had heard that the HEC was out to set political 
demands that involved the formation of committees to oversee governmental 
departments, a matter he strongly opposed, as it directly threatened his status.235   
Al-Qafilah covered the proceedings of the day.  It stated that an oath read by 
Mahmood Al-Mardi was recited.  The oath pronounced: 
I swear by God Almighty to be faithful to the Arab nations’ cause and 
to march in solidarity united with the sons of my country.  No 
sectarianism, no division and God is my witness.236 
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A set of speeches were made during the meeting and all, as the Political Agent noted, 
agreed ‘in blaming the British for everything that is wrong in Bahrain’.  It was 
estimated that three to four thousand attended the meeting.237 
 Sets of political demands were proclaimed and a petition was forwarded to 
the Ruler.  The petition included four demands: first, the formation of a ‘Legislative 
Assembly’ via general elections; second, the introduction of a Penal Code; third, for 
the Government to allow the establishment of trade unions; fourth, the foundation 
of a ‘high court of appeal’ to act as an arbiter ‘between the Legislative and Executive 
Authorities’.  The petition was signed by the eight frontline members of the HEC and 
was dated 28 October 1954.238  Al-Bakir claimed that the petition was given to the 
Ruler by hand, by two members of the HEC: Ibn Musa and Abu Dheeb.239  Belgrave 
mockingly described the two HEC members who submitted the petition as ‘a small 
tobacco shop owner and a recently-bankrupt boat owner of Hedd’.240  Belgrave’s 
views of the Movement were tied with its individuals, even if the two members of 
the HEC were as described by the Adviser, what would it take away from them?  
Belgrave was only attempting to self-justify his opposition to the Party by ridiculing 
its members.  The Adviser also mocked the HEC by describing them as the 
presenters of Bahrain’s Magna Carta.241  Surprisingly, in his memoir, Nutting shared 
a similar impression of the members of the HEC, albeit not in a demeaning and 
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sarcastic way, comparing them to ‘English barons who brought about the signing of 
Magna Charta’.242  
 The most striking feature of the demands according to Wall’s intelligence 
was the information that reached him of the HEC’s plans in case the Ruler refused 
their demands.  The Party had planned to send representatives to Cairo and hire an 
Egyptian lawyer to file a case in British courts in London against the Administration.  
The Political Agent did not hide the Ruler’s suspicions of the Movement fearing that 
the British might be enticed to intervene as they had in 1923 when they removed 
his grandfather from power.  Wall additionally blamed the Bahraini Administration 
for its failure, since the attack on the fort, to display to the general public the steps it 
had taken towards internal reform, due to it not having ‘any organ of publicity’.  
Reforms before the incident were made by the Administration, but were not 
announced publically.  These reforms included the appointment of Geoffrey L Peace 
as a Judicial Adviser and the hiring of Colonel Hamersley as an Assistant 
Commandant to the Police.  In addition to this, steps had been taken to arrange for 
the compensation of the families of those who fell on 1 July.243   
 Was it possible that the formation of the HEC, the courage to voice its 
demands, and to challenge the Administration was merely a result of local 
developments?  It is highly unlikely to be the case, as the formation of the nationalist 
party coincided with the announcement that the British would evacuate the Suez 
Canal Zone.  The declaration of withdrawal must have seemed to the nationalists in 
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Bahrain as a sign of weakness and will have stimulated the Movement to come 
forward with its own set of demands. 
 In late October the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Assistant Head 
of Eastern Service, Nevill Barbour, toured the Middle East and included a short stay 
in Bahrain.  The Adviser met Barbour on 30 October.244  In Nevill Barbour’s 
collection kept at St Antony’s College in Oxford he recorded some information on 
the new modus vivendi formed between Sunnis and Shi’ites.  He sympathised with 
the Movement and recounted details of a meeting conducted with ‘the principal 
organiser of this political demonstration’ whom he did not name, but was likely to 
have been Al-Bakir.  The meeting took place at a Bahraini club to which a member of 
staff from the Political Agency had taken him.  The opposition figure that Barbour 
met objected to the BBC’s Arabic Service coverage of Bahrain, claiming that it 
offered ‘a misleading picture of local conditions’.245 
In Shuckburgh’s unpublished diary notes of his tour of the Middle East, the 
FO’s Under-Secretary visited Bahrain accompanied by Robert Belgrave on 6 
November, arriving from Iraq.  On the day of their arrival at the Residency they were 
taken to a banquet in the Ruler’s palace.  Shuckburgh recorded an intriguing 
encounter at the banquet where he met the Adviser.  It was Belgrave who had 
approached the Under-Secretary and talked ‘gravely about unrest in Bahrain’.  In 
Shuckburgh’s judgment, the Adviser seemed to have ‘no remedy’ for the ongoing 
conflict and acted rather ‘curiously reserved’.  On the following day a private 
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meeting was held that included Shuckburgh, Burrows, Wall, and Sheikh Salman in 
his palace in Riffa.  The conversation initially dealt with British support for the 
Administration in Bahrain in light of recent events.  Shuckburgh urged the Ruler to 
reach out to the general public and use the radio and press to achieve this.  He also 
advocated pushing the Administration towards further reform of the judiciary and 
commended the Ruler for his appointment of a Judicial Adviser.  Shuckburgh was 
informed according to his diary, although he did not name his source, that the Ruler 
believed that the British were ‘supporting the agitators against him’.  Belgrave later 
met with Shuckburgh and had a personal discussion vis-à-vis local affairs.  
Shuckburgh said that any crackdown on the agitators by Britain would be seen as 
interference in the state’s domestic affairs.  The Under-Secretary encouraged the 
Administration to improve its public security forces.  He also urged the Adviser to 
publish a pro-government newspaper and he noted in his diary the possibility of 
publishing ‘a British-subsidised newspaper’ for the entire Gulf region similar to the 
Iraq Times with Bahrain as its headquarters.  However, his suggestion was not made 
to Belgrave at the time.246  
The HEC announced the formation of a new ‘box’, a fund to support the Party 
by collecting subscriptions.  The ‘box’ was named the National Savings Fund.247  The 
HEC continued to hold meetings by taking advantage of Muslim celebrations to 
generate the largest possible crowds, and this time the Prophet Mohammed’s 
birthday was chosen.  The anniversary fell on 8 November and the gathering was 
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conducted at the Eid Mosque.  Al-Qafilah published extracts from Al-Bakir’s speech 
during the gathering in which he continued his attacks on foreign-owned-or-
operated enterprises in Bahrain, accusing them of ‘blackmail’ and demanded that 
they give ‘what they owe of rights to oppressed people’.248 
The Ruler refused the demands by the HEC and Burrows informed the FO.  
The Residency advised the Ruler to further publicise the Government’s work and 
instructed the Administration to look into turning the Official Gazette into a weekly 
newspaper.249   
With rumours of possible strikes occurring in response to the Ruler’s refusal, 
accompanied by trouble similar to the fort attack of the previous summer, the 
Resident wrote a strongly worded letter to the Ruler saying that he, ‘has now been 
good enough to discuss with the Political Agent and myself the problems which have 
arisen in the internal affairs of Bahrain for which Your Highness is responsible’.  He 
advised (or rather directed) him in this matter to form a Commission of his own 
selection to look into public demands and needs.  The Commission would report 
their findings to the Ruler.  He would then decide what course of action to take 
based on the findings.  In Burrows’ view this action would ease the current internal 
political situation.250  The Ruler replied to the ‘kind letter’, but did not take any 
further action.251  
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The Administration later heeded the advice of the Residency and a public 
announcement was made on the appointment of a Commission to investigate the 
performance of various government sectors without naming any of its members.  
The HEC, in response, issued a statement labelling themselves as ‘the effective 
instrument for expressing the wishes of this struggling nation’.  The proclamation 
rejected the actions taken and it called for a  ‘boycott [of] this Commission and 
regard anyone cooperating with it as a traitor’.252  
Facing a stalemate, the Political Agent aimed to act as a mediator to defuse 
the situation between the local Administration and the HEC.  In early December Wall 
met personally with Al-Bakir and Kamal-el-Deen who discussed with him their 
views about the Government’s proclamation.  Wall was informed by the two that 
they would boycott the Commission and would be calling for a national strike 
starting on Saturday 4 December.   
The two nationalists demanded from Wall that the Commission be made up 
of individuals seen as ‘neutral’ and that it should compromise six members, half of 
them to be ‘representatives of the people’ and the other half appointed by HMG and 
not the Ruler.  But Wall turned down British participation in the affair.  Furthermore 
he expressed to Al-Bakir and Kamal-el-Deen that it was unfair on their part to object 
to the Commission before any members were selected.  But to no avail and they 
insisted on going ahead with the strike.  The strike was later declared by the HEC to 
begin at 6.00 am on 4 December and to continue on through 10 December.253 
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The meeting between Wall and the two HEC members is recorded by 
Belgrave in his diary entry of 2 December, as Wall had informed the Adviser of 
seeing the two.  No details were provided as to who had called on whom and/or the 
details of the meeting.254  The meeting with the Agency was a most unusual situation 
for the nationalists.  They had consistently and publically objected about British 
‘interference’ in domestic affairs and the management of companies by foreigners. 
But, despite this, they demanded that they have three elected representatives in the 
Commission and that the other three were to be chosen by the British.   
Al-Bakir denied any direct contact with British officials at the time, asserting 
that his only contact with the British was through a Bahraini employed at the 
Residency.  Moreover, on a different occasion in the early days of the HEC, he 
claimed that he was approached by an unidentified man who advised him to contact 
the public relations officer (ranked as a Third Secretary at the Agency) but that he 
had refused to do so.255  Of the two, Wall and Al-Bakir, the latter would lose more in 
the eyes of his supporters if he had revealed his early communication with the 
Agency.  As to Wall, he would not benefit from forwarding false reports to the 
Residency or to the FO thus jeopardising his career. 
The announced strike was an early test for the HEC and of its popularity.  If 
successful, further pressure would be placed on the Administration.  However if it 
failed it would put the Movement in a difficult situation.  The first day of the strike 
on 4 December was a success, according to an account by Wall to the FO.  Indeed it 
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was so successful that it was estimated to have paralysed ninety per cent of 
Bahrain.256   
The HEC issued a pamphlet that congratulated the public on the strike’s 
success, informing them to report ‘without delay’ any incident to the Party’s First 
Aid Scout members.  This was the first mention in HEC statements of a Scouts’ 
movement in their organisation acting in a security role.257  During the strike the 
Bahraini Government issued an order forcing the closure of Al-Qafilah on 5 
December and the newspaper’s last issue was dated 26 November.258 
The Times of London reported the strike on 6 December.  No further details 
on the strike were given, other than it was in support of demands some of which had 
already been met by the Bahraini Government.259  The strike ended on 10 December 
and no major disturbances were reported.  On the following day, the Ruler 
publically announced the establishment of a Commission consisting of six men to 
examine educational, health, judiciary, and local security facilities: three were to be 
members of the royal family together with a Shi’ite, a merchant (probably Sunni), 
and the British Director of Customs.  Although Burrows considered the 
announcement to be ‘satisfactory’ he wished to see a wider variety of people chosen 
from more diverse backgrounds.260  The six appointed members were: Sheikh 
Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Mubarak bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Ebrahim 
bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa, Salim Al-Arrayed, Ahmed Fakhroo, and GWR Smith.  The 
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proclamation also declared that a Penal Code for Bahrain was to be drafted.  In 
addition the Ruler proclaimed that elections for the Manama Municipality would 
take place ‘in a month’s time’.261 
Al-Bakir contacted Saudi Arabia’s King Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and 
asked the Saudi monarch to mediate between the HEC and the Bahraini 
Government.  The King replied to the Secretary of the HEC advising him ‘that the 
path you have followed is not in the interests of yourselves, your country or your 
ruler’.  He cited an old Nejdi proverb, saying ‘a dispute between two is only in the 
interests of a third’.  He then advised Al-Bakir to seek reconciliation with the local 
Administration.262 
During the rise of the HEC, British policy in Bahrain was designed to reduce 
tensions between the Administration and the nationalist movement.  The British 
forced their opinions on the Ruler when they believed it was necessary fearing that 
a deadlock could have led to violent disturbances.  In Al-Bakir’s view British policy 
seemed confused and indecisive.  He believed that that was due in part to Britain’s 
ruling Labour Party and its preoccupation with upcoming elections in Britain.263  
The Bahraini nationalist leader was displaying his lack of knowledge of British 
politics, clearly believing (wrongly) that the Labour Party was in power in 1954.  
A possible explanation for Britain’s approach to the situation in Bahrain was 
that they were trying to strike a balance between the Administration and the 
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nationalists.  Britain had just completed the long-awaited evacuation treaty with 
Egypt and was not prepared to antagonise Nasser, knowing of his possible support 
of nationalist movements abroad.  The British still hoped that Nasser was the 
missing piece of the puzzle needed for making peace in the region and participation 
in anti-Communist alliances.  However Nasser’s honeymoon with the West was 
reaching its conclusion and competition with Iraq over Arab supremacy would 
cause Cairo to gradually move its attention eastwards. 
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Part II: Turning East 
 
Chapter Four 
Pacts and Committees 
January to June 1955 
 
If the mid-twentieth century could be described as the age that saw the rise 
of global pacts and alliances, then the year 1955 in Bahrain could best be described 
as ‘The Year of the Committees’.  This is because of the large number of committees 
which were established to oversee various departments and aspects of Bahraini life 
in response to confidential reports presented by the Commission of Enquiry.  It 
could also be said that the events that unfolded in the Middle East and in Bahrain 
from January to June 1955 solidified existing divisions.  The region became, as Lord 
Butler, the Chancellor of Exchequer and later the Leader of the House of Commons, 
described it, ‘the predestined scene of the Cold War for 1955 and 1956’.264  While 
large political battles were raging in the wider world, Bahrain was occupied with its 
own unique conflict.  This brought the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden into 
direct contact with the crisis for the first time and showed how British policy 
adapted to developments.  This time also saw Nasser adopt a new strategy as 
strengthening ties with the Eastern Soviet sphere moved the Egyptians gradually 
away from Western dominance.   
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In early 1955 a COS Committee memorandum re-emphasised the importance 
of the Middle East as an-air-and-sea communications crossroads linking three of the 
world’s continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe.  It was imperative seen as to block any 
Soviet incursion into the Middle East thus allowing them access to the Indian Ocean 
and the Arabian Gulf.  The paper cited Iraq as being pivotal ‘in trying to draw 
together the Arab States’.265 
Iraq’s intentions on taking the Western initiative ‘in defence’ of the Middle 
East were not left unchallenged.  Tensions between Egypt and Iraq grew when the 
latter declared its intent to sign a mutual defensive alliance with Turkey.  The 
announcement was countered by Egyptian propaganda attacks.  The Egyptians 
called for an emergency prime ministerial meeting to discuss recent developments 
in the Arab League on 22 January.266  In the meeting Egypt declared that it was ‘not 
yet ready to accept open alignment between the Arab States and the West’, although 
Egypt’s motives were not clear, Stevenson, the British Ambassador to Egypt at the 
time, believed it might have been associated with Egypt’s ‘anxiety to maintain her 
hegemony of the Arab League and in that way to secure the lion’s share of Western 
aid’.267   
 In Bahrain, following its successes of 1954, the HEC continued to press the 
Administration to accept further demands.  The frontline and senior members of the 
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Party met on a regular basis to discuss their approach and the methods they would 
use to tackle obstacles as they appeared.  The Cooperative Compensation Fund’s 
headquarters was initially used as the Party’s offices.  Meetings were also held at Al-
Alaiwat and E Fakhroo’s residences.268   
 Sir Leslie Fry, of the Eastern Department on behalf of the British Foreign 
Secretary, forwarded one of the earliest instructions from the FO to the Residency in 
the Gulf on how to handle the internal Bahraini conflict on 25 January 1955.  The 
Residency was told to adopt a policy in Bahrain that was dependent  
upon how the situation develop[ed], in particular, upon the degree to 
which the appointment of the Ruler’s Committee [Commission of 
Enquiry] reduces the pressure from the reformers.   
 
Moreover the Residency was instructed to persuade the Ruler to satisfy ‘local 
aspirations and [to] give his administration a more modern look’.  However caution 
was to be exercised by British officials in avoiding undermining the Ruler or 
‘causing him to abdicate’ as a result.  The amount of pressure exerted on the Ruler 
was left to Burrows’ own judgment.269 
 In an effort to counter the opposition’s attacks against the Administration 
and to publicise its work, the Government of Bahrain announced in February the 
creation of a Public Relations Department, the management of which was awarded 
to Belgrave’s son JH Belgrave.270  As for the HEC, the Party aimed to fulfill one of Al-
Bakir’s long-held visions when it announced in its circular numbered fifteen of 8 
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February its intention to establish a trade union without government consent.  A 
fund was created to support the union.  The Party also announced its boycott of all 
government councils and committees, ordering citizens (both appointed and 
elected) to withdraw from them immediately.  The measure included committees 
created previously by the Administration for Waqf purposes, minors, municipalities, 
trade, courts, and all other such entities.  The HEC warned that those who failed to 
resign ‘will be considered as a traitor’, thus solidifying internal polarisation. 
In the same circular the Movement introduced its policy for the coming 
months.  It first called for the formation of committees in Bahrain’s cities and 
villages to oversee local disputes as an alternative to the Government’s own judicial 
system.  Second, it gave the Government of Bahrain an ultimatum of two months to 
respond to its demands.  If the Government failed to answer positively to the 
demands, the Party would then launch demonstrations throughout Bahrain’s major 
urban centres.  The Movement also called for a boycott of the Manama Municipal 
elections.  The casus belli was that the Municipal Council should fall under the 
jurisdiction of ‘the people’ and not the Administration.271  The circular was followed 
by an official letter to the Ruler of Bahrain dated 9 February from the HEC urging 
him to ‘accept the people’s demands’ without further delay.272  The announcement 
displayed a new tone by the HEC when confronting the Administration -- both 
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overconfident and daring.  The Party forwarded a letter to the Political Agency in 
March announcing its intention to establish a trade union.273   
 Early 1955 saw the appointment of a new Political Agent in Bahrain, upon 
the completion of Wall’s services, Charles Gault.  In February and after 
approximately two months of service in Bahrain, Gault sent the Resident his views 
regarding local developments for the first time since arriving in post.  The Agent 
viewed nationalists, like every Arab ‘a volatile creature and when his interest or 
enthusiasm is aroused, wants the whole loaf at once, without pausing to think’.  
From Gault’s perspective as a new diplomat in Bahrain he acknowledged the 
Bahraini Administration’s work and progress over the decades but had also 
affirmed that it was flawed.  In Gault’s opinion the worst department operating in 
Bahrain was the Police Force because of the poor training of its officers and men 
who lacked professional crowd-control techniques.  He also pointed to the new and 
growing oil wealth of neighbouring countries (Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) that 
was attracting Bahrainis to work there for better wages and further adding to local 
grievances.  With these conditions according to Gault, ‘Bahrain has I feel reached a 
turning point in its history’.  In Gault’s opinion the driving force behind the recent 
struggles in Bahrain was ‘nationalism, which has permeated Bahrain’ resulting in 
the current political deadlock.  The Agent believed that the time had come to 
pressure the Administration into making even further reforms.274  One of the first 
suggestions Gault provided the Bahraini Administration with was the development 
                                                        
273 ‘Bernard Burrows, Residency’s Monthly Report for March 1955’, in Political Diaries of the Persian 
Gulf, vol. 20 1955-1958, ed. R.L. Jarman (London: 1990), 1-4 (2). 
274 TNA, FO 1016/386, Gault to Burrows, 10 February 1955. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 92 
of its own Labour Law to divert the HEC from establishing a trade union.  The 
Labour Law should aim, he said, to better manage the conditions of workers in 
Bahrain and to enable the setting up of trade unions.275 
The HEC’s boycott of the Manama Municipality’s elections proved yet another 
successful undertaking.  From the twelve elected seats, of a total of twenty-four, as 
the other twelve were to be appointed by the Ruler, none ran for the elections.276  
The alarming success of the boycott was based on the Party’s tactics of denouncing 
those who wished to run as traitors.  The event further boosted the Party’s 
egomania as it now seemed virtually invincible. 
Following the election debacle, Gault conducted a private meeting on 17 
February with the Adviser in which he rebuked him over certain policies his 
Administration exercised that had played its part in the recent political congestion.  
Gault said that the Ruler should undertake further reforms in order to appease the 
HEC.  He pointed to the unsatisfactory and inadequate condition of the police.  The 
Agent felt that the abysmal state of the public security forces might bring about 
direct British intervention with troops on the ground if a major disturbance 
occurred, a situation he wished to avoid at all costs.  Gault criticised Belgrave over 
the closure of the two publications, Sawut Al-Bahrain and Al-Qafilah, as this was 
seen as being in conflict with Western principles of press freedom.  The Agent also 
outlined to Belgrave his views that several government departments were in need of 
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more British staff to ensure greater efficiency.  In concluding the meeting, Gault said 
that he assumed that ‘the Adviser realises now that things are serious here’.277   
Eden was due to meet for the first and last time his future nemesis, Egypt’s 
leader Colonel Nasser, in Cairo on 20 February.  The visit was part of his trip to 
attend SEATO’s first council meeting due to be held in Bangkok.  At the time the 
Alpha Plan was alive and continued to seek to ‘cast Colonel Nasser in a leading role’, 
working towards a long-standing settlement with the Israelis.  It was up to the 
Foreign Secretary in his short visit to Cairo to play his part in encouraging the 
Egyptians to work towards a resolution without seeming to impose his will on the 
issue.  A list of arguments and counter arguments were created for Eden to confront 
Nasser with.278  
 Upon Eden’s arrival a dinner was organised with Nasser at the British 
Embassy in Cairo.  The topic of an Arab-Israeli settlement was brought up.  
According to Eden, the Egyptian leader was not ‘entirely negative on the question’ 
but had ‘emphasised the importance of timing and the need for a comprehensive 
settlement’.  However the main topic of dispute raised was regarding Iraq’s new 
alliance with Turkey.  Nasser stated his objection of the Pact between the two states 
as it ‘had seriously set back the development of effective collaboration with the 
West by the Arab States’.  Eden believed that the Egyptian leader’s hostility to the 
Turco-Iraqi Pact was due to jealousy ‘and a frustrated desire to lead the Arab 
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World’.279  The Foreign Secretary’s thoughts on Nasser’s stance towards the Pact 
were also shared by Lloyd, who believed that Nasser ‘was extremely jealous of Nuri 
and afraid that Iraq would challenge Egypt for leadership of the Arab states’.280  
Eden’s next stop, after Cairo, was the islands of Bahrain. 
Al-Bakir claimed in his memoir that, following the success of the strike of 
December 1954, the British were determined to communicate with the HEC.281  
However Al-Bakir, as the Residency’s monthly report of March 1955 confirmed, had 
personally requested the opportunity to meet any British personalities stopping in 
or visiting Bahrain.  Indeed the Residency saw him to be keener to approach the 
British than vice versa.  He asked the Political Agent for an opportunity to meet Dr 
Bennett, the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Fuel and Power and 
Sir John Sterndale-Bennett, the Deputy Commissioner General for South East Asia, 
who both visited Bahrain in 1955.  Unfortunately for Al-Bakir the meetings were not 
possible since the guests had already left when he made the request.  The HEC’s 
Secretary later requested to personally meet Eden during his stop in Bahrain on 21 
February en route to the SEATO meeting in Bangkok.  Gault informed Al-Bakir that 
such a meeting was not possible as Eden was only staying to meet the Ruler of 
Bahrain for approximately one hour.  He, however, agreed to forward any letters 
presented to Eden by the HEC.282  In another pro forma from the Political Agency 
that consisted of the minutes between Al-Bakir and Gault, the latter documented the 
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Party Secretary’s threat that, if he was unable to meet Eden, he would then declare a 
demonstration on the day of Eden’s visit.283 
During Eden’s visit to Bahrain, the HEC presented a seven-page 
memorandum to him listing their demands via the Political Agent.  In the 
memorandum the Party stated that HMG are ‘our natural allies and in whom the 
people of Bahrain have faith’ in improving local conditions and rights.  It offered a 
brief background of the Movement and warned that further delays to agreeing to 
their demands might push Bahrainis into an uncontrollable state.  The HEC 
additionally informed Eden that the Administration resorted to deducting a week’s 
wage from its employees during the strike of December 1954 and closed down two 
nationalist publications.  The memorandum, moreover, described Belgrave as a 
‘dictator’ and called for democratic processes to be implemented.  To the HEC, 
Belgrave seemed to be destined to remain in post for ever and the Ruler appeared 
content on continuing with the Adviser’s services.  The Party also urged HMG to 
strengthen its ties with the people of Bahrain and not with the Ruler.284   
At this stage the HEC seemed to have adopted a policy of double-dealing 
between its nationalistic calls and clandestine direct-dealing with the British 
Political Agency in order to maximise its political gains.  From one perspective they 
seemed to the public to be anti-British and from another through their approaches 
to British officials in Bahrain they were persistent in gaining British support for 
their demands.  
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On the same day the demands were presented to Eden, the Foreign Secretary 
met the Ruler of Bahrain.  Eden informed the Ruler that HMG was paying close 
attention to developments in Bahrain and urged him to openly declare his policies to 
his people.  Eden pointed to his ‘appreciation’ of the steps made by the Government 
but also cautioned the Ruler ‘that just because people now were better educated and 
had time to look round it was impossible to stand still’.285   
Clarissa Eden, the Foreign Secretary’s wife, accompanied him on his trip. 
Details from her account of the visit were slight, but she did reportedly say that she 
left her husband with the Sheikh, so he ‘can tick him off for something or other’.286  
To Belgrave, the Ruler was ‘delighted’ with the result of this, albeit short, meeting 
and he took on board Eden’s advice which he understood to be along the lines that 
the Government must improve its public relations activities.  He urged the Adviser 
to look into producing a daily newspaper on behalf of the Administration.  The 
Adviser, due to his habit of micromanaging the Government, criticised the Ruler for 
thinking that such an assignment ‘could be done in the office in spare time’.287  
However, it must be said that, had the Government adopted this approach earlier 
and had allocated a specialist to the task, it could have developed into an instrument 
for voicing the Administration’s vision and works and, thereby, greatly eased the 
situation.  Eden instructed Gault to reply to the HEC memorandum by making it 
clear that ‘constitutional methods’ must be utilised in expressing views and there 
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should not be ‘rival organisations’ to the Government causing confusion to the 
general public.  On the details of the response, the Foreign Secretary gave the 
Political Agency and Residency a carte blanche to answer the HEC in accordance 
with the points he had dictated.288   
 The Political Agent discussed with Burrows the pros and cons for the most 
appropriate policy to take in responding to the HEC on behalf of Eden.  Gault feared 
that, if Eden’s overall response sounded positive it might encourage the HEC, further 
resulting ‘in the government machine coming to a standstill’.  Gault suggested 
another approach to the predicament which was to point out the Bahraini 
Administration’s accomplishments and steps it had taken towards further reform.  
The risk of this response would then be, according to the Agent, for the HEC to 
launch demonstrations, strikes, and violence.  The Agent also thought that if a 
positive response was granted to the HEC that other Gulf States might look at 
developments in Bahrain unfavourably.  Therefore, according to Gault, the approach 
to take with Al-Bakir and his followers was to ‘return a somewhat damping reply to 
the High Executive Committee, even if this risks producing a relatively violent 
reaction’.  In the Political Agent’s view a functioning government with a portion of 
its population in opposition is by far a better approach than a government 
malfunctioning due to instability.289   
The official British reply to the nationalists was submitted by the Political 
Agent on 17 March to the HEC and it underlined the reforms that had been recently 
adopted by the Government, among which was the draft of a new Penal Code, the 
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hiring of a Judicial Adviser, the hiring of an Assistant to the Commandant of the 
Police, the Ruler’s promise of developing the constitution governing the municipal 
councils, the hiring of a British doctor as an Assistant to the State’s Medical Officer, 
the installation of new electricity plants, and the construction of new schools for 
boys and girls.  The letter took the HEC to task for its stubbornness in not 
cooperating with the Administration and it further warned the Party that ‘you must 
not try to run before you can walk’.  It stated, additionally, its refusal to 
acknowledge the HEC, since there were no constitutional means that legitimised it.  
The letter also highlighted the channels of communication that were available to 
them but which they had boycotted.  The latter was in reference to February’s 
municipal elections.290  The Adviser did not hide in his diary his pleasure at the 
British response to the HEC as he considered it ‘a smack in the eye to them by 
others’.291   
 The reply was personally read out and handed to Al-Bakir by Gault.   
Al-Bakir’s initial verbal response to the letter ‘reiterated that his Committee was not 
prepared in any circumstances to co-operate with the Bahraini Government since 
they had lost faith in it’.  He also attacked Belgrave, suspecting that he had ‘too much 
influence with the Ruler’.292       
The HEC responded to the British reply in a letter dated 29 March, in which 
the Party emphasised the topic of the centralisation of power by the British Adviser.  
In addition they criticised the steps taken by the Government towards reform as 
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being not enough.  The Party also went on to explain its stance on every issue in 
minute detail, repeating the same ideas it had outlined in its earlier memorandum, 
in a letter spread over ten pages.293  Gault offered his opinion to the Residency on 
the HEC’s response, saying that it ‘brings forward no new argument which would 
warrant our answering it on the Foreign Secretary’s behalf’.294  Burrows further 
believed that the entire and only point of the HEC’s response was to ‘have the last 
word’.295 
On the regional scene the Turco-Iraqi Pact finally saw light on 24 February 
when it was signed by both parties.  Nuri represented the Iraqis and Adnan 
Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, represented the Turks.  The Pact officially 
linked an Arab State, (Iraq) to NATO via Turkey.296  The signing of the Pact was seen 
as the first step towards formulating the Northern Tier defence alliance. 
Meanwhile in late February in Bahrain Edward Skinner of BAPCO’s 
management informed the Residency that Al-Bakir’s (unnamed) cousin had told the 
company’s Security Department in Awali of a plot to mount demonstrations starting 
on 1 April.  The demonstrations would run for three consecutive days.  If the 
demonstrations failed to produce the nationalists’ desired outcomes, the 
assassination of a member of the ruling family and a European was to be carried out.  
The reason as to why the cousin had uncovered the alleged plot was his disapproval 
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of it.  Burrows did not believe that there was any evidence to prove that the idea was 
approved by Al-Bakir.297  
Plans to reach a peace settlement in the Middle East between the Arabs and 
Israelis suffered a serious setback on 28 February.  Ongoing border tensions 
between the Egyptians and Israelis were reported on that date, only days following 
David Ben-Gurion’s (a known hawk in his dealings with the Egyptians) re-
appointment as the Israeli Minister of Defence.  This was a so-called ‘reprisal’ raid 
by the Israelis against Egyptian military units in Gaza resulting in the deaths of 
forty-two Egyptian soldiers.298  In Nutting’s perspective the Egyptians saw the raid 
as part of a plot by the West to undermine their revolution.299  Dr Murad Ghaleb, a 
former Egyptian diplomat to the USSR, took a similar approach to Nutting’s, as he 
claimed that the then Egyptian leadership saw it as a message to persuade Egypt 
into a defensive pact with the West.  But, if this was the case, it backfired because 
the event triggered Nasser to shop for arms outside of the Western sphere.300  
Nasser had earlier promised the army new American-made arms.  But they never 
arrived.  Heikal blamed Churchill for blocking the Americans from arming Egypt out 
of fear that they might be used against the British in the Suez Canal Zone.301  In the 
summer of 1954 and during the Suez Canal Zone evacuation talks, Churchill thanked 
President Eisenhower for withholding, ‘arms and money from the Egyptian 
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dictatorship’.302   Nasser’s own position at the top of the Egyptian regime was at 
stake and he had to find a solution before a crisis of confidence in him developed 
within Egypt’s military ranks.  At this point Trevelyan understood that Nasser was 
‘prepared to take major political risks in order to obtain a decisive superiority in 
armament over Israel’.303   
The Egyptians were quick in their response to the events and Nasser set out 
to form his own ‘Southern Tier’ alliance that included Syria and Saudi Arabia to 
stand against the Turco-Iraqi Pact.  Nasser’s pact would also restrain Jordan from 
attempting to join the Iraqis and would re-emphasise Egypt’s position in the Arab 
World.304 
On 1 March, the day after the escalated border tension between Egypt and 
Israel, Gault held a pre-arranged meeting with the Ruler of Bahrain.  The Agent was 
criticised by the Ruler for offering an audience on a number of occasions to Al-Bakir.  
The Ruler feared that by providing Al-Bakir and his followers with an open door to 
the British it had ‘encouraged them’ further with their movement.  Sheikh Salman 
brought to Gault’s awareness the limited finances the country received from oil 
revenues in comparison with other states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar 
and its inability to compete with other regional states.  In return, Gault 
demonstrated the necessity for the Bahraini Administration to further publicise its 
vision and works to the general public.  In defending his meetings with Al-Bakir, the 
                                                        
302 Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 1954 in The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955, 
edited by P.G. Boyle (Chapel Hill, NC: 1990), 147-49.  
303 Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, 6. 
304 BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956.  Doc. 582: 
FO 371/115496, [Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi defence association]: inward telegram no 368 from Sir R 
Stevenson to FO on the response to Colonel Nasser’s defence initiative, 9 March 1955; and Wheelock, 
Nasser’s New Egypt, 224. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 102 
Agent remarked to the Ruler that he felt obliged to receive complaints from the 
general public, even from ‘troublemakers’.305  
By early March the HEC formulated a draft scheme to establish a trade union.  
To counter this, and as advised by Gault, the Administration announced a project to 
set up a labour law code and a Government Labour Committee.  So, on 3 March, 
Burrows invited Matthew T Audsley, the Labour Counselor in Cairo, to Bahrain for a 
few days to offer his expertise in this field.  Audsley met with Al-Bakir and managed 
to successfully convince him to put off the establishment of his union until his next 
(unspecified) visit to Bahrain. 
 Burrows summarised the policy that was to be adopted by the Residency in a 
message to the FO on 5 March.  Regarding recent internal developments the 
Resident said: 
In the light of our interest in its welfare, we would continue to watch 
the progress of political developments here with sympathy and would 
give advice if required.  But we could not recognize, or have dealings 
with, a committee which had set itself up without any constitutional 
basis and which boycotted the democratic processes which had been 
made available.   
 
He also cautioned that any resort to violence by the HEC would result in the loss of 
British and international sympathy for its cause.306 
The new proposed Government Labour Committee announced by the 
Administration in March consisted of three government representatives, two 
members of the ruling family, a British officer, three BAPCO employees of which one 
would be a British or an American, the second an employee of a local Bahraini firm 
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and an Arab, three workers one representing BAPCO, another a government 
employee, and finally one was to be chosen from four candidates nominated by the 
HEC.  Audsley personally met with Al-Bakir and urged him to accept the proposal as 
the HEC’s plans for a single trade union was not realistic, according to the British 
labour adviser.  After consultation, the HEC accepted the idea but later withdrew 
their support.  This change of mind came in the form of three demands.  Firstly, that 
the HEC put forward a nominee of its own choice and that the Government had no 
say in the Party’s decision.  Secondly, the official acknowledgement of the HEC by 
the Government of Bahrain.  Thirdly, the insistence on forming an ‘Assembly’ to 
discuss issues other than labour.   
With the HEC’s refusal to accept the Government Labour Committee, the 
Administration decided that the last three posts were to be filled by elections in 
April.  As well as its attempt to form a Labour Committee, the Bahraini 
Administration had taken the initiative independently to set up two other appointed 
committees responsible for overseeing the Departments of Health and of Education 
based on the Commission of Enquiry’s recommendations, which had yet to be 
published in full.  The Ruler then declared his intention to personally contribute 
£157,500 towards new health and educational projects to be directed by the two 
new committees.307   
Regarding the Commission of Enquiry’s findings, reports on each department 
were sent to the Ruler, to the Adviser, and to the Political Agent as each department 
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was surveyed.  No major issues were raised according to Gault.  However there were 
many ‘individual criticisms’ in the reports which could not be ignored and should be 
acted upon by the Administration in due course.308 
A circular (number sixteen) published by the HEC on 15 March criticised the 
Government on its intention to establish health and education committees with 
appointed members.  The Party reinstated its demands to form a Legislative Council 
elected by the people.  It also criticised the councils to be established with merely 
advisory powers and noted that their decisions could be overruled by the 
Government.  The HEC called on the rejection of the health and education 
committees and for those nominated not to accept their nominations.309  
The Political Agent informed Burrows of a meeting that had taken place 
between him and Al-Bakir, upon the initiative of the latter, on 6 April.  The HEC’s 
Secretary came to inquire about Audsley who, due to his commitments elsewhere, 
had promised to return to Bahrain to continue his work on the country’s labour 
issues.  He had heard a rumour that Audsley would not be returning to Bahrain.  Al-
Bakir had promised Audsley not to proclaim his own trade union until the British 
Labour Adviser had returned.  He spoke of his fear of delaying the matter further as 
his supporters ‘were difficult to restrain’.  Gault viewed Al-Bakir’s words as a threat 
and informed him that neither the Resident nor himself  
approve his tactics of attacking the Bahrain Government from all sides 
while refusing, and inciting others to refuse, to cooperate with that 
government when invited to do so.310   
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So the HEC officially formed its own trade union in early April.311  The organisation 
came to be known as the Bahra’ni Trade Union.312   
 Gault also criticised the Bahraini Administration for its slowness in 
responding to political developments.  The Agent blamed the slow reactions of the 
Adviser on his insistence ‘in trying to do everything himself – as he was able easily 
to do years ago when government was simpler’.  He was also critical of the HEC’s 
policy in handling the internal political situation, as ‘Whatever the Bahrain 
Government do will be found wanting by them’.  Gault suggested to Burrows the 
appointment of an assistant to Belgrave to aid the Government in its work, although 
he doubted that Belgrave would accept the idea.313 
 On 6 April Eden took over the British Premiership from Churchill.314  On 
Churchill’s last day in office, Britain officially joined the Turco-Iraqi Pact which 
would soon come to be known as the Baghdad Pact.315  The decision to join the Pact 
was proclaimed by Eden earlier in the House of Commons on 30 March.316  The US 
did not join the Pact as it feared that its membership of the alliance would hinder its 
relations with Nasser.  Furthermore, the American Jewish lobby disapproved of the 
US partaking in the coalition as long as Iraq was part of it and Israel was not a 
member.317 
On the same day that the Government Labour Committee’s elections were 
due, on 19 April, an article attacking the Adviser in Bahrain was published in Egypt’s 
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Akher Sa’ah (The Last Hour) Magazine.  The article was headlined ‘Revolution 
Sweeps Bahrain’.  It stated that ‘The people of Bahrain are on the move.  The secret 
national movement is growing stronger and for several weeks this country has been 
living on the edge of a volcano’.  It also reported that the Secretary General of the 
Arab League, Abdul-Khaleq Hassouna, had received ‘a grave report’ regarding affairs 
in Bahrain forwarded to him by ‘a special messenger’.  The article saw the 
Movement as one struggling to free Bahrain from ‘British Imperialism’ and to 
liberate it from the hands of Belgrave, who was labelled ‘the British High 
Commissioner in Bahrain’.  The article also suggested that Belgrave saw himself in 
Bahrain as ‘the Guardian of Islam’.  The article portrayed the Adviser to be the actual 
Ruler of Bahrain on behalf of the British.  The magazine went on to provide an 
overview of Belgrave’s career prior to becoming the ‘High Commissioner of 
Bahrain’, and it declared that he had been dismissed from his post at Siwa Oasis and 
that only through his ‘aristocratic’ wife did he manage to land the post of 
Commissioner in Bahrain.  The magazine also alleged that Belgrave had successfully 
‘acquired for himself a huge fortune’ and had used his powers to appoint his wife as 
an educational director for girls’ schools.  Other attacks were made on the British 
Director of Health in Bahrain, RHB Snow, who it said had performed negligent 
surgery after he had operated on a patient’s healthy eye instead of the one which 
had glass in it for two years.  The report, however, did not state how the patient 
managed to live comfortably for two years with glass in his eye.318  Belgrave was 
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informed of the article by the Ruler’s uncle, who as Belgrave noted, was upset at its 
content.319 
 Akher Sa’ah, like other media outlets in Egypt following the fall of King 
Farouk, was heavily monitored by the Egyptian regime.  The press became an 
instrument of influence and propaganda echoing Egypt’s own policy.  For each print 
publication a government representative was assigned so that nothing was to be 
published outside set boundaries.320  The timing of the attack on British interests in 
the Gulf followed Egypt’s protest at the formation of the Baghdad Pact was critical 
and was part of the regime’s policy of undermining British interests in the Arab 
World. 
The allegation of Belgrave being dismissed from his role in Egypt and later 
aided by his wife in landing the new post in Bahrain was not accompanied by any 
proof.   But it was repeated by Al-Bakir in his speech to the Kuwaiti Studentship 
Union in Cairo in 1956.321  Al-Bakir’s repetition of the claims points to two 
possibilities: either he reiterated what Akher Sa’ah had stated regarding Belgrave or 
he was that ‘special messenger’ who passed on to the Arab League’s General 
Secretary the claims the magazine had published.  
The Government Labour Committee’s elections for the three elected seats 
took place as scheduled and there was no call to boycott them.  The results were 
announced on 24 April and included the names appointed by the Government to the 
Committee.  It consisted of the following persons from the Government of Bahrain: 
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Sheikh Ali bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Ali bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa, and the 
Director of Customs GWR Smith.  Representing the employers were: LA Smith 
Personnel Manager of BAPCO holding British citizenship, Mohammed Kanoo a 
leading merchant, and SM Uchi, a building contractor.  From the elected workers 
were Mahmood Al-Alawi, an accounts officer at the Adviserhip (or Adviserate – 
Belgrave’s headquarters), Ali bin Sayid Hussein from BAPCO, and Mohammed 
Qassim Al-Shirawi.322  The first meeting of the Bahrain Government Labour 
Committee was held on 30 April with Audsley’s presence as work began on the 
setting up of a labour code in Bahrain.  Burrows requested the FO to send experts to 
assist the Committee with its work.323 
Following the establishment of the Labour Committee (and to Burrows’ own 
surprise) the HEC ‘gave up its demand for recognition by the Government in return 
for being allowed unofficially to nominate the workers’ representatives on the 
committee, who were then “elected”’.324  The latest demand was not met by the 
Administration.  
On 2 May, Bahrain was due to receive an unexpected visitor from Egypt.  
Nasser had recently completed his tour of Asia and to attend the Afro-Asian 
Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference, in Indonesia between 18 to 24 
April.  The Conference was the Egyptian Prime Minister’s first visit abroad.325  The 
Bandung Conference aimed ‘to demonstrate the solidarity of the neutral, non-
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aligned states of Africa and Asia’, as Nutting commented.  Nasser managed to 
convince the conference to have its headquarters in Cairo.  The movement that 
emerged later came to be known as the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Movement.326    
En route to the conference Nasser, in an Air India plane that was provided for 
his journey, had stopped in Rangoon, Burma where he met with People’s Republic of 
China’s Premier Chou En Lai.  The Chinese understood the need for Egypt to arm 
itself and both sides considered the possibility of the Soviets being the suppliers.  
The Chinese Premier promised Nasser to look into the matter with the Russians.  
Following Nasser’s return to Cairo, China confirmed to the Egyptians Russia’s 
willingness to sell arms to Nasser.327  Previous attempts during Stalin’s era had been 
made by the Egyptians to purchase arms from the Soviets but these efforts fell short.  
According to Anwar Al-Sadat it was Stalin’s own ‘principles [that] prevented him 
from supplying weapons to non-Communist states’.328   Stalin distrusted countries 
outside of the Soviet orbit as Dulles had observed.  That approach changed in the 
new Soviet Union and a policy of greater tolerance was adopted.329  The event was a 
key turning point in the Cold War politics of the Middle East as Nasser and his 
followers outside Egypt began their migration to the Eastern sphere under the 
Soviet umbrella.330  Furthermore, the conference led Nasser to adopt a policy of so-
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called ‘positive neutrality’ within the context of the greater Cold War scenario.331  
Nasser’s hostility to the Baghdad Pact must had attracted the Soviets to him, as the 
Pact was aimed primarily against them.  Turning Egypt into a satellite state by 
winning over Nasser, even if he did not adhere to Communist ideology, was a major 
coup in the new Great Game.332 
Belgrave wrote in his diary of 2 May of being woken up at 3.30 am with the 
news that Nasser, upon returning to Cairo from the Bandung Conference and tour of 
Asia, had requested to refuel in Bahrain after fog had diverted his plane from its 
planned stop in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.  The Egyptian Prime Minister was due to 
arrive at 8.00 am accompanied by Major Salah Salem, the Secretary General of the 
Arab League, and two newspaper editors.  The Egyptians were greeted by the 
Resident, Political Agent, and the Adviser, who the Ruler had sent on his behalf.  
Burrows’ fear of a certain request by Nasser came true when the Egyptian leader 
asked the Resident for the opportunity to drive around Bahrain.  The Resident 
feared that this would lead to unwanted demonstrations.  He considered two 
possible alternatives to prevent any unforeseen public reaction.  The first was to 
order a Royal Air Force (RAF) officer at the airport to intentionally create a car 
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accident at the gate of the airport, thus temporarily blocking it.  The second option 
was to have Nasser driven in the Residency’s car with a British flag flown on the 
car’s front side.  But before any of the possible solutions could be acted upon the 
process of refueling the plane was completed and the Egyptians were ready to 
board.  Nasser remained in Bahrain for a total of approximately thirty minutes, 
according to Belgrave.  Al-Bakir arrived late and managed to have a few words with 
the Egyptian leader.  He apologised to Nasser in the name of the people of Bahrain 
for not knowing earlier about his arrival.  As a consequence of this curtailed visit 
Egyptian media outlets attacked the British in Bahrain for their failure to publicise 
Nasser’s visit although British officials were only informed of it a few hours before 
to his brief stopover.333   
In a letter to Harold Macmillan, the then new Foreign Secretary in Eden’s 
Cabinet dated 9 May from Burrows, he explained the Residency’s objective in aiding 
the Administration in its process of setting up the new Government Labour 
Committee.  The Resident said:  
We are in fact making the rather curious experiment of introducing 
industrial democratic processes in a society in which political 
democracy is almost entirely absent and in which it continues to 
appear most unwise to tamper too rapidly with the existing 
constitutional position.  
 
Burrows also made the point that although the frontline members of the HEC were 
pushing strongly for a trade union, none of them were labourers.  It was hoped that 
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with a new and strong labour legislation, Bahraini workers will ‘be swayed less by a 
handful of ambitious would-be politicians’.334  
During the month of May Al-Bakir and Belgrave exchanged correspondence 
and copies of those letters can be found at TNA.  Al-Bakir had first forwarded a 
request to Belgrave that his passport suspension be revoked.  Al-Bakir told the 
Adviser of his wish to travel abroad, particularly to Cyprus as he sought medical 
treatment for an unidentified ailment and for two weeks of recuperation.335  
Belgrave replied to Al-Bakir’s request by saying that, as he had previously obtained 
a Qatari passport before he had sought asylum in Bahrain and that the Ruler had 
granted him a Bahraini passport instead.  But since the Ruler had withdrawn it, ‘he 
is not prepared to reconsider the matter’.  Belgrave, nonetheless, offered Al-Bakir a 
travel document but that did not grant him Bahraini citizenship.  Belgrave sent a 
copy of the letters to the Political Agency.336  It was odd for Al-Bakir to request, 
without a prior indication of an illness, permission suddenly to travel abroad.  His 
wish to visit to Cyprus was also a peculiar one.  There are two possible explanations 
regarding Al-Bakir’s sudden wish to travel.  The first was his desire to use Cyprus as 
an initial point that would enable him to travel later to Egypt, on the assumption 
that if his original request was to go to Egypt it would be rejected.  The second 
possibility was that Al-Bakir desired to see at first hand the Greek-Cypriot armed 
resistance movement that rose against British on the island.  The resistance 
movement behind the activities was an organisation named the National 
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Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA).  In April, EOKA had launched its terrorist 
campaign against British troops aimed at ending Britain’s hold on the island and 
unification with Greece.337  
 On an international level the Soviets looked to counter the influence of 
Western alliances and in particular NATO, and they announced on 14 May the 
formation of The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (WTO) --
known in short as the Warsaw Pact.  This consisted of the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Albania.338 
 The HEC conducted a meeting with its supporters in A’ali village on 20 May 
during which the Party echoed its determination to achieve its demands in full.  
Regarding the anticipated Penal Code the HEC warned that such a code must be first 
approved by ‘the people’ before its implementation.  Although it was not clear 
whether the approval sought was through a general public vote or through the 
Party’s involvement in its formulation.  Closer ties with the Egyptians were being 
struck when the HEC announced that it was sending eight students to further their 
studies in Egypt.  The scholarships were awarded by Egypt and the HEC would pay 
for the eight students’ travel expenses.  Interestingly, the Movement during its last 
gathering confessed to having deserters amongst its ranks.  But no further 
information was provided as to the reason why these members decided to abandon 
the Party.339   
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 In June the Bahraini Administration issued a set of announcements.  It first 
declared the creation of a committee specialising in reviewing Bahraini traffic law.  
The second announcement was regarding the Penal Code, which was first set to be 
written following the events of 1954, was now to be introduced on 1 August.  The 
Government also announced the formation of a press censorship committee.  Finally 
-- and for the first time in the Adviser’s career -- the Adviser’s duties during his 
absence in the summer of 1955 while on leave were to be taken over by GWR Smith, 
the Director of Customs.340 
 A new nationalist biweekly newspaper appeared for the first time in early 
June since the closure of Al-Qafilah.  The new newspaper was to be managed by the 
same team that supervised the former paper and was named as Al-Watan (The 
Nation).341  The newspaper was quick in launching attacks on Britain’s regional 
allies and in particular on Nuri, who it claimed conducted secret meetings with 
Israeli diplomats in Turkey.342 
 Belgrave left Bahrain on 22 June heading for Britain and the US.  He did not 
return to Bahrain until 26 September.343  On the same day of Belgrave’s departure, 
the HEC held a public meeting at the Mu’min Mosque.  The event was attended by 
approximately three thousand.  The HEC was marking the first anniversary of the 
death of the four demonstrators who had fallen during the attack on the fort in the 
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summer of 1954.344  On 27 June, Bahrain’s Public Relations Department launched its 
first major project by inaugurating the Bahrain Radio Station in Arabic, as the voice 
of the Administration.345  The Bahraini Government then introduced the State’s new 
Penal Code with the intention of it coming into effect by the beginning of 
September.346  
 By the summer of 1955, British policy was based on taking slow yet 
significant steps towards reform in Bahrain.  Labour reform seemed to be an 
experiment and a step towards further modernising the Government.  The HEC’s 
response to the Administration’s steps was rather disappointing to the British as it 
had called for boycotts of democratic opportunities such as the Municipal Council 
elections.  In the coming six months the Movement would witness a new crisis with 
the Administration in protest at the introduction of the Penal Code.  In addition to 
the radicalisation of some of its members, strengthened ties with the Egyptians, and 
a call to support Egypt’s Soviet arms deal would become the highlight of the second-
half of 1955. 
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Chapter Five 
The Nationalists’ cry ‘Arms for Egypt’ 
July to December 1955 
 
In Shuckburgh’s view the summer of 1955 exhibited a gloomy scene, as 
events throughout the Middle East, including ‘strikes in Bahrain’ as he noted in his 
diary, were all a testimony to a state of anarchy infecting the region.  Meanwhile, 
Plan Alpha seemed to him ‘like a beautiful dream’.347  On the international level the 
second-half of the year saw Nasser’s stock rise once more within the Arab World as 
he concluded Egypt’s arms deal with the Soviets.  The Baghdad Pact took a step 
forward with the adherence of two new states: Pakistan and Iran, but suffered a 
major setback when Jordan refused to join because of domestic opposition.  The 
price of failure in Jordan would later cast its shadow on Bahrain’s own internal 
affairs.  In Bahrain conditions did not improve in the second-half of the year as 
objection to the Penal Code developed and for the first time, were specifically anti-
British.  Conflict between the Administration and the HEC resurfaced as negotiations 
between the two sides got underway.  A call to help fund Egyptian arms purchases 
was made and a visit to Bahrain by Anwar Al-Sadat, then a Minister of State in Egypt, 
will all be highlighted in this Chapter. 
The second-half of the year saw a summit held in Geneva and attended by 
heads of state from the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union (the ‘Big Four’).  
The four discussed various matters of interest that included, inter alia, the 
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unification of Germany, security in Europe, and trade between the two Cold War 
protagonists.  Eisenhower also, informally, raised the topic of ‘open skies’, a matter 
rejected by the Soviets.  In the conference Eden invited the Soviet Union’s leaders 
(Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev) to visit Britain.348  The Middle East would 
become one of the main topics for discussion between the two sides during the 
Soviets’ visit in April of the following year, and will be discussed in Chapter Seven.    
In Bahrain, the earliest official reaction to the Penal Code by the HEC was 
published through a Party circular on 7 July.  The circular heavily condemned the 
proposed code, based on the premise that it contradicted Islamic teachings.  It also 
pointed to a law featured in the code that made unauthorized groupings illegal, 
which the HEC felt it was directed straight at it.349  Al-Watan launched a campaign 
attacking the code, it proclaimed in one of its headlines printed in bold letters that 
‘The Penal Code is more lethal than a bomb, so resist it!’350  Burrows believed that 
the HEC’s opposition to the code on religious grounds was only an excuse used by 
the Party ‘to inflame opinion among the unlettered in the villages as well as in 
Manama’.351  The code was originally drafted by the FO with the intention of not 
only introducing it in Bahrain but throughout the Arabian Gulf.352  The Political 
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Agent viewed the opposition to the code to be an attack against the British since 
they were its authors.353   
Ties between Bahrain’s growing nationalist movement and Egypt were 
further enhanced during the second half of 1955.  One of the steps taken towards 
that goal was the Party’s participation on behalf of Bahrain in a conference held by 
the World Islamic Youth Conference (WIYC) in Egypt on which Al-Watan reported in 
a series of articles.  The WIYC’s General Secretary at the time was the Minister of 
State and Free Officers’ member Anwar Al-Sadat.354  Al-Shamlan, a frontline member 
of the Movement and other senior members attended the conference.  Al-Shamlan 
had left Bahrain on 17 June on an unspecified visit to Egypt and Europe for a period 
of three months.355  At the WIYC’s event Al-Shamlan delivered a speech and Ali 
Sayyar, the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Watan gave a talk.  The Bahraini delegation urged 
them to include the ‘Bahraini case’ with other topics of discussion on the conference 
agenda and the WIYC organisers accepted their proposal.356 
In Al-Bakir’s memoir, it was the Egyptian Kamal Yaqub, whose position was 
not specified by him, who had played an instrumental role in the HEC’s participation 
in the WIYC event.357  Jassim Murad, an associate of the HEC, revealed in an 
interview published by Bahrain’s Al-Wasat (The Centre) newspaper in 2004, that 
the linking point between the Party and the Egyptian regime was Yaqub, who 
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worked at the time as a representative for the WIYC.358  Murad did not specify the 
nature of the ties that existed between the Party and Yaqub.  No known writings of 
the members of the Free Officers’ Movement or Egyptian diplomats at the time 
reference Yaqub, except in the Free Officer Khalid Mohieddin’s memoir Now I 
Speak.359  
In addition to Al-Watan, a second Bahraini nationalist weekly newspaper, Al-
Mizan (The Scale), was launched on 22 July.  Bahraini students in Iraq wrote the 
newspaper’s editorials and its Editor-in-Chief was Abdulla Al-Wazzan.360  
Unfortunately only one reproduced copy of the newspaper exists for public viewing 
at the ICC, although there are some selected translated articles from the newspaper 
found at TNA in relation to the conflict.361  However it would be logical to conclude 
that, since Bahrainis in Iraq wrote the newspaper, its content would parallel Iraqi 
policy.  The only issue available at the ICC proved the opposite with an article 
attacking Nuri entitled, ‘An Iraqi Poet Challenges Nuri Al-Saeed’ and another 
praising Nasser entitled, ‘A Man who knows what he wants’.362 
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The eight students on scholarships sent on behalf of the HEC to Egypt left 
Bahrain on 22 August.363  Four studied law, three specialised in engineering, and 
one wanted to further his studies in agriculture.  As a goodwill gesture to Bahrain, 
Egypt had also sent a number of teachers and doctors to the islands without pay.364  
Egyptian teachers and educational missions to the Arab World, and 
particularly those sent to the Gulf and Bahrain, had contributed to the growing 
nationalist sentiment.  In the second-half of 1955, as Macmillan observed in a paper 
he submitted to the British Cabinet on Middle East Oil, these were [the educational 
missions] the ‘main weapons’ used by the Egyptians in the area.  Also in the Foreign 
Secretary’s opinion the Egyptians based their attacks by using three categories: the 
press, radio, and education.  He compared the sponsorship of Egyptian teachers 
abroad to a similar method used by the Greeks in Cyprus.365  The Residency, for its 
part, despatched a message by Burrows to the FO in 1955 on the ‘significance of 
Egyptian influence’ in the Arabian Gulf region and in particular in the field of 
education.   
In Bahrain, the Resident wrote, there was growing Egyptian influence and 
the local administration did not wish to associate itself with the process of 
recruiting Egyptian teachers.  Although the teachers and ‘experts’ had only basic 
qualifications, in Burrows’ view, they were the only accessible source of Arabic-
speaking staff available.  The Resident also informed the FO that the Bahraini 
Director of Education, Ahmed Al-Umran had remarked during an official visit to 
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Egypt that he was greeted ‘for the first time [with] an atmosphere of hostility and 
suspicion’.366  In a conversation between Nutting and Al-Umran, in one of the 
former’s memoirs, the Bahraini official took measures to halt Egyptian influence in 
Bahrain through education.  Some of those measures included the reduction of the 
number of Egyptian education staff in Bahrain.  The Administration also sponsored 
students being sent abroad to further their studies at the American University of 
Beirut instead of Egypt.367  Bahrain did not only just recruit Egyptian teachers and 
‘experts’ but Arabs from other countries that had just escaped from colonial rule 
were also employed.368  In 1955 there was an estimated 33 per cent of foreign Arab 
teachers to Bahrainis of all the educational staff in local government boys’ 
schools.369   
Objection to the Penal Code became more evident to the Resident in August.  
He advised the Ruler to postpone its introduction until November and to set up a 
committee to review the elements in dispute.  A committee was duly appointed by 
the Government on 20 August.  In response, the HEC issued a circular further 
attacking the Penal Code and advising those appointed not to participate in its 
affairs. 
The first meeting of the committee to review the code was a disappointment 
to the Administration as only three members attended; they were:  Sheikh Mubarak 
Al-Khalifa (the Ruler’s brother), Smith (the Acting Adviser), and a Muslim Shi’ite 
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Judge by the name of Baqir Al-Asfour.  Al-Asfour was at the first meeting merely to 
explain his decision to withdraw.  The cleric claimed that the code had been 
presented to highly learned Shi’ite religious figures in Iraq who decreed that the 
code contradicted Islamic law.  Subsequently information reached the Residency 
that some Bahrainis were calling for the intervention of a prominent Egyptian legal 
expert, Abdul-Razeq Al-Sanhouri, who had previously assisted the Libyans and 
Iraqis in drawing up their own Penal Codes.370  
 With the Shi’ite religious festival of Muharram fast approaching on 28 and 29 
August, celebrating the martyrdom of Hussein, the Political Agency feared that the 
occasion might end in unwanted disturbances.  News had already reached the 
Agency which suggested that the HEC was attempting to organise an anti-British 
demonstration on 3 September.  The Political Agent feared that this demonstration 
might turn violent and would target British property and persons.  The Agent noted 
that, for the first time, Egypt was mentioned by name in HEC notices.  Gault also 
observed a rise in the Party’s tone when railing against British interests.  An 
unnamed member of the Residency, according to Gault’s account to the FO, met with 
Al-Bakir.  The Bahraini nationalist informed him that he had failed to persuade his 
fellow party members to avoid attacking Britain through their published notices.  
Gault’s informant further claimed that Al-Bakir had threatened to resign as a result 
of his disapproval of this policy adopted by the HEC.  Gault added that Bahraini 
Shi’ite agitation was rising ad infinitum against the Administration due to their 
disapproval of marriage regulations introduced in the Penal Code.  Others (both 
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Sunni and Shi’ite) were united in their disapproval of the Administration’s policies 
as they viewed them to be highly influenced by Britain.371  
The Political Agent suggested to the Resident that he should meet with the 
Ruler in order to recommend British naval reinforcements be landed from Her 
Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Flamingo.  Gault reiterated that Britain would not permit the 
‘disruption of Government in a British-protected State’.372   
 Regarding Al-Bakir’s threat to resign, Burrows forwarded further 
information on the matter to the FO.  According to the Resident, Al-Bakir visited the 
Residency in Juffair on 24 August.  The nationalist leader met with an unidentified 
Residency staff member, he pointed to his failed efforts in deterring his fellow 
members of the HEC from attacking Britain in their last published circular.  He 
blamed two of the Party members for adopting that line and he named them as Al-
Mardi and Sayyar.  In Al-Bakir’s view the two had ‘just returned from Egypt and 
were full of “new ideas” about the national movement’.  Al-Bakir, moreover, 
revealed that his resignation was withheld for two weeks by the HEC.  He also 
informed the British that he had lost control over the Movement and its pursuit of 
peaceful means to bring about reform.373  In Burrows’ opinion the Party’s 
radicalisation came following the return of Al-Shamlan, one of the frontline 
members of the HEC, to Bahrain from Cairo in the summer.374  
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 Al-Bakir’s visit to the Residency presented a new perspective on his attitude 
concerning his Movement and its members.  The incident was not recorded by Al-
Bakir in his memoir.  It is possible that the HEC as a whole were not aware of Al-
Bakir’s meetings with the British.  If it had been made public at the time it would 
have either split the HEC or would have led to Al-Bakir’s removal from office.  The 
possible motive behind Al-Bakir’s recent approach was his knowledge that major 
anti-British disorders might occur and by so doing he might clear his name and 
avoid arrest. 
 Burrows met with the Ruler on 27 August and proposed Britain’s direct 
intervention if problems were to arise in Bahrain during the anticipated 
demonstrations.  The Ruler gave Burrows his approval to take all necessary 
measures to protect the islands.  Burrows did not doubt as he addressed the FO that,  
Egypt will want to make the most of this opportunity to pose, using 
the High Executive Committee as a tool, as the champion of the 
sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf against the British imperialists, an 
area in which she has not hitherto been able to exercise much 
influence.375   
 
Al-Watan’s increased tone in attacking British policy corresponded to the rise 
of tensions in August.  Al-Mardi made it clear in the headline to his article that ‘The 
English are our real enemies’.  The title continued, ‘“Al-Watan” unveils English 
Colonialism in Bahrain’, which was just as well because the text was completely 
deleted by the censor.376  Egypt’s Tahrir (Independence) publication in August also 
aimed to set the stage for ‘The Volcano which will erupt next month’ in Bahrain as it 
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reported events on the islands.  The article looked forward to the coming of a 
revolution driven by the anger generated by Bahrain’s new Penal Code.  Tahrir 
further criticised the Administration because it had ‘behaved badly’ during its 
reception of Nasser in May, but gave no further details.377  Gault made ready all 
necessary defense arrangements following the Administration’s consent in case 
violence occurred during the Shi’ite festival or in the anti-British demonstration.  
HMS Flamingo anchored offshore Bahrain and HMS Loch Lomond sailed from Basra 
in southern Iraq to Bahrain.378  However the much-anticipated Shi’ite festival passed 
without any major disturbances.379 
 In order to lessen further tensions and with anti-British demonstrations 
rumoured for 3 September, the Administration announced on 30 August the 
suspension of the Penal Code until further notice.  This, according to Gault, helped to 
ease tensions and no disturbances were reported.  However intelligence reports 
that reached the Agency testified to the possibility of the HEC issuing a new circular 
calling upon the Ruler once again to meet their demands.  Gault also predicted the 
possibility of demonstrations erupting following Belgrave’s return in late 
September.380 
After matters settled in Bahrain, Burrows analysed the situation and wrote: 
‘In effect we are now paying for the thirty odd years of Sir Charles Belgrave’s 
benevolent despotism in Bahrain’.  He continued:  
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Sir Charles’s system of one man administration in which he has 
concentrated everything of importance into his own hands, even to 
the extent of signing cheques for 10 rupees, is daily showing its 
inadequacy to contend with the increasing number and widening 
scope of the problems which now affect Bahrain.381  
 
To the Political Agent the situation in Bahrain seemed complex and difficult to 
manage and it had become an ‘intractable problem’.382   
Division in Bahrain’s society was apparent as not all locals were in favour of 
all the HEC’s demands.  A petition dated 5 September was despatched to the Ruler 
signed by prominent Bahraini Shi’ite families.383  Another petition, also sent to the 
Ruler, represented the views of various leading Sunnis in Bahrain emphasising their 
opposition of the HEC.  This petition claimed (in part) that the HEC’s constant 
threats in its circulars had caused ‘a state of panic and fear’.384  
In his memoir Al-Bakir highlighted the Party’s loss of popularity among its 
supporters noting that some had abandoned the HEC by the end of 1955 and in 
early 1956.  In his view the biggest number of dissidents was to be found among the 
Shi’ite community.  The HEC’s Secretary did not offer his views as to why those 
supporters decided to leave except to say that they had complained about the 
actions of some of the Party’s members.385  The exodus could have been related to 
the deserters’ disappointment in the Movement as a result of their initial 
understanding that the HEC would defend Shi’ite ‘Hussieni rituals’,386 and not just as 
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a political movement in opposition to the Government.387  The HEC’s gatherings at 
Shi’ite mosques and Ma’tems during religious festivals could have given the false 
impression that the Movement was all for that cause.  To Mapp, Al-Bakir’s friend 
before the formation of the HEC, one of the visions shared by the Sunni Bahraini 
nationalist was to abandon the rituals associated with the month of Muharram.388   
Al-Bakir’s secret communications with the Political Agent in Bahrain and his 
approaches to the Residency were conducted using a mysterious contact developed 
through the Residency.  The contact point with the Residency (as revealed in papers 
found at TNA) was that of a British diplomat First Secretary, Ivor Thomas Mark 
Lucas.  In a minute written by Lucas on 8 September, he stated through an 
unidentified member of the HEC, the Party’s desire to form a ‘Shadow Government’ 
with which to confront the local Administration.  This suggests that Lucas was the 
contact point.389  Lucas was interviewed on 25 January 2005 by Malcolm McBain, a 
former British diplomat as part of the Churchill College Cambridge’s The British 
Diplomatic Oral History Programme.  He confirmed in the interview that he was the 
contact point between the Residency and the opposition.  Lucas did not specify 
whether there were other British officials in contact with the opposition or that this 
role was solely his at the time.  Nor did he specify who in the opposition they were 
in contact with, nor the time period over which these contacts were made.   
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Lucas claimed that Burrows was the one who requested him to reach out to 
the HEC to keep ‘certainly not an open, but not a particularly clandestine 
relationship with them’.  The First Secretary recalled that the contacts went 
smoothly between the two until the Ruler discovered them.  Upon the Ruler’s 
discovery, Burrows was summoned and told by the Ruler, according to Lucas, ‘I hear 
that the young men in your Residency are hob-nobbing with my opposition.  I won’t 
have it!  If you want to know what’s going on in my island, you come and ask me!’  
From that point onwards the ‘beautiful friendship’ as described by Lucas between 
him and the nationalists ended.  The British diplomat, however, did not specify the 
date from which contact was broken.390 
Belgrave’s diary entry of 18 October, following his recent return from leave, 
might indicate the time period of the Ruler’s discovery of Lucas’ involvement.  
Belgrave revealed on that date that the Ruler complained first to Gault regarding 
Lucas’ activities and saw him to be ‘equally responsible for the trouble here as A.R. 
Bakr and the rest’ as Belgrave noted.  Later Belgrave confirmed the meeting 
between the Ruler and Burrows as the former had suddenly asked to meet the 
Resident on 22 October.  The Ruler complained to him regarding the actions of 
Lucas, which ‘had caused people to suppose the British were supporting the other[s] 
against the Shaikhs’.  The Adviser did not mention Burrows’ response or any action 
taken following the meeting.391  
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 Bahrain had escaped serious conflict and sub rosa meetings were then held 
between the HEC and the Ruler to see whether a compromise could be reached.  
Although at first neither the Political Agency nor the Residency were informed of 
the meetings by the Administration, Al-Bakir made the British aware of them as 
minutes by an unnamed British official from the Residency reveal.392  In the 
meetings two draft agreements drawn up by the HEC were presented to the Ruler.  
Further an unsigned note attached to the letters offered information as to the 
proceedings of the meetings.  The first meeting between the two sides was 
conducted on 10 September.  Al-Shamlan and Kamal-el-Deen represented the HEC 
in the meeting, in which demands by the Party were presented to the Ruler.  Sheikh 
Salman displayed his willingness to accept all of the demands by the HEC, except 
those regarding the formation of a Legislative Council and he also requested the 
omission of the address to the HEC.  Another draft of the demands dated 24 
September was presented by the HEC and was also rejected by the Ruler mainly due 
to written assurances the Sheikh had sought from the HEC.   
 According to a note attached to the drafts the source that had provided the 
Agency with copies of the letters was Al-Bakir and the message being conveyed in 
the note was that the Ruler was explaining to the HEC that the British who were the 
ones obstructing reform in Bahrain.  The last claim cannot be verified, especially 
since the Ruler already had knowledge of the Political Agency and the Residency’s 
open door policy with the HEC and would have known that such a statement might 
reach British officials’ ears.  The note also included a single comment by two British 
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Residency officers and First Secretaries (Lucas and FB Richards) who both 
exclaimed ‘Very interesting indeed’.  Details of the first letter from the HEC dated 10 
September to the Ruler, from the copies provided by Al-Bakir, criticised the Sheikh 
for not heeding to the Party’s demands and urged the establishment of a Legislative 
Council.  Moreover, the pro forma voiced its concern about the work of the 
Commission of Enquiry, the Penal Code, and offered general criticisms of various 
government departments.  The second letter dated on 24 September alluded to a 
discussion that took place between the HEC and the Ruler.  This centered on the 
Ruler’s approval of holding elections for the committees/councils of health, 
education, and municipal affairs.  The letter further urged for reform in the public 
security and judicial sector.  Most importantly the pro forma declared its agreement 
with the Ruler to postpone any further talks regarding the establishment of a 
Legislative Council.393 
Britain continued with its intention to expand the Baghdad Pact and it was 
announced that Pakistan intended to join the alliance.  Since Pakistan was also a 
member of SEATO, the Baghdad Pact would successfully link NATO with Turkey 
being a member to SEATO through Iraq.394  Pakistan’s official adherence to the Pact 
was followed by Iran’s ascension to the alliance.  An Iraqi diplomat, Awni Khalidy, 
was chosen as the General Secretary of the Pact.395 
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On 27 September Nasser publically announced his Soviet arms deal by saying 
that the Czechs had actually delivered military supplies and equipment.396  The deal 
involved the Egyptians supply to the Russians with staggered payments of cotton 
and rice in return.397  The agreement was estimated to be worth between ninety and 
two hundred million US dollars, according to Eisenhower.  The US President also 
asserted that following the conclusion of the arms arrangement, the Soviets offered 
the Israelis their own arms deal.  The Israelis had rejected the Soviet offer, he 
said.398 
Britain’s initial reaction was to call this ‘Egyptian blackmail’.  In a minute by 
Sir Robert Hadow and Sir Harold Caccia the two noted that ‘Whatever policy we 
adopt must avoid giving the other Arab States the impression that blackmail and 
neutralism pay’.399   
Ghaleb, in an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2008, recalled a discussion with Ali 
Sabry, Nasser’s aide, who said that he believed that the arms supplied by the Soviets 
would enable Egypt to defeat Israel in military confrontation.  Ghaleb, in return 
expressed to Sabry, his belief that the objective of the arms supplied was not to 
initiate a conflict with the Israelis as such an escapade would result in strong and 
dire consequences for Egypt from the West, a matter the Soviets well understood.  In 
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fact the Soviet arms deal was made to protect the Egyptian revolution from 
within.400  Ghaleb’s claims corresponded with Trevelyan’s views’ as portrayed by 
Henry Byroade the US Ambassador to Egypt; Trevelyan believed that it was not in 
the interest of the Soviets for an Egyptian-Israeli war to break out.  The Soviets 
feared such a war would cause the re-installation of a Western military presence in 
the Middle East and that takeover of the Suez Canal Base would follow.  The conflict 
would then disrupt Soviet penetration into the region and Africa.401  Trevelyan, 
moreover, saw that the arms deal with the Soviet bloc had ‘added to Nasser’s 
prestige’ and increased his popularity.402   
Likewise in confirmation with Ghaleb’s statement according to Macmillan the 
Egyptian regime was ‘maintained by the Egyptian army and depended on its success 
in providing the army with weapons’.  Eden feared that the news might disturb 
British ‘interests in the Middle East as a whole’.  He echoed Britain’s reliance on 
Middle Eastern oil to maintain the Empire.  The Prime Minister believed that the 
policy to be adopted was to assist Britain’s friends in the region and to isolate 
Nasser.403  He also sought to adopt a policy of enlarging the Baghdad Pact, and 
Nasser’s attitude towards it was less important.  Eden, furthermore, understood 
Nasser’s need for arms as it strengthened his position internally, so to the Prime 
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Minister the ‘decision to accept the Soviet offer was understandable if 
regrettable’.404    
The sale of Soviet arms to Egypt opened the possibility of financial aid.  In the 
summer of 1955 the Egyptian regime announced a plan to build an ambitious 
project known as the Aswan High Dam.405  Trevelyan saw the project to ‘be the focal 
point of Egyptian development over the next twenty years’.  It aimed to develop and 
irrigate more land to keep pace with Egypt’s growing population.406  The project 
was also designed to ‘develop hydro-electricity’.407  It was hoped that the World 
Bank would finance most of the project with the balance coming from the US and 
Britain.408  Dulles received information from Egypt that the Soviets might follow-up 
their arms deal by offering economic aid that included finance for the dam.409  
Commenting on that prospect Shuckburgh saw Nasser to be totally ‘unreliable’ and 
accused him of ‘consciously handing over his country to Communism’.410  The whole 
High Dam demarche would add to the conflict between Nasser and Britain later in 
1956 in another step towards the eventual Suez debacle.   
In Bahrain new confidential minutes on 3 October forwarded to the Resident 
by an unnamed official described Al-Bakir’s account of the latest developments 
between the HEC and the Administration.  Al-Bakir informed the official that a 
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gathering would be held on Friday 7 October, a Shi’ite religious holiday.  Al-Bakir 
specified that the HEC intended to announce that if the Government did not allow 
for the establishment of health, education, and municipal councils to be either 
elected in full or half-elected, then it would publicly declare the details of its 
meetings with the Ruler.411  Following the meeting between Al-Bakir and the 
anonymous official on behalf of the British, and on 4 October an announcement by 
the HEC was made inviting the general public to an assembly on 7 October at the 
Mu’min Mosque.412   
In an effort to discover public opinion of the conflict in Bahrain, British 
officials, such as Malcolm Gale met casually with local Sunni merchants to seek their 
views on current affairs.  Yusuf K Al-Moayyed thought that both the Ruler and the 
British were well respected in Bahrain, ‘but that Belgrave was universally hated’.  
Ahmed Kanoo told Gale: ‘We shall never have peace in Bahrain until the Adviser 
goes’.413 
 A new attitude adopted by the Ruler rekindled the hope of a political 
breakthrough locally.  Upon the request of the Ruler, and accompanied by his 
Adviser, a meeting with the Political Agent was held on 6 October.  Gault expressed 
his surprise to the FO at the Ruler’s recognition to the formation of committees 
dedicated to health, education, and municipal affairs, half its members appointed 
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and the other elected.  The Ruler sought the Agent’s approval of these measures and, 
without hesitation, the Agent agreed.414   
The new policy by the Ruler eased political tensions once again.  The HEC’s 
gathering took place as scheduled on 7 October and was attended by approximately 
four thousand people.  The HEC’s Secretary indicated at the meeting that 
discussions had been conducted with the Ruler but resulted in his agreeing to only a 
few of the demands presented to him.415 
Sheikh Salman published a proclamation on 15 October which confirmed the 
establishment of half-appointed, half-elected councils for health, education, and 
municipal affairs.  As for the Penal Code, the Ruler declared that the Administration 
had ‘asked for an expert in Law to study it and to report to us on what it is 
contravening the Sharia’ (Islamic Law).416  Burrows considered this to be ‘a big step 
forward in the development of the elective principle in Bahrain, and indeed in 
Persian Gulf affairs’.  Although he seemed dubious about the outcome.417 
 Regrettably the political breakthrough was short-lived.  The HEC published a 
circular on 20 October that highlighted its disappointment with the recent reforms 
undertaken.  The Party also demanded ‘reforms’ in the departments of public 
security and the Administration’s judiciary system, two points it believed to have 
been overlooked by the Ruler.  The circular warned that ‘The authorities should 
bear the consequences of what is happening as a result of these excesses and this 
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open challenge to the desires and hopes of the people’.  The Party reiterated its 
previous demand that the only way to move forward was by the formation of a 
Legislative Council.  The HEC also announced its plan to boycott the proposed 
councils.418 
Burrows believed that a misunderstanding had occurred between the two 
sides.  The Ruler thought that the reforms in the police and in his judiciary system 
had already been met by his proclamation in July 1954 and that there was no need 
to announce reform in these departments once again.419  As a result of these 
developments the HEC declared a general meeting on 28 October and rumours of 
strikes resurfaced.  Burrows conveyed to the FO that information had reached him 
that the HEC’s Assembly would then head towards either the Political Agency’s 
headquarters in Manama or the Residency in Juffair.  The HEC aimed with this 
gesture to demand the removal of Belgrave from office, as they believed that he had 
influenced the Ruler into omitting the points they believed were agreed upon 
regarding police reform.  The Resident thought that the HEC had mistakenly blamed 
Belgrave for the decision.  Burrows was also critical of the HEC’s increased anti-
Western tone.   
Furthermore the Residency was made aware of the HEC’s efforts to collect 
money to help finance Egyptian arms purchases from the Soviets.  The Resident 
alluded to the Ruler’s guess that the HEC’s sudden ‘switch in policy was dictate 
direct from Egypt’, a matter Burrows did not rule out.  The theory would be for the 
Egyptians to push the Bahraini Administration into further concessions in the form 
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of parliamentary government turning the Administration later into a seemingly anti-
British one.420  Gault also believed that the HEC aimed through this new dispute to 
gain ‘maximum profit from the Ruler’s refusal by accusing him of breaking his 
promises and by threatening retaliation by way of strikes and demonstrations’.421 
With matters still in deadlock, the HEC unexpectedly forwarded to the 
Adviser its intention to continue negotiations with the Ruler and also retreated from 
its earlier decision that insisted on the two points they believed were omitted by the 
Ruler.  Sheikh Salman agreed to continue discussions and went a step further when 
he decided to have all three councils completely independent of Government.  He 
further promised to appoint ‘trained legal men’ to advise local judges and direct 
them on how to implement the new Penal Code, once it was authorised.  The 
Residency welcomed the HEC’s decision to end the deadlock and withdraw its 
insistence on the two points of dispute. 422  A possible explanation of the HEC’s 
sudden change of heart was that the Party realised that their stubbornness could 
lead to a loss of all political gains in the long run. 
Although tensions had reduced following the recent agreement between the 
two sides, the Residency feared that the independence of the councils would allow 
for the eventual replacement of British experts and professionals by Egyptians.423  
The Residency’s fear was not altogether unfounded; on 21 October Al-Watan 
published an article about an Egyptian medical doctor who was banned from 
practicing in Bahrain.  The newspaper exclaimed, ‘What will the position of the 
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Government and people of Egypt be when they know that we are standing idle and 
powerless towards [supporting] one of its sons’.424  The reason provided for the 
banning of the Egyptian’s practice was not stated.  Nevertheless, it pointed to the 
possibility of Egyptian experts gradually taking over jobs held mostly by British or 
Western specialists.425   
A proclamation by the Ruler issued on 28 October included a set of reforms 
to be undertaken by the Administration with the HEC’s consent.  The first was the 
hiring of an expert to oversee the reconstruction of the civil and criminal courts.  A 
committee would be created to assist the expert in his work.  The second 
proclamation was the hiring of a judge at each court to assist the local judges.  Third 
was the organisation of security in harmony with acknowledged worldwide 
regulations.  Fourth the time frame given for health and education councils to 
operate was two years.  Finally, the reform of Bahrain’s prisons was to be 
undertaken.426   
Gault approved of the Ruler’s announcement and actions as they ‘took the 
wind out of the sails of the nationalist representatives’.427  In regards to the 
merchant community’s view of recent developments in Bahrain the ‘general attitude 
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is that the reformists have now been given enough rope and it is to be hoped that 
they will hang themselves’, according to Gault.428 
 An account by the Political Agency to the Residency on the latest 
developments in Bahrain provided some detail (not made public) of the negotiations 
that had taken place between the Administration and the HEC.  Although nationalist 
papers such as Al-Watan had adopted a call for women’s rights as it had published 
articles in this field like ‘On the Issue of Women’s Freedom in Bahrain’ by Shala 
Khalfan and ‘We must Equip Women for Freedom’ by Abdul-Rahman Al-Shamlan,429 
remarkably the HEC objected to the Administration’s wish to allow women the right 
to vote for the three councils.  Oddly the Party only insisted on men voting and for 
the minimum age of voting to be set at eighteen.  The Bahraini Government on the 
other hand thought that the minimum age put forward by the HEC was too low.  
Furthermore, Gault revealed that Al-Bakir believed in private that ‘Bahrain would 
not be ready for a Legislative Council for another five or seven years’, contradicting 
the main objective set by his Movement.430  
 In November the HEC publically announced its intention of organising a cris 
de coeur to assist Nasser financially for the purchase of Soviet weapons.  Al-Watan 
published a series of articles in relation to the matter that provided details of the 
event and its sponsors.  A committee to raise and deliver the funds was established 
and consisted of Yusuf bin Isa BuHiji, Ebrahim Al-Maskati, Al-Alaiwat, Al-Shamlan, 
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and Ebrahim Kamal; all were founding members of the HEC.431  The first fundraiser 
took place on Friday 11 November during a friendly football match between teams 
that represented the city of Manama and others of Muharraq.  The three sons of the 
Ruler, Sheikh Isa, Sheikh Khalifa, and Sheikh Mohammed contributed to the fund 
with 15,000 Rupees from Sheikh Isa and 10,000 Rupees from Sheikh Khalifa and 
Sheikh Mohammed.432  Sheikh Isa also bought a portrait of Nasser in an auction for 
3,100 Rupees.  The total amount collected was estimated by the Residency to be 
around 200,000 Rupees.433   
Al-Watan headlined the news of the fundraiser on its front page saying 
‘Bahrain is fighting a back battle for the sake of Egypt’s Army’.  The opening 
sentences of the feature that covered the fundraiser saw the event as a call in 
support of the Palestinian cause.  It also claimed that during the event an unnamed 
Egyptian from Egypt’s educational mission gave a speech thanking Bahrainis for 
organising the event.  The newspaper indicated that the first fundraiser raised 
107,300 Rupees from around thirty-eight donors.434  A second fundraiser consisted 
of eighty-nine donations totaling to 77,099.15 Rupees.435  The total amount of 
donations of the first and second fundraiser was 184,399.15 Rupees, making the 
final figure close to the approximate figure of the total funds the Residency believed 
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had been collected.  The idea of collecting funds for Egypt, as Burrows noted, was 
first practiced in the Gulf by Kuwait and only later adopted by Bahrain.  However 
the Bahraini involvement in fund-raising was grander.  The concept later spread to 
other Gulf States, such as Qatar.436    
A thank-you letter by Nasser was published to the people of Bahrain in Al-
Watan as acknowledging their support in financing Egypt’s quest for Soviet arms.  
The letter, dated on 4 January 1956 said: 
You had presented an amount of 44,366 Dollars as a contribution 
from you to arm the military, in order to complete the means of 
defence for the beloved homeland.  Please accept my sincere gratitude 
to your honorable feelings and true nationalism.437 
 
In the end it was Israel that benefited the most from Egypt’s arms deal with 
the Soviets since most of the weapons purchased were cited in the Sinai Peninsula 
and were captured by the Israelis during their sweep of Sinai later in the Suez War.  
Other military vehicles also became easy practice targets, because Egyptian soldiers 
were ‘riddled with disease and undernourished’ and incapable of properly 
defending their positions.  Thus Nasser’s mortgage to the Soviets of three years’ 
cotton harvest and external aid to purchase the arms benefitted the Israelis more 
than it did the Egyptians as French journalists during the war Merry Bromberger 
and Serge Bromberger testified in one of the earliest accounts of the Suez War.438 
 Following the fundraisers by nationalists in Bahrain the Political Agent 
considered the Movement now to be ‘encouraged by Egyptian precept to regard 
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themselves, as revolutionaries’.  To Gault the process of internal reform ‘has gone as 
far as it should for the time being’.  The Agent viewed that it was now time for the 
politicians to prove themselves in the space so far allotted to them before further 
political concessions were awarded.439  The FO in response to Gault’s views set their 
policy regarding developments in Bahrain via a letter signed by Sir Derek Riches, the 
newly appointed Head of the Eastern Department at the FO,440 on behalf of the 
Foreign Secretary.  The FO believed that a wait-and-see approach should be taken in 
light of developments.  Further, the FO agreed with Gault’s proposal to see how the 
new channels of expression were utilised by the reformers before other changes 
took place.441  
The HEC introduced the new post of President of the HEC in December.  The 
Party awarded the post to Kamal-el-Deen, a Shi’ite cleric and frontline member.442  It 
is not clear whether the position of President was superior or inferior to that of Al-
Bakir’s post as Secretary.  It was more likely a move by the HEC to regain some of its 
Shi’ite members who had abandoned the Party earlier than a radical change in the 
Party’s structure. 
Britain continued to try expanding the Baghdad Pact and it attempted to 
bring into the alliance the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  King Hussein bin Talal of 
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Jordan hinted to the British his inclinations for his country to be part of the Baghdad 
Pact on 9 November.  The mission to allow Jordan entry into the Pact was assigned 
to Britain’s Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer.  Dulles had earlier 
warned that any ‘move to expand the Baghdad Pact would probably deny us 
Nasser’s cooperation’, but his advice had fallen on deaf ears.443  The undertaking 
proved disastrous to Jordan and the region and accelerated the departure of John 
Bagot Glubb Pasha from the Arab Legion with its consequences for Bahrain as it 
hastened Belgrave’s exit as Part Three and Four of this thesis examines.  
Templer’s mission to Jordan lasted from 6 to 14 December and was met with 
aggressive public scorn and resentment.  A number of Ministers from the Jordanian 
Cabinet protested at Jordan’s involvement in the Pact.444  It was hoped that through 
Jordan’s inclusion that the then current British-Jordanian Treaty be substituted with 
the Pact.445  Egypt did its part in attacking Jordan’s entry into the Pact, Glubb 
recalled the Voice of the Arabs claimed to Jordanians that joining the Pact was ‘a 
trick to help Israel’, as Israel would later join the alliance and thus be forced onto 
Jordan as an ally.  Templer tried in vain to counter that argument by stressing that 
the Pact’s charter did not allow other states’ entry unless it was unanimously 
approved by all members.446   
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On 13 December four Jordanian Ministers of Palestinian origin resigned and 
chaos reigned on the streets of Jordan.447  King Hussein believed in his memoir that 
the protesters were financed by ‘Egyptian money’ as they ‘stormed buildings from 
one end of Jordan to another’.448  Nasser had previously made it clear to Byroade, 
the US Ambassador to Egypt, who informed in return Trevelyan that he would not 
obstruct Britain’s Northern Tier defence arrangements manifested in the Baghdad 
Pact if no other Arab State and/or the US joined.449  Nasser, following the Suez 
Crisis, recalled that Britain’s Ambassador to Egypt had promised him not to have 
other Arab States join the Baghdad Pact.  He expressed his surprise concerning 
Templer’s mission to Jordan as a result and Egypt’s ‘reaction was very hard’, the 
Egyptian leader declared.450     
Heikal noted that the Templer mission set the stage for an intensive 
propaganda war in the Middle East by the Egyptians who attacked British interests 
and the Baghdad Pact itself.451  During this crisis Bahrain received its share of 
attacks as Egyptian radio falsely claimed that Bahrain allowed Israeli goods entry 
into the islands, breaking boycott regulations imposed by the Arab League.452  The 
Administration quickly issued a public notice by the Ruler on 11 December banning 
the import of Israeli goods and dealings from Bahrain as a counter step.453 
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The Residency also noted in its account for the month of December a sharp 
rise in attacks on European workers in Bahrain.  Some of those were British and 
suffered serious injuries.  The report blamed the cause of the incidents on the ‘lack 
of respect for law and order which has become noticeable in Bahrain’.454  However 
external factors must have had an impact on emotions in Bahrain leading people to 
act so forcefully.  Belgrave’s attitude towards these events from his diary was 
similar to that of the Residency.  As a method to combat this growing trend the 
Adviser simply noted, ‘we have the cars [police vehicles] to deal with [this] and 
court’.455 
 Nasser saw the Baghdad Pact as an anti-Soviet alliance and by obstructing its 
expansion he was supporting the Soviet Union, the power in opposition to the West 
in the Cold War.  Bahraini nationalist leaning towards the East was recognised in a 
pro-Soviet short article published in Al-Watan’s front page on 16 December which 
declared that ‘Khrushchev, the Communist Party Secretary, said during a visit to 
Burma that the English were robbing their colonies up to their last piece of 
bread’.456  Eden was critical of Khrushchev’s statements in Burma in his memoir as 
he viewed him to have used ‘abusive rhetoric of the colonial system, ignoring their 
own extensive empire over subject peoples from Samarkand to Hungary’.457   
With the collapse of the Templer mission, Bahrain was due for a one-day visit 
on 17 December by Al-Sadat.  He arrived to Bahrain from Qatar as part of his tour of 
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the Gulf that included Kuwait as his next stop.458  The Adviser noted that during Al-
Sadat’s visit, the Egyptian Minister suffered an embarrassing moment when he was 
carried on the shoulders by Bahraini supporters and accidently dropped into a 
puddle of mud.  He then lunched with the Ruler in his palace in Riffa and departed.  
The Ruler informed the Adviser that Al-Sadat requested a brush and water to 
remove the mud stains.  Unfortunately, no brushes were available, only a broom.  
The Adviser considered the visit to be a complete ‘flop for the Committee’ because of 
the embarrassing incident of dropping Al-Sadat.459  Burrows commented on the visit 
saying that Al-Sadat ‘disappointed the “High Executive Committee” and the more 
enthusiastic pro-Egyptian elements’.  But he did not elaborate further on the 
reasons for that disappointment.460   
At the conclusion of the year Bahrain prepared itself for its epoch-making 
elections for the councils.  Events in Jordan in 1956 led Bahrain into further 
disturbances that included an attack on the British Foreign Secretary’s car 
procession.  Both states would cast their shadows on the process of decision-making 
in Whitehall.  
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Part III: The Nationalists’ Strike  
 
Chapter Six 
Local Elections, the Glubb Affair, and Selwyn Lloyd’s Corner  
1 January to 10 March 1956 
 
The first three months of 1956 were eventful in Bahrain as they included an 
election for the Education Council, the re-emergence of tensions between the 
Administration and the HEC, and the effect of regional developments that intruded 
into Bahrain’s political scene.  It culminated with the stoning of the recently-
appointed British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s car convoy during his visit to 
Bahrain.  
 In 1956 Bahrainis were waiting for the elections of the three councils (health, 
education, and municipal affairs) that had been agreed on by the Administration and 
the HEC in the previous year.  Al-Watan’s issue of 13 January announced the 
Government’s plan to conduct the Education Council’s elections first; six seats of the 
total of twelve were up for election.  A committee of Bahrainis was formed to work 
with the Public Relations Department to oversee the electoral process.  A period of 
ten days was allocated for candidates who wished to run in order to register their 
names and information.  As for the delay in the process of electing the councils, the 
newspaper believed that that was due to the process involved in preparing the list 
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of eligible voters (the electoral roll) by the Administration.461  The Times of London 
covered in a short report preparations for the upcoming elections in Bahrain, seeing 
these elections as ‘the logical outcome of political activity arising from demands for 
more popular representation in the Government’.462  
A new biweekly publication named Al-Bahrain (Bahrain) appeared for the 
first time on 6 February.  It was to be a pro-government newspaper.463  It only 
published a few issues and closed in the same year.464  There are no original or 
reproduced copies of the newspaper available for public viewing in Bahrain.  
  Lucas provided the Residency in Bahrain with a comprehensive account on 
the preparations and proceedings of the Education Council’s elections.  The 
elections, according to Lucas, were to take place on 10 February.  Arrangements 
included the erection of tents by the Government at various polling stations since 
there were no buildings appropriate to the occasion.  Fifty-two ballot boxes were 
distributed throughout the islands; each box was to be accompanied by four officials 
and a policeman.  Voting was to start at 7.00 am and end at 7.00 pm.  The voting 
process took place smoothly and no major incidents were recorded.   
 On the following day at 8.00 am the ballot boxes were opened and the votes 
were counted.  The results were ready by 7.00 pm and scored a massive victory for 
the HEC’s candidates as they won all six seats.  The total number of people who were 
entitled to vote were 23,479 and the actual number of voters reached a very healthy 
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18,981, or some 81 per cent of the electoral roll.  The winning candidates included 
Khalil Al-Moayyed (Sunni) 17,991 votes, Taqi Al-Baharna (Shi’ite) 17,862 votes, Ali 
Al-Tajir (Shi’ite) 17,852 votes, Qassim Fakhroo (Sunni) 17,846 votes, Mohammed Q 
Al-Shirawi (Sunni) 17,816 votes, and Ali Abd-Ali Al-Biladi (Shi’ite) 17,794 votes.  
Those who ran in opposition to the winning candidates were viewed as pro-
Government and had called themselves the National Front.  Their candidates were 
all Sunnis and included Hamad Al-Fadhel who received 1,410 votes, Salim Al-Absy 
1,120 votes, and Ahmed Al-Binali 1,112 votes.  Lucas believed that the National 
Front fielded three Sunni candidates in an attempt to divert the Sunni vote from the 
HEC.  
  One of Lucas’ criticisms of the voting process was that only about thirty per 
cent of voters were able to mark the ballot papers themselves.  The rest seemed 
illiterate and requested the aid of officials in the process of choosing their 
candidates.  It was announced by the Administration that the Health Council’s 
elections would take place on 16 March.465  
 Burrows’ initial reaction to the election results was that the figures of the six 
winners, which ranged from 17,000 to 18,000, seemed ‘suspiciously similar’.466  
There is no information provided through the Administration, Political Agency, nor 
by the Residency that implied foul play.  Following the Council’s elections the HEC 
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issued a bulletin numbered thirty-nine in which it congratulated its followers 
claiming ‘a crushing victory’.467   
 In 1956 the Bahraini Administration prepared to strengthen its Police Force 
in light of the previous unrest.  A proposal was adopted to recruit skilled and 
experienced Iraqi officers to enlist locally.  In Belgrave’s diary the earliest mention 
of recruiting Iraqis to the Police Force was between himself and Sheikh Khalifa bin 
Mohammed bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the Public Security Chief in Bahrain, when they 
discussed the matter on 30 October 1955.  In a later diary entry on 2 November 
Belgrave claimed that the idea to get recruits from Iraq was originally Sheikh 
Khalifa’s.  No further information was provided by Belgrave on the matter until 15 
January 1956, when he said he had held discussions on a possible location to 
accommodate the new Iraqi recruits.468 
 The Residency’s Annual Report for 1956 on the Gulf region confirmed that 
the Administration had adopted the idea of recruiting Iraqis in November 1955.  
However when news of this spread locally in 1956 the nationalists made clear their 
opposition to the idea.  According to Burrows the nationalists based their opposition 
on two grounds.  Firstly was the fear that the development of the local Police Force 
would result in unfavourable consequences to the opposition itself allowing for 
greater government control of the streets.  Secondly, the resentment generated by 
the Baghdad Pact had fallen onto Iraqis who were seen as an integral part of that 
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alliance in opposition to the Egyptians,469 and this move would see Bahrain ‘drawn 
into the orbit of the Pact’.470  
By the second-half of February discontent amongst members of the HEC 
against the Administration resurfaced.  A new circular was issued warning the 
Government on three issues.  First, was the delay in hiring a legal expert to examine 
the Penal Code.  Second, was the decision to recruit Iraqi officers to the Police Force.  
Third, was the Government’s delay in electing the remaining members of the 
Education Council.  The circular accused the Administration of ‘trying to escape 
from recognising the Committee which has been proved undoubtedly that it is the 
only representative of the people’.  Furthermore, the Party warned the Government 
of ‘bad consequences’ that would occur if their demands were not met within a 
week.471   
 The Administration’s delay in announcing its candidates for the Education 
Council, according to the Resident, was due to an internal government debate of 
whether to add an extra Chairman to the twelve members of the Council or have him 
chosen from among the twelve members of the Council.  The issue was still 
unresolved at the end of February.  In regards to the delay of acquiring an expert to 
review the Penal Code, Burrows had been told by the Administration that Al-
Sanhouri, the Egyptian legal expert, had been chosen for the position.  The 
Administration had opened negotiations with Al-Sanhouri to acquire his services in 
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November 1955, but it had taken until early 1956 for both parties to reach a deal.472  
The Adviser’s diary note of 22 February indicated that Al-Sanhouri was due to  
(finally) arrive in May.473 
 Taking the HEC’s threat seriously, the Residency called on Belgrave 
according to his diary entry of 23 February.  They advised him to hold back the 
recruitment of Iraqi officers, fearing that this might result in tensions locally.474  
Initially it was arranged that Bahrain would employ one hundred and fifty Iraqis 
into the Force.  The local Administration accepted the advice delivered by the 
Residency and the appointment of the officers was postponed.475  The Foreign 
Secretary informed the FO that, as a result of the HEC’s declared threat, British 
officials in the Gulf were to stand by the Ruler with armed forces if necessary if the 
Bahraini opposition resorted to disorder and violence.476 
 The Resident discussed with the FO details of the anticipated Foreign 
Secretary’s visit to Bahrain as he was due to stop over from Cairo on 2 March en 
route to New Delhi and later Karachi to attend SEATO’s Council of Ministers 
meeting.  According to a tentative schedule agreed by the FO and the Residency, the 
Minister was due to arrive at 7.00 pm local time.  He would then be escorted to the 
Residency in Juffair where he was due to give a short press conference.  Following 
the conference Lloyd would be escorted to the Ruler’s palace in Gudaibiya in 
Manama, for a ceremonial dinner with the Ruler and dignitaries.  Finally the Foreign 
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Secretary was scheduled to hold a private discussion with the Sheikh to deliberate 
local affairs and then he would head back to the airport in Muharraq.  Burrows 
expressed to the FO his concern that the issue of Bahrain’s acquisition of Iraqi 
officers would be stoked up by Egyptian propaganda and that this might result in 
internal problems during the Secretary’s visit.477 
 The Resident’s fears were not groundless as a minute by an unidentified 
British official in Bahrain found at TNA suggested the knowledge that by late 
February the HEC was studying the possibility of staging a public demonstration 
during Lloyd’s visit to Bahrain.  The demonstration’s objective was to force the 
Minister into pressing the Bahraini Administration to resolve the current standstill 
between it and the HEC.478  A communiqué from Gault to the Residency revealed a 
possible new communications link between the British and the HEC, as Burrows had 
instructed Lieutenant Colonel Anderson (the Information Officer at the Residency) 
to negotiate personally with Al-Bakir.  The negotiations aimed to produce means 
that would end political stalemate in Bahrain and have the Administration 
acknowledge the HEC.  With this acknowledgement the HEC would then be able to 
directly approach the Bahraini Government and the need for an intermediary would 
cease to exist.  On the issue of staging demonstrations during Lloyd’s visit, Anderson 
managed to receive verbal assurances from Al-Bakir that no protests would take 
place on the day of the Foreign Secretary’s arrival.479  Subsequent to these 
assurances, the Office of the Senior Naval Officer, VA Wight-Boycott in the Gulf 
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region in his tour d’horizon of events in March, believed that the HEC had intended 
on presenting the Foreign Secretary with a petition.  However the Residency 
encouraged the HEC to express its opinion to Lloyd publically in a press conference 
which the Minister was scheduled to give at the Residency.480   
Unexpectedly for the Foreign Secretary events in Jordan during his overseas 
trip cast a shadow first on his visit to Cairo and later manifested itself upon his 
arrival in Bahrain.  Twenty-year-old King Hussein suddenly dismissed the British-
born Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion, Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot 
Glubb Pasha, on 1 March.  Glubb was given only a few hours to leave the country as 
the King feared rebellion in the army if he remained.481  The Pasha departed from 
Jordan to Cyprus following his dismissal.  He had served in Arab states for thirty-six 
years and commanded Jordan’s Arab Legion for seventeen years since 1939.482  The 
Arab Legion under Glubb supervised Jordan’s army, police, National Guard, and 
navy.483  King Hussein in his memoir explained his decision to sack Glubb.  He based 
some of his conclusions on his frustration towards having the police linked to the 
Arab Legion.  Furthermore, Glubb had angered the King as the latter refused to 
accept the dismissal of a number of soldiers from the Legion because of their 
nationalist ideals.  The Jordanian King additionally viewed the fifty-nine year-old 
Glubb at the time to be ‘old-fashioned’ and lacking in modern military strategic 
planning.484  Another possible explanation for King Hussein’s dismissal of Glubb was 
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a very personal one.  The King had developed strong friendship with the Head of 
Jordan’s Air Force John Dalgleish who taught the young King how to fly.  In late 1955 
the Pasha decided to have Dalgleish replaced by February 1956.  Dalgleish left 
Jordan on 28 February only hours prior to Glubb’s sacking.  Glubb’s decision might 
have affected Hussein’s general attitude towards the Pasha.485  The British Cabinet 
alluded to a telegram from Sir Charles Duke, the British Ambassador to Jordan, who 
proposed that Glubb’s dismissal might have been a personal affair and not one 
aimed against Britain’s influence in the region.  However the Ambassador was also 
concerned that British personnel could no longer effectively regulate the Legion 
and, as a result, Jordan would fall under the influence of a ‘neighbouring state’.486     
Glubb’s dismissal was celebrated by Jordanians and demonstrators thronged 
the streets chanting anti-colonial slogans.487  Keith Morfett of the London 
newspaper the Daily Express reported demonstrators to have shouted ‘Down with 
Glubb!  Out with Glubb the imperialist!’, similar chants would be echoed later in 
Bahrain.  Adding insult to British injury, Morfett also reported rumours that 
involved Jordan joining Egypt’s Southern Tier alliance and that the Legion would be 
put under the direct command of Egypt’s Commander-in-Chief, General Abdel-
Hakim Amer.488 
To Glubb, the decision to dismiss him was partly due to efforts by Lieutenant-
Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar a close friend of Hussein.  The friendship between the two 
developed first in France when the former served as a military attaché at the 
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Embassy in Paris.489  Indeed, after Glubb’s dismissal Nuwar was promoted by the 
King to become the head Jordan’s armed forces.490  The American intelligence officer 
Archie Roosevelt documented that Nuwar later launched a failed coup d’état against 
the Jordanian monarchy.491 
 When news of Glubb’s dismissal reached London, Nutting recalled arguing 
the entire evening and through the night with Eden vis-à-vis the current 
developments.  To Nutting, Eden ‘put all the blame on Nasser’ and said that ‘the 
world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser’.  Eden was fearful that 
Nasser would succeed in obliterating Britain’s position in the Middle East and 
thereby undermine the Prime Minister’s own status.492  In his memoir Eden linked 
the events in Jordan to Cairo’s radio propaganda campaign against Glubb Pasha that 
opened on 15 February.  He perceived the event to be a ‘coup against Glubb’.  
Moreover, the Prime Minister believed that the decision by the Jordanian monarch 
to sack Glubb was due to ‘constant articles in the press’ including British media, that 
portrayed the Pasha as the real leader in Jordan.493    
The Manchester Guardian said that the move had ‘taken London completely 
by surprise’.  Glubb’s dismissal also included the sacking of two other Britons 
employed by the Legion: Brigadier William Hutton and Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill.494  
The New York Times said the move had ‘stunned and mortified’ politicians in Britain.  
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It viewed the sacking as ‘a fresh blow to British prestige in the Middle East’.  The 
newspaper added that British aid and loans to Jordan since 1946 totalled 
£75,000,000, running at £9,200,000 annually.495  For his services, HM Queen 
Elizabeth II knighted Glubb on 9 March.496 
As events in Jordan were taking shape Lloyd was in Egypt on 1 March, on a 
short stop en route to Karachi.  The Foreign Secretary was due to meet the Egyptian 
Prime Minister at a dinner at the Tahera Palace.  During the meeting, according to 
Lloyd, the Baghdad Pact was discussed.  Nasser required assurances from Britain 
that it would not expand the Pact by enlisting new Arab States.  This, he said, would 
improve Anglo-Egyptian ties and he agreed in return to halt Egyptian propaganda 
aimed at British interests in the Middle East.497  The news of Glubb’s dismissal 
arrived during the meeting but Lloyd was not informed about this until after its 
conclusion.  The following day the Foreign Secretary met again with Nasser, the 
latter congratulated him on the news of Glubb’s dismissal as he saw it as a move 
done to improve British relations with Egypt.498  In Heikal’s account, Lloyd’s face 
during the second meeting with Nasser turned red when the Egyptian Prime 
Minister asked if Glubb’s exoneration was a good decision.  Heikal further asserted 
that Nasser had only known of the news at around 9.00 am on 2 March when British 
journalist Tom Little covering the Foreign Secretary’s visit informed Heikal of the 
news and in turn Heikal informed Nasser, just before his second meeting with 
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Lloyd.499  Although Heikal’s claim should not be ruled out, it is hard to believe that it 
took Nasser approximately twenty-four hours to discover the news of Glubb’s 
dismissal.  Trevelyan maintained in his memoir that Lloyd ‘was convinced that 
Nasser had known of General Glubb’s dismissal’ beforehand and there was a 
possibility that he intended it to coincide with his meeting with the Egyptians.500  
The developments surrounding Glubb’s dismissal would also be felt by Lloyd during 
his subsequent stop to Bahrain.  
News of Glubb’s sacking spread throughout Bahrain and, according to 
Belgrave, it ‘was widely discussed in the bazaars’.501  In Wight-Boycott’s account, 
with Lloyd due to arrive in Bahrain, all British military services that included the 
Royal Navy, Army, and RAF were notified that a possible demonstration might take 
place during his visit.  However public security was left in the hands of Bahrain’s 
Police Force.   Lloyd arrived on schedule at Bahrain’s Muharraq airport at 7.00 pm 
and was personally met by the Ruler, the Resident, the Political Agent, senior British 
officials, and the Residency and Agency’s staff.  The Minister’s accompanying 
delegation included twenty-eight members of which thirteen were women 
employed as personal assistants and secretaries.  A convoy of cars taking the 
Minister and his delegation proceeded from the airport to the Residency’s 
headquarters in Juffair.  Ladies among the delegation followed the procession in 
taxis accompanied by female employees from the Residency.  When the Resident’s 
car that contained the Foreign Secretary advanced to the causeway linking 
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Muharraq Island with Manama crowds appeared on both sides of the road resulting 
in the procession coming to a standstill.502   
In Gault’s description the car convoy had passed by a crowd at 7.15 pm 
which had just gathered to watch a local football match.  Upon realising that the 
convoy was clearly conveying a VIP and very likely to be Britain’s much-anticipated 
Foreign Secretary, the crowds gathered by the roadside and shouted in Arabic, 
‘down with Belgrave’, ‘down with the imperialists’, and ‘down with the colonisers’.  
Then the assembled throng got ‘completely carried away by its own hysteria’.503  
Lucas recollected in his memoir that the verbal attacks did not only target Belgrave 
but Lloyd too.504  Lloyd’s memoir suggested that he was unable to recognise what 
the crowds were actually shouting at the convoy as the ‘mob’ was ‘yelling’ in Arabic.  
He was later informed that demonstrators shouted ‘Go home, Belgrave’.505  The 
Resident’s memoir recalled that the demand he heard from protestors was that 
‘Belgrave should go’.506  Heikal on the other hand asserted, (although he was not an 
eyewitness to the event) that demonstrators also chanted Nasser’s name.507 
The British traveller Roderic Owen provided a rare account from a neutral 
point-of-view, as he did not represent his Government nor was he employed by the 
Administration.  He claimed to have been an eyewitness to the stoning of Lloyd’s car 
as he lived in Muharraq where the incident had taken place.  He claimed that crowds 
of Bahrainis had gathered in close proximity to Muharraq’s police station and at a 
                                                        
502 TNA, FO 371/120545, V.A. Wight-Boycott: Disturbance in Bahrain, 6 March 1956. 
503 TNA, FO 371/120544, Gault to Burrows, 22 March 1956. 
504 I. Lucas, A Road to Damascus: Mainly Diplomatic Memoirs from the Middle East (London: 1997), 34. 
505 Lloyd, Suez 1956, 49. 
506 Burrows, Footnotes in the Sand, 67. 
507 Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, 84-85. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 160 
restaurant known as Oriental Restaurant that led to the causeway leading to 
Manama.  Contradicting Gault’s testimony, Owen reported that the mob that had 
attacked the car had shouted in English and not Arabic.  He recounted that 
protestors said in rhythmic fashion, ‘Selwyn Lloyd, Bell-er-grave must go!  Selwyn 
Lloyd, Bell-er-grave must go!’  The crowds later ‘began stamping on the ground, 
then the stamping turned into a kind of dance.  This was the dam bursting; this was 
Arab hysteria’ as Owen observed.508  
Wight-Boycott’s account revealed that although the police were present, they 
were helpless to defend the car convoy from the gathered crowd.  Athough the 
Resident’s car that had carried Lloyd escaped without serious damage, the crowd of 
protestors managed to throw sand into the car landing on the lap of Deputy Under 
Secretary of State, Sir Harold Caccia.  The procession of cars managed to continue, 
but with constant ‘stops and starts’.  The car carrying the Senior Naval Officer 
suffered damage to its bodywork as the mob attacked it.  Another car saw a brick fly 
into it from a demonstrator, but no injuries were documented.  The convoy finally 
managed to slip through the demonstrators and cross the causeway to Manama.  
Unfortunately the BOAC’s buses that accompanied the convoy were destroyed by 
the demonstrators and a failed attempt was made to burn a bus owned by BAPCO.  A 
Bahraini fire engine was despatched to the scene but was also stoned by the mob.  
The demonstrators refused to abandon the scene until police reinforcements 
arrived and a confrontation erupted between the two sides with rifle butts used to 
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disperse the angry mob.509  The Ruler’s car was also reported by Gault to have 
suffered severe dents.510  The location where the incident took place in Muharraq 
came to be known in Bahraini folklore as ‘Selwyn Lloyd’s Corner’.511   
The convoy managed to finally reach safely the Residency and the situation 
seemed to have quietened down by 8.20 pm when the Foreign Secretary gave a 
short press conference in the Residency.512  An unnamed journalist from Al-Watan 
questioned Lloyd; the answers were published approximately a month following the 
incident in Bahrain.  One of the questions asked of Lloyd was about the desire 
according to the journalist of people under British protection to gain freedom in 
selecting the form of rule they wished to be governed by.  The Minister responded 
by stating his belief of gradual evolution of government without speeding up the 
process therefore causing public disorder.  Another question was raised regarding 
Britain’s stance on the public demands in Bahrain for reform.  Lloyd responded in a 
similar fashion to the first question, calling for a process of political development to 
take place and evolve by itself.   
Lloyd was also asked about rumours that Britain wanted to establish a 
number of military bases in Bahrain, which the Minister denied.  Finally a question 
was put forward to Lloyd on Britain’s stance regarding the Baghdad Pact.  The 
journalist questioned whether it was in the interest of HMG to support the Egyptian-
Indian non-aligned movement that emerged from the Bandung Conference instead 
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of the Baghdad Pact for the cause of greater global peace.  In Lloyd’s answer he 
referred to the creation of NATO and how it aided the West in countering the 
Soviets.  He believed that the countries in close proximity to the Soviet Union in the 
Middle East did well by forging their own alliance and it was in HMG’s own interest 
to take part in such an alliance.  He concluded that the Pact’s objectives were purely 
defensive.513   
The Foreign Secretary was then escorted to the Ruler’s palace in Gudaibiya 
for a formal banquet.  Although it was previously proposed by Burrows that a 
private meeting with Sheikh Salman and the British Minister would follow the 
dinner reception, recent developments intruded on the evening’s conversation and 
the topic of Britain’s stance towards the HEC was openly reviewed.  Burrows 
recorded the points discussed between the two parties during the banquet.  In the 
Resident’s account, the Ruler informed the Foreign Secretary of information he 
believed that connected the HEC with British officials in Bahrain.  On his part Lloyd 
expressed Britain’s confidence in the Ruler’s statesmanship.  Lloyd later suggested 
to the Ruler that he set up an Advisory Council that would become a means by which 
‘reasonable elements from Bahraini society’ could offer advice.  Regarding HMG’s 
dealings with ‘insensible and ignorant elements of society’ Lloyd explained to the 
Ruler that ‘We found that by giving them an opportunity to talk they became much 
less dangerous.  The same should be tried in Bahrain’.514  The reception at the palace 
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included the presentation of a decorated sword by Sheikh Salman to Lloyd.515  As for 
the Adviser, he declared in his memoir that an anteroom at the palace was used as a 
place from which to communicate with the police.  Belgrave continuously updated 
the Ruler on the situation in Muharraq.  To the Adviser it ‘was the most trying social 
function that I have ever attended’.516   
 During the Foreign Secretary’s stay at the palace, news arrived that the 
demonstrators had regrouped and were blocking the roads, had planted devices to 
puncture car tyres, and had gathered to await the return of the Minister to 
Muharraq airport, according to Wight-Boycott’s account of the affair.  Upon 
receiving this news the Resident requested the Senior Naval Officer to keep HMS 
Loch Foda on stand-by.  The officer requested that the ship keep part of its 
complement ready to land should orders come to do so.517  According to Burrows’ 
own account the mob returned to the scene at 10.30 pm.518 
With the dinner over, Lloyd was escorted after 11.00 pm to the Residency 
building in Juffair.  The ship’s shore party was ready to disembark at 11.38 pm.  The 
Senior Naval Officer signalled for thirty men of HMS Loch Foda to land at 11.52 pm.  
They landed at 12.35 am aided by BAPCO’s tugboat and were escorted by troop 
carriers from Sitra to Juffair, ready for action, if needed.  The party of women who 
had accompanied the Minister did not attend the palace banquet and were taken to 
the Residency were they remained.  They returned by taxi and on schedule to the 
airport.  No one was injured but the mob managed to break one of the cars’ 
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windows.  Fortunately for Lloyd the mob that had eagerly awaited his return 
abandoned its vigil in the very early morning of 3 March and he was finally escorted 
out of the Residency at 1.30 am for his flight to New Delhi at 2.45 am, having 
suffered a mere four-hour hiatus to his schedule.519   
In a private letter from Wight-Boycott to his mother, now kept at the 
Imperial War Museums in London, he added some further details about the event.  
He noted that he had accompanied Lloyd’s car parade in a separate vehicle.  He was 
sure that the protestors ‘were not after blood at that time’.  He also noted that the 
two trucks that drove the thirty military personnel from Sitra to Juffair were driven 
by ‘unauthorised drivers’.  Inside the British Naval Base during the height of the 
crisis that night, he had the men ‘armed to the teeth’ and equipped with tear gas.  He 
confirmed that they were not needed as the crowd that had waited for Lloyd’s 
return had dispersed before he drove by.  He also made it plain to his mother that he 
had no wish for a confrontation with the demonstrators as he feared that grave 
consequences would follow.520   
Belgrave sent a letter dated 8 March to his friend Colonel Charles Fredrick 
Howard Gough, the British MP for Horsham, in which he justified his attitude to the 
stoning of Lloyd’s car convoy.  The letter’s content was passed to the FO through Sir 
AD Dodds-Parker, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as Gough had handed it 
to him.  After the Adviser provided the MP with an overview of the HEC that 
involved personal attacks against the nationalists’ leaders, the letter revealed new 
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details on the police’s handling of the crisis from his point-of-view.  Belgrave blamed 
the police for their failure to arrest any of the rioters and believed that they 
deserved ‘to be sacked’.  The reason for their failure to arrest those involved was 
their belief that firearms would have been used in the process causing injuries and 
loss of life.  The Adviser further revealed that on the morning of 2 March the police 
had unpacked packages of tear gas and had practiced using it.  However during the 
drill the wind had blown in the wrong direction.521  Gough’s interest in Bahrain’s 
affairs was apparently tied to his role in the insurance industry, for which he had 
travelled to Bahrain on a number of occasions.522 
The British newspaper The Observer debated whether the riot was 
intentionally staged during Lloyd’s visit or was ‘an unlucky coincidence’.  The 
newspaper leaned towards the second possibility, saying that ‘The supporters of 
this movement [HEC] are also doubtless not immune from the general current of 
political nationalism and “anti-imperialism” in the Arab World’.523   
 Lloyd’s papers, located at Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, 
surprisingly had more documents about valuing and insuring the ornamental sword 
presented to him by the Ruler than about the riot and near disaster that he had 
experienced.  He had conducted detailed correspondence with the Alliance 
Assurance Company and Spink and Son.524   
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The Suez Oral History Project aimed to interview various personalities vis-à-
vis the Suez War whose transcripts are found at King’s College London.  Historians 
Anthony Gorst and WS Lucas interviewed Sir Donald Logan who had accompanied 
Lloyd in Bahrain and was an eyewitness to the event, as he was then his Assistant 
Private Secretary.  He recalled that the incident was not for him a life-threatening 
ordeal, as he was in either the second or third car of the procession when the attack 
took place.  In Logan’s account, Lloyd was in the first car accompanied by Caccia.  
Logan mistakenly called the attacking mob supporters of the ‘Committee of 
Education’ and not the HEC.  The news of the HEC winning all seats up for election 
earlier in February for the Education Council might have resulted in his confusion.   
Logan firmly believed ‘that there was great suspicion that the Egyptians were 
behind everything in the Gulf’.525   
Lucas, then the Residency’s employee, when interviewed as part of The 
British Diplomatic Oral History Programme at Churchill College Cambridge, 
suspected that the incident of stoning Lloyd’s car had ‘affected his judgment at the 
time of Suez a few months later’.  In Lucas’ opinion, Lloyd arrived in Bahrain feeling 
that Nasser had personally ridiculed him over the issue of Glubb’s dismissal.   Lloyd, 
Lucas suggested, carried a ‘chip on his shoulder in Bahrain’ and when he was met 
face-to-face with rioters he thought it to be ‘all part of this Nasser-inspired plot’.526  
Heikal also made the same point, believing that Lloyd (following the Bahraini 
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incident) ‘thought that Nasser was playing a cat and mouse game with him and that 
Bahrein was the final act of the cat attacking the mouse’.527   
In Shuckburgh’s diary entry of 3 March he claimed to have been approached 
by Eden who asked him to contemplate earnestly the idea of reoccupying Suez as a 
move to respond to Glubb Pasha’s sacking.  As the issue was being discussed news 
arrived of Lloyd’s stoning in Bahrain.  Shuckburgh felt that everything was in a state 
of a mess, ‘and the Arabs [were] hating us more and more’.  Eden’s excitement at 
recent developments later prompted him to ask Shuckburgh to arrange a ‘weekend 
[of] meetings at Chequers’ on the situation in Bahrain and a tour d’horizon of the 
overall defence of the Gulf region.  Shuckburgh thought that the weekend meetings 
were most unnecessary.528  Nutting described Eden at that time as behaving ‘like an 
enraged elephant charging senselessly at invisible and imaginary enemies in the 
international jungle’.529   
Conservative MP Julian Amery voiced his opinion on recent developments in 
Bahrain and the Middle East.  Amery was joint leader with Captain Charles 
Waterhouse of the Suez Group informal body consisting of about fifty MPs aimed to 
counter policies of appeasement towards Nasser and reversing what they saw as 
diminishing British influence in the region.530  Amery’s letter to The Times on 5 
March viewed the dismissal of Glubb and stoning of Lloyd’s car in Bahrain as signs 
of ‘the bankruptcy of the policy of appeasement in the Middle East’.  He linked these 
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developments, inter alia, to Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine and the Suez Canal 
Zone.  Amery’s letter continued: 
We are now very close to the final disaster.  The challenge to our 
influence in Jordan and on the Persian Gulf, if left unchecked, must 
lead to the breakup of the Baghdad Pact.  Our oil supplies, without 
which we cannot live, would then be in immediate danger; our 
communications with other Commonwealth countries would be 
threatened; and all Africa would be opened to Communist advance. 
 
Amery blamed the British Government, saying that it had failed to offer the 
leadership necessary to tackle unrest and disruption in the region.  But he said that 
all was not lost, if a mission to save British influence in the Middle East could be 
mounted.531   
The Lord Lloyd, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1951-57) had 
been received with similar anger when he visited Aden in May.  Yemeni protestors 
had surrounded The Lord Lloyd’s car as he arrived in Yemen for a ten-day visit.  
Demonstrators were reported to have chanted ‘Down with Imperialism’.  His car 
was also attacked by kicks and sticks from protestors as The Glasgow Herald 
revealed.532  The Daily Express added to the report that approximately a thousand 
Yemenis had surrounded the procession.  They had hired buses to get the 
demonstrators to the scene. 533  The organisation of the demonstration was probably 
inspired by Bahrain. 
Burrows tried to understand the reasons that led to such an unexpected 
welcome from Bahrainis to the Foreign Secretary.  He acknowledged that Belgrave’s 
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centralisation, outdated methods of governing, and three decades in office had 
played a role in recent events.  He, nevertheless, thought that some of the criticism 
of the Adviser was fuelled by people’s ‘personal grudges’ against the Administration 
as some had failed to get what they wanted ‘in individual matters’.  In addition the 
Resident believed that recent developments in Jordan and the dismissal of Glubb 
Pasha had infected attitudes locally.  Burrows also doubted that Belgrave wanted to 
leave his post anytime in the near future.534   
The Resident later reflected in his memoir on the comparisons that could be 
made between Glubb and Belgrave.  He maintained that the position of both ‘were in 
some ways similar but in other ways different’.  The most common feature between 
both ‘was that they both stayed too long in their positions’ and concluded: 
The admirable work which they had carried out in the past could no 
longer be performed in the same manner and a degree of British 
tutelage which their presence implied was no longer acceptable in the 
growing spirit of nationalism which was then pervading the whole of 
the Middle East. 
 
He viewed the problem as a common trait among other British politicians in 
occupying a position for too long, ‘from Winston Churchill down’.535 
The Resident met with Belgrave the day following the riot and told the 
Adviser that the first lesson to grasp from the event of stoning the Foreign 
Secretary’s convoy was the need to improve Bahrain’s public security forces.  The 
Resident further suggested that the idea of appointing Iraqi officers to strengthen 
the local Force be revisited, but reduced in number to thirty.536 
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Reviewing the attack on the Foreign Secretary, Burrows proposed three 
theories.  First, that the HEC intentionally organised the demonstration.  Second, 
that a single member or a small group of the HEC was behind the demonstration.  
Third, that agents provocteurs opposing the HEC staged the demonstration.  The 
Resident then went on to doubt the theory that implied that the HEC organised the 
event as they had expressed on 3 March to the Residency their ‘sincere expression 
of deepest regret at what occurred’.  Burrows leaned towards the second theory as 
information had reached him that Al-Shamlan had been addressing the crowd 
following the football match.  The Residency believed that, due to Al-Shamlan’s 
action, he was to be ‘court-martialed’ by the HEC.   
Burrows also informed the FO that he had learned from Belgrave that the 
Ruler had told the Adviser that he was fully responsible for order in Bahrain and 
that he had the freedom to arrest the frontline members of the HEC.  Belgrave in 
return informed the Resident that the Administration was not capable of carrying 
out that move on its own, fearing a violent backlash.  The grounds for arresting HEC 
members would cite the contents of a circular issued by the Party on 21 February in 
which it had warned the Administration about ignoring its demands.  But Belgrave 
indicated that there was not sufficient evidence to convict them in a court of law.   
Burrows warned the Adviser that major disturbances might follow the 
suggested arrests.  He then recommended to the Ruler that he form a Privy Council 
to receive public comments and recommendations and he promised to gain the 
support of HMG for this idea.  Burrows reiterated the need for the Adviser to 
strengthen the Police Force.  The Resident further urged Belgrave that the Bahraini 
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Government should announce without delay an enquiry into recent events.  
Burrows also asked the FO whether they would allow British forces to be deployed 
in Bahrain should the HEC arrests take place.537  
Sheikh Salman expressed his earnest apology on 4 March to the Resident 
about the imbroglio of the attack on Lloyd and laid the blame on the HEC’s agitation.  
In response, the Resident suggested to the Ruler awarding the HEC its demand for 
official recognition, provided it changed its name.  To Burrows’ surprise, the Ruler 
accepted his suggestion, adding his own quid pro quo – that Al-Bakir leaves Bahrain 
for a fixed period of time.538   
Bahrainis at the time were probably unaware of the gravity of the situation 
and that serious action was being considered by high-ranking British policy makers.  
Shuckburgh noted in his diary on 5 March that,  
The Ministers – led by the PM [Eden] – were made keen to land British 
troops somewhere, to show that we are still alive and kicking; and 
they thought Bahrain a good place because of the recent stoning of 
Selwyn Lloyd. 
 
During the same meeting plans were also discussed to deport Cyprus’s Greek-
Cypriot nationalist leader Archbishop Makarios.539  British authorities showed their 
determination in Cyprus on 9 March when Makarios and three others were arrested 
and deported from the island.  The Governor of Cyprus, Field Marshall Sir John 
Harding, CIGS, made a statement saying that Makarios was suspected of supporting 
EOKA’s radical elements.540   
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It could be argued that the deliberations between the Resident and the 
Eastern Department at the FO, headed by Riches, in addition to Burrows’ work 
between the Ruler and the HEC to reach a level of understanding between the two 
sides, had saved Bahrain from an almost-inevitable disaster.  Riches thought that 
Burrows had acted sensibly during the crisis a matter on which he commended him.  
Based on a written discussion between the two, Riches conceded that Britain must 
not take any action against the HEC basing his decision on three arguments.  The 
first affirmed that there was no concrete evidence to believe that the HEC staged the 
recent disturbance.  The second was that individuals cannot be arrested based on 
their ideas.  The third underlined that direct British intervention would commit 
Britain and would be seen as depriving the Ruler of his own authority.541   
Al-Bakir claimed in his memoir that the stoning of Lloyd’s car convoy was a 
turning point in Britain’s policy towards the HEC, as Britain then conspired to 
‘execute its plans to eliminate the Committee’.542  The British Cabinet’s attitude 
towards developments in Bahrain were never shared at the time with the HEC nor 
were they made public.  The attitude of the Residency seemed, on the contrary, 
genuinely sincere in its attempt to end local hostilities, urging both sides to reach a 
level of understanding.  Therefore Al-Bakir’s comment on British policy after the 
Lloyd incident was incorrect as it failed to reflect the reality on the ground and the 
status quo.  
Eden was to face a disgruntled House of Commons on 7 March with events in 
Jordan and Bahrain dominating the debate.  Eden, with the short time he had, 
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prepared a speech for the Commons which was to be ‘regarded as one of the worst’ 
of his career, as he later confessed.  Eden was ‘well lectured in the House of 
Commons’ by critics.543  The efficiency of the Baghdad Pact was also debated and in 
that context Nutting argued that the Soviet menace in the Middle East was 
‘calculated and carefully planned’ and that the Pact was ‘proving an effective 
instrument for the defence of the Middle East’.  As for the Gulf region, Nutting 
promised to take all necessary steps to maintain Britain’s position and friendship 
with the rulers of Arab Gulf States.  In relation to Bahrain, Lieutenant-Colonel Neil 
McLean, said in the House of Commons that he saw Glubb’s dismissal to have ‘been 
underlined by events that followed in the Bahrein area which we thought we had 
under complete control’.544   
Brigadier Terence Clarke proposed that Britain should send more ships to 
the Gulf to ensure the protection of sheikhdoms there and the flow of oil.545  Even 
Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of Britain’s opposition Labour Party, believed that the 
country should maintain its position in the Middle East in light of recent 
developments.  He highlighted the importance of oil in sustaining Britain, expressed 
his fear that the Middle East would be overtaken by the Soviets, and criticised the 
Government for failing to recognise the growth of Arab nationalism.546  
Humphrey Mynors, the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor, sent a letter to 
Shuckburgh on 8 March in which he warned him of conditions in Bahrain.  He 
passed information from a British banker he knew in Jordan who believed that 
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trouble in Bahrain was imminent based on his experience of Jordanian affairs.  On 
the Adviser’s position the letter called for change or ‘an explosion will come’.547  On 
the Belgrave question (although he was not an employee of the British Government 
as Riches asserted) his analysis of the situation was that: 
nothing which would diminish British prestige more in Bahrain and in 
the whole of the Gulf than if the success of the rowdy Egyptian 
campaign for the removal of Glubb was immediately followed up by a 
similar success in Bahrain.  
 
Nonetheless Riches also asserted that a plan to ‘ease Belgrave out’ by the end of the 
year must be implemented.  Riches dreaded the idea of Belgrave being possibly 
replaced by an Egyptian Adviser.  He proposed three alternative courses to adopt.  
First was the hiring of a British assistant to the Adviser who would eventually take 
over Belgrave’s duties.  Second, was to hire either an Iraqi or Pakistani citizen, both 
countries being members of the Baghdad Pact, as a substitute for Belgrave.  Third 
was to divide Belgrave’s work into two: an ‘Occidental Secretary’ to Bahrain’s Ruler, 
and another as a ‘Chief Secretary to the Administration’.548 
Peace may have been restored to Bahrain, but tensions remained high 
throughout the first ten days of March.  The HEC had planned to hold an event on 
the day of Prophet Mohammed’s Al-Isra wa Al-Mi’raj anniversary due on 9 March.549  
The function was called off by the Party as it feared it might lead to the event getting 
out of hand, as minutes by an unidentified person from the Residency noted.  The 
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minutes also revealed that there was a strong belief publically that the arrest of the 
Movement’s leading figures was imminent.550   
 Burrows thought that ‘any disturbance of basically local origin is apt to have 
overtones of Egyptian propaganda and, therefore anti-Iraq feeling, added to it’.  
Burrows believed that Egyptian radio played a critical role locally compared with 
Iraq’s radio station.  To the Resident the Egyptians were ‘in a different class to that 
of Iraq and Egypt has so far shown itself the most ready provider of experts and 
technicians’.  Burrows recommended to the FO the establishment of cultural 
missions between Iraq and Arab Gulf States, to strengthen Iraqi influence and 
diminish that of Egypt.551   
In a note from the British Prime Minister to his Minister of Defence on 10 
March, Eden declared that ‘We have just got to get it into these people’s heads that 
the situation in the Persian Gulf may become highly dangerous at any moment’.  
Eden further warned that oil supplies must not be compromised and military 
support was vital for its protection.  He insisted that ‘Both the political and military 
difficulties have got to be overcome’.552   
 In March the situation in the Middle East looked gloomy for Britain, 
Conservative politician William Clark summarised in his memoir the state of affairs 
as he saw them: 
General Glubb, commander of the British-trained Arab Legion in 
Jordan, was sacked by King Hussein, which was a shocking blow to 
our prestige throughout the Middle East.  The Baghdad Pact was 
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breaking up and so was our whole Middle East position (Selwyn Lloyd 
was fooled in Cairo and stoned in Bahrein).553 
 
No major events were recorded immediately following the stoning of Lloyd’s 
procession and negotiations between the Administration and the HEC, mediated by 
the Residency, seemed to be moving towards an eventual resolution.  But the 
morning of 11 March proved catastrophic, as a minor quarrel in the vegetable 
market in Manama became a deadly affair and developed into a general strike.  The 
event turned the Prime Minister’s attention once again to Bahrain and a demand for 
the arrest of the opposition.  Nonetheless, negotiations continued locally and 
resulted in a colossal political breakthrough as the next Chapter details. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Municipality Incident, Official Recognition  
of the Nationalist Movement, and the Belgrave Question  
11 March to June 1956 
 
After the sudden disturbance that accompanied the visit of Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary tensions in Bahrain remained high.  A minor incident at the local Manama 
vegetable market resulted in a mass brawl that reached the capital’s municipal 
offices -- hence the label the ‘Municipality Incident’.  The latest episode would result 
in a number of deaths followed by a strike with the very real threat to violence.  The 
incident pressed British strategy makers to re-evaluate their policy on Bahrain and 
deliberate over the Belgrave question.   
 Frantic correspondence between the Residency and the FO ensued, as the 
Residency continually updated the FO on developments in Bahrain and seek its 
advice.  On a broader perspective, events in Bahrain, together with Nasser’s gradual 
rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc and Glubb’s dismissal, forced the strategists in 
Whitehall to abandon the Alpha Plan and adopt a new one.  Eden was even moved to 
caution Khrushchev during the latter’s visit to Britain to stop interfering in the 
Middle East.  
Only minutes after the Administration had successfully met with the HEC on 
11 March, the Resident had to inform the FO that an unplanned and unexpected 
disturbance had occurred in the capital’s vegetable market close to the main souq 
and municipal offices.  It seems the cause was an approach by a municipal 
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regulations official to a vegetable market seller who had set up an unlicensed stall 
on the roadway.  The official told the seller to remove his products and an argument 
developed between the two.  A scuffle ensued between a policeman, who was at the 
scene, and the vegetable seller and, as always, crowds gathered.   
The fracas turned into a large-scale brawl and police officers stationed at the 
market sought refuge in the Municipality’s offices.  The mob pursued the fleeing 
policemen and besieged them.  The police from inside and outside the building 
fought hard to disband the angry mob for more than four hours, but with little 
success.  An attempt was made by the police outside to drive a truck to the door of 
the Municipality to rescue their colleagues, but their efforts failed.  Only then did the 
police open fire, killing two people on the spot and fatally injuring three others.  It 
was assumed at the time that someone from the crowd fired first.  The Residency 
immediately moved a small unit of British forces from the Arabian Gulf to Bahrain as 
a ‘precautionary measure’.554    
Belgrave believed that the clash had developed as a result of sectarian 
tensions between the vegetable sellers (the majority of whom were Shi’ites) and 
municipal officials who were mostly Sunni.  Furthermore, the vegetable sellers were 
already disaffected because they had recently been moved to a new market built by 
the Ruler and had much preferred their previous, albeit outdated, premises.  These 
feelings compounded the sense of resentment towards municipal officers in his 
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opinion.555 
Early next day, 12 March, the expected announcement of a national strike did 
not happen.  However a number of Shi’ite public transport and BAPCO vehicle 
drivers failed to come to work.  Shops at the local souq did not open for 
‘precautionary reasons’.  No news of violence in Manama was reported, but in 
Muharraq a number of vehicles were stoned.  The Residency felt ready to cope with 
the situation as two British frigates lay at anchor in Juffair and Sitra, available to 
protect Bahrain’s oil refinery.  The Residency pressed unidentified members of the 
HEC to use their influence to encourage those who wished to go on strike to return 
to work.  Burrows believed that the ‘Ruler is anxious that [the] stationing of British 
troops here should be regarded only as temporary expedient lasting, he hopes, only 
a few days’.  Apart from the stationing of troops to protect the oil company’s 
facilities, there were no discussions on the use of these forces to bring about law and 
order.556 
The HEC’s actions and policy seemed to Burrows to be all too predictable and 
he had predicted the steps that would be taken by the Party way before its issue of a 
circular.  He said that the HEC would issue an announcement calling on people to 
refrain from any violent activity, the condemnation of the police, a demand for an 
enquiry, and Belgrave’s head.557 
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As expected, the HEC issued a proclamation on 12 March in which it 
expressed its shock ‘by the irresponsible criminal act’ and laid the responsibility 
squarely onto the Government.  The Party blamed Belgrave personally for past 
shootings and for the Municipal Incident.  As expected the HEC demanded the 
immediate dismissal of the Adviser.  However what was not expected by the 
Resident was that the Movement also announced the commencement of a strike 
based as what it oddly cited was the peoples’ own desire for a strike.558  Burrows, 
through the Residency’s staff, made contact with the HEC and they were urged to 
end the strike.  But Burrows felt that the Party’s influence over its own followers 
was ‘much less than it was’.  He was right, and anarchy prevailed.559 
 The earliest Government reports that had reached the Residency suggested 
that the police were strongly provoked and that shots had possibly been fired first 
from the crowd.  Further investigation suggested that a bullet extracted from one of 
the victims of the affair was not police issue.  The Resident did not question that the 
police had fired wildly but was not able to lay the blame on them for doing so since 
they had been placed in considerable danger.  Nevertheless it was all too clear to 
Burrows that ‘Feeling against Belgrave is unfortunately widespread, even among the 
normally-responsible elements, senior merchants etc.  His departure would ease 
immediately the situation’, although the incident itself had nothing to do with 
Belgrave personally.  However the Adviser’s departure at this particular time was 
seen as particularly awkward and a ‘considerable blow at our prestige’ especially it 
would follow so soon after the dismissal of Glubb, Burrows thought.  To ease this 
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highly volatile situation Burrows felt that it would be a good idea to establish an 
Administration Council to take over Belgrave’s responsibilities.560 
Eden’s response to this news of further disturbances in Bahrain was 
recorded in Shuckburgh’s diary entry of 12 March.  At first a meeting to discuss the 
matter was held at 10 Downing Street.  Shuckburgh noted that Eden in the meeting 
immediately ‘began by cursing us for not telling him about the Bahrain telegrams 
last night (Sunday), and proceeded to be pretty bloody to everyone present’.561 
Internationally-circulated newspapers, such as the New York Times, covered 
developments in Bahrain.  It reported that a dispute at the vegetable market in 
Bahrain had turned into a riot aimed at Belgrave’s dismissal.  The newspaper also 
claimed that eleven people had died as a result of the riot without providing further 
details.562  The UK daily The Manchester Guardian offered its version of events 
saying that only three men were killed in the latest disturbance.  The paper 
concluded that, ‘There is no foundation for reports that the incident had any anti-
British basis’.563  The London-based Daily Express offered a more detailed account of 
the disturbance and background to the conflict, adding that one hundred and twenty 
British military personnel were on their way to Bahrain and said that the riot was in 
protest at Belgrave’s presence.564  The Daily Mirror newspaper maintained in its 
news coverage that eleven people were killed ‘when anti-British riots flared’ in 
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Bahrain’s capital as protestors demanded Belgrave’s dismissal.565  The most 
accurate report of the event was published in The Times, suggesting that the event 
commenced as a dispute between a vegetable-seller and municipal official, which 
had escalated into a riot when a large crowd besieged the police who had intervened 
at the scene.566 
Shuckburgh was assigned by Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, to 
prepare minutes of discussion with the Prime Minister to be forwarded to Sir Gerald 
Templer.  It proposed that problems in Bahrain had arisen ‘from the general 
awakening of the Arab world and the unsettling effect of Egyptian leadership’.  The 
minutes recorded that the use of British forces in Bahrain could prove to be 
disastrous and used only ‘in a moment of extreme emergency’.  It was also asserted 
that the HEC movement in Bahrain had ‘never been directed against us [Britain]’.  
Nonetheless fear persisted that agitation might turn anti-British and the continued 
presence of Belgrave and his future was in the balance.  The minutes went on to 
record the view that, in order to maintain the overall continuation of Britain’s 
presence in the Gulf region ‘the Egyptian drive for revolutionary leadership in the 
Arab world as a whole’ must be countered.  That realistic assessment of the 
situation would later change with the Prime Minister’s personal reaction to further 
developments.567 
The situation in Bahrain took a turn for the worse on 13 March as reports of 
‘hooliganism’ in Manama were received and that official cars passing between 
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Manama and Muharraq had been obstructed.  Other roads were blocked, more 
vehicles were stoned and a European-owned car was burnt out.  Understanding the 
complexity of the situation and seeing that matters had gone too far, the HEC 
informed the Residency that they were prepared to withdraw their insistence on 
Belgrave’s departure, as a quid pro quo for the Administration announcing an 
enquiry into the latest shootings.  The Party, it said, would then urge people to 
return to work.  Burrows recorded that the Residency was in contact with a member 
of the HEC to negotiate a breakthrough but did not name the individual concerned.  
The Resident observed that the HEC did not want to extend the strike and had 
seemed unprepared for it.   
After the Residency’s mediation between the Administration and the HEC, an 
initial understanding between the two was reached.  In order to help bring about an 
end to the strike the HEC was granted permission to use trucks equipped with 
speakers to urge people to disband.568  
 But the strike continued and on 14 March a noticeable change was seen in 
Burrows’ attitude towards the nationalists.  The Resident, in his account to the FO, 
alluded to the possibility of initiating a crackdown against local agitators whether 
they were individual agitators or HEC members.  Burrows proposed to the FO that 
British troops should take over some of the responsibilities of the local police in 
order to restore order on the islands.  Furthermore the Resident said that he had 
been approached by Belgrave who sought action against the HEC if they opted to 
extend the strike.  Burrows sought advice from the FO.  The Resident now believed 
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that even when the HEC advocated or called for non-violent strikes they turned into 
‘a threat to security since strike conditions are bound to breed incidents which, as 
we have just seen, can grow to dangerous proportions’.569    
The HEC for its part tried to call off the ongoing strike, but to no avail.  On 14 
March the Resident met with the Ruler to persuade him to meet with the HEC in 
order to finalise an agreement with the Party.  In the discussion the establishment of 
an Administration Council to assist the Ruler in his work and ease pressure on 
Belgrave was also discussed.  The Ruler did not accept the Resident’s proposal to 
meet the HEC and requested that British officials in Bahrain meet them first.  So 
Gault met with four unidentified members of the HEC on the afternoon of the same 
day.  The Agent discussed three major points with the nationalists on which to base 
an end to the deadlock.  The first was official acknowledgement of the HEC.  The 
second was that an enquiry should be launched to look into recent events.  The third 
point was the dismissal of Belgrave.  The Resident then expressed his hope that an 
agreement would be reached soon.570   
Shuckburgh, based on his diary entry of 15 March, saw Eden to be in a great 
‘state of excitement’ as he was shown the latest telegrams on Bahrain from the 
Residency.  Shuckburgh specified that as a response the Prime Minister ‘seems to 
want to march troops in and arrest the “Higher Executive Committee” with which 
Bernard [Burrows] is now negotiating’.  The developments in Bahrain and the 
region must have added to Eden’s overall anxiety.  Shuckburgh believed that 
matters had reached a state ‘where each telegram that comes in causes Ministers to 
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meet, telephone one another, draft replies and curse everybody’.571  The British 
Cabinet held a meeting on 15 March to discuss the crisis in Bahrain.  In the meeting 
Nutting examined the possible responses to the conflict.  One was to back the NUC 
and take the risk that the strike would continue for a longer period.  Another was to 
bring in one hundred and seventeen Iraqi officers to assist Bahrain’s police 
(favoured by the Ruler but currently discouraged by his Adviser).  Deploying British 
troops was also mooted.  Eden noted in the meeting Iraqi personnel were already en 
route and that it would look ‘indecisive to divert them now’.  Nutting suggested 
advising the Iraqis to delay their arrival and to significantly decrease their numbers.  
Eden ordered to inform Burrows that he could deploy British troops to restore 
order.572   
In the Cabinet meeting’s conclusion it was disclosed that British troops had 
already been deployed to Bahrain from the Trucial State of Sharjah (in modern day 
United Arab Emirates).  Additionally there were two frigates anchored off Bahrain 
and a cruiser was ordered to sail from Malta.  Eden also disclosed that the 
Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East and the Gulf Resident both recommended 
that any use of force by Britain in Bahrain might result in very damaging long-term 
consequences.  However with current developments ‘in Bahrain some use of British 
troops seemed inevitable’, the Prime Minister commented.  He noted Burrows’ view 
that the situation would be exacerbated by the arrival of Iraqi reinforcements, 
recommending that no more than thirty ‘non-commissioned officers’ be sent to 
Bahrain and that those ‘should be held back until the situation had been restored’.  
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Burrows wanted the authority based on his judgement as to whether British forces 
were needed in Bahrain.  It was therefore essential to bolster Bahrain’s Police Force.  
Based on these arguments, the Cabinet invited the Foreign Secretary to inform 
Burrows that he had the authority, with the Ruler of Bahrain’s prior consent, to use 
British troops in Bahrain if he deemed it necessary.573    
 Lloyd told the Residency that the FO was ‘gravely disturbed’ at the situation 
and developments in Bahrain and that its first priority was to bring the riot to an 
end.  The FO felt that it had ‘no confidence in [the] High Executive Committee’s 
ability to assist’ in the process of bringing the strikes to an end.  Moreover, the 
Foreign Secretary sensed that the HEC  
are setting up unacceptable conditions for co-operation with [the] 
Ruler and I am concerned lest continued negotiation with them will 
merely lead to protracted discussions while riots persist.   
 
Lloyd had endorsed Burrows’ proposal to delay the arrival of Iraqi police 
reinforcements.  Nonetheless it recommended the strengthening and development 
of the Police Force.  It also granted the Resident permission to use British troops to 
bring order to Bahrain, but only with the Ruler’s permission.574  
 On the wider front, Eden sent Eisenhower what he claimed was British 
intelligence on Nasser’s plans in the Middle East.  These included the formation of 
the United Arab States under Egypt’s leadership.  This involved the overthrow of the 
Hashemite ruling families in Iraq and Jordan, the overthrow of the Libyan ruling 
family, the establishment of republics in Northwest Africa, and at a later stage, the 
unseating of the Saudi Arabian monarchy.  This strategy, according to Eden, had 
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received Soviet support by aiding the Egyptians in organising its intelligence 
services.  The plan also featured the despatch of trained Egyptian personnel (in the 
form of education missions) to the Arab World who would establish communication 
‘with anti-Government movements’.575   
 Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, Eden, at the time leading up to the 
Suez crisis, had seemed obsessed by Nasser.  Nutting recalled in his memoir that 
during a telephone conversation between him and Eden, he suggested earlier 
various steps that should be taken to isolate Nasser.  Eden viewed Nutting’s 
recommendations unfavourably and exclaimed:  
But what’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralising’ 
him, as you call it?  I want him destroyed, can’t you understand?  I 
want him removed, and if you and the Foreign Office don’t agree, then 
you’d better come to the Cabinet and explain why.576 
 
The Political Agent had another meeting on 15 March with four members of 
the HEC.  An initial agreement was reached for the official recognition of the Party 
provided that Al-Bakir left Bahrain for a fixed time as requested by the Ruler and 
that an enquiry into recent events was held.  No objection to the Ruler’s conditions 
by the HEC was recorded.  At that point there seemed to be a clear division between 
the members of the HEC.  Al-Bakir and Al-Shamlan wished to bring the strike to a 
swift end but the Shi’ite element of the Party saw themselves to be in a personal 
feud (particularly with the police) following recent events.  Furthermore locals from 
                                                        
575 Eden to Eisenhower, 15 March 1956 in The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957, edited 
by P.G. Boyle, (Chapel Hill, NC: 2005), 123-24.   
576 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, 34-35. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 188 
Muharraq Island (a predominantly Sunni community) had also shown an 
unwillingness to accept any form of settlement.577  
The Residency updated the Ruler on 16 March regarding the recent 
understanding reached with the HEC.  Burrows explained to him that the Party had 
been told that the latest proposal was ‘the final offer’ and that he had pressed the 
HEC to end the strike by 17 March.  The dissidents had also been warned that any 
future disturbance would entitle the Government to exert its authority to bring by 
stability and security.578  
Eden was preoccupied with Bahraini affairs and together with Lloyd, drafted 
a message to Bahrain reiterating that there should be no move to displace Belgrave 
at this stage, although Shuckburgh himself believed that the Adviser ‘ought to go, 
and soon’, as he noted in his diary, adding: 
Fuss, fuss; no confidence in anyone; teaching Bernard Burrows his 
business.  The PM [Eden] has never understood that it is far more 
courageous to accept a humiliation than to do a damn silly ‘bold’ 
act.579 
 
It was around this time that, according to Shuckburgh, the Prime Minister recalled 
meeting the Adviser’s son who, he understood, was ‘training to succeed’ his 
father.580  Eden also thought that the Residency in Bahrain should have never 
allowed itself to be put into a position to negotiate with the HEC on Belgrave’s 
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future.  Eden, it seems, preferred for negotiations to stall rather than to secretly plot 
Belgrave’s demise.581 
On 16 March the FO’s Eastern Department instructed the Resident that any 
move to displace Belgrave at this point ‘would be a great blow to British prestige in 
Bahrain and in the whole of the Gulf’.  It also proposed three moves: the hiring of an 
Assistant Adviser to replace Belgrave, the hiring of an Iraqi or Pakistani Adviser to 
replace the Adviser, and dividing the position of the Adviser into two different 
posts.582  Burrows then informed the Ruler Britain’s support of the Administration 
and its ‘retention of Belgrave’.583  
With this directive in mind the Resident urged the FO to consider hiring an 
assistant to the Adviser who would gradually take over the Adviser’s work, saying 
that this would improve public opinion and maintain British prestige.  Belgrave’s 
status had not been a matter for debate in recent negotiations, but the nationalists 
spread rumours that Belgrave was soon to leave his post.  The Residency, in return, 
warned the Party about repeating such claims and threatened that -- if it continued -
- they would have to issue a public statement on the matter.584  A possible 
explanation as to why the Party spread rumours of Belgrave’s departure was to 
appease their supporters and convince strikers to suspend the strike.585  
The Government of Bahrain issued an official communication, signed by 
Belgrave, on 16 March recognising the opposition under the new name of the 
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National Union Committee (NUC).586  The FO expressed its pleasure to the Residency 
that the situation in Bahrain had settled down.587 
 The proclamation of the official recognition of the NUC was reported 
internationally and the BBC’s English radio also announced on 16 March that Iraqi 
policemen were being despatched to Bahrain.  Following the report the Resident 
requested the FO to issue a statement denying the validity of the news report on 
both the Arabic and English services.588  The initial broadcast by the BBC was picked 
up by other media outlets, such as the New York Times, which reported that an Iraqi 
unit of one hundred and forty men was on its way to Bahrain from Baghdad.589  The 
Manchester Guardian also covered the rumours of Iraqi officers being sent to 
Bahrain.  The newspaper added further and exaggerated claims to the initial 
account, saying that two hundred Iraqi officers were on their way to Bahrain but 
were asked to return.  It also said that an agreement had been concluded between 
the Iraqi and Bahraini Governments on seconding the Iraqi officers for six 
months.590  The Daily Express also covered the news of Iraqi officers being sent to 
Bahrain with its claim that two hundred policemen were to be sent.591 
The announcement of the NUC’s official recognition was followed by another 
public notice from the Government on the formation of a Board of Enquiry to review 
recent developments in Bahrain, headed by the Judicial Adviser to the 
Administration Geoffrey Peace and the Assistant Judge for HMG Court for Bahrain, 
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WPR Mawdsley.  The Board would look into disturbances that had occurred from 2 
to 16 March and called on any witnesses to come forward and testify regarding the 
incidents.592 
Recent events in Bahrain did not go without an Egyptian twist Trevelyan 
posted to the FO a communiqué concerning Egyptian media coverage of Bahrain.  He 
reported being surprised that the, ‘Egyptian press devoted relatively little space to 
Bahrain’s disorders’.  However the small coverage of events in Bahrain that there 
was portrayed the British as having attacked Bahraini citizens.  For example, Al-
Akhbar (The News) newspaper recorded on 14 March that ten were killed in 
Bahrain due to ‘British machine-gun fire during a British attack on the populace’.  
Furthermore the paper blamed the start of the incident on British soldiers who 
suddenly attacked Bahrainis avenging earlier anti-colonial protests and demands for 
the removal of the British Adviser.  Another account of events was issued by Al-
Gomhouria (The Republic) also published on 14 March that said that those who had 
fallen had died following Belgrave’s own orders to open fire.  The newspaper 
maintained that Bahrainis were calling Belgrave ‘Glubb II’.  Akhbar Al-Youm (News 
of Today) in alluding to the attacks in Bahrain by the British said somewhat 
strangely that they had targeted Bahrainis’ religious freedoms.593  Angered by the 
fabricated news in the Egyptian press, Riches suggested that the matter ought to be 
raised personally with Nasser.594 
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 The NUC visited the Ruler in his palace on 18 March to sign a settlement 
agreement.  Al-Shamlan gave a speech in which he appreciated the Ruler’s 
acceptance of the NUC.595  The New York Times covered this news, reporting that the 
strike in Bahrain had ended and that the local ‘authorities had agreed to set up 
committees to consider grievances’.596   
 As matters settled Riches summarised the state of agitation that had led to 
the recent disorder making three points.  The first was Shi’ite suspicion (from a 
sectarian perspective) towards the Administration governed, as it was, by a Sunni 
ruling family.  The second was the feeling of discontent towards the Adviser by 
Bahrainis as a whole.  The third was the rise of Arab nationalism.  Based on these, 
Riches summarised the policy needed to deal with the situation in Bahrain.  He 
proposed first and foremost to strengthen the police by hiring British officers, the 
recruitment of only thirty Iraqi officers (hoping that this lesser number of Iraqis 
would not be a cause dissent), the employment of more Iraqi officers in the longer 
term, and hiring of Bahrainis to the force.  As for Belgrave, his departure should be 
eased out.597   
  The Labour MP Philips Price asked the Foreign Secretary in the House of 
Commons on 19 March about the advice given to the Ruler in enabling the public to 
take an active part in the country’s own affairs.  Lloyd replied that Bahrain’s internal 
affairs were its own business.  Nonetheless he referred to discussions held with the 
Ruler to further modernise his Government.  Another Labour MP, Henry Hind, 
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pointed out that Bahrain was the only Arabian Gulf sheikhdom where a form of 
democracy existed explaining that it had established an electoral roll and elections 
had taken place and to that the Foreign Secretary responded positively.598 
The Ruler also declared, on 20 March, the formation of an Administration 
Council with Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa as President.  The members were:  
Sheikh Khalifa bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Duaij bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Sheikh 
Khalid bin Mohammed bin Abdulla Al-Khalifa, GWR Smith, Ahmed Al-Umran, and 
Salem Al-Arrayed.  Yusuf Al-Shirawi was appointed Secretary.  The Council, which 
was to meet weekly with representatives from various government departments, 
had a one-year term with the option of its reappointment and extension.  
Administrative affairs were to be dealt by the Council through the Ruler or the 
Adviser.  Most importantly, the Council was ordered to open channels of 
communication with the general public and to keep themselves up to date regarding 
the state’s affairs.599  The Government of Bahrain further announced the promotion 
of Colonel Hamersley from Assistant Police Commandant to Police Commandant 
(effective from 20 March), replacing Belgrave as the head of the police.  Additionally 
the Administration announced its need to recruit policemen to the force and 
awarded Bahrainis priority in the selection process.600   
The Political Agent endeavoured to analyse the Bahraini Administration’s 
structure and the reasons for the agitation towards the Adviser and his assessment 
of Belgrave was that 
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in order to get things done, acquired the habit of exercising more 
executive authority than he should have done and at the same time 
the Ruler has tended to shelter behind his Adviser when unpleasant 
decisions had to be taken – making his excuse always that the Adviser 
had wanted it this or that way.  This in turn has brought the Adviser 
the reputation among the Bahrainis for being the real ruler of Bahrain. 
 
Furthermore, his hands-on, micro-management style, Gault believed, had 
delayed some projects, adding to Bahrainis’ frustrations.601  
On 21 March an Air Ceylon flight was scheduled to refuel in Bahrain.  It was 
to carry the prominent Egyptian politician Al-Sadat as he was en route, this time to 
Karachi, to attend Pakistan’s Republic Day celebration.  To Burrows’ surprise the 
nationalists seemed not to have been informed of Al-Sadat’s stopover and thus no 
organised party awaited his arrival.602  Nevertheless Radio Cairo reported, 
according to the Residency’s monthly report, that Al-Sadat had awarded one 
thousand rupees to the families of the victims who had fallen during the riot of 11 
March.  Burrows insisted that that no such incident had occurred.603   
Yet, on 1 May, the British Embassy in Cairo signed by the Chancery 
forwarded a letter to the Residency in which it claimed that Major Amin Shakir, the 
Assistant Secretary General of the WIYC, had confirmed the substance of Cairo 
Radio’s broadcasts to the Embassy.  Shakir informed the British that Al-Sadat 
instructed him to distribute the amount of a thousand rupees to the family of each of 
those who had died on 11 March.604  Whether this was true or not and how Shakir 
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went about his mission in Bahrain without the Administration or British knowing, 
remains a mystery.  
 Having set up Nasser in Egypt and aided him through its intelligence services 
to take over the state, the Americans were ready to abandon the Alpha Plan that had 
aimed at establishing a long-term peace settlement between the Arabs and Israelis.  
In President Eisenhower’s opinion it had become clear by the spring of 1956 that 
the Egyptian leader’s primary objective was ‘to be the most popular man in all the 
Arab world’.605  In addition, Nasser turned towards the Eastern bloc, incited trouble 
in Jordan, and increased his influence in Bahrain.  This prompted the Western 
powers to seek different solutions to perceived threats in the Middle East.   
 US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed, in a memorandum to 
Eisenhower, a new plan to handle Egypt’s leadership.  The strategy, which was 
eventually adopted by the US and Britain, was dubbed the Omega Plan and set down 
Anglo-American policy towards the Egyptians.  The plan inter alia would refuse the 
selling of arms to Egypt, purposely delay the Aswan High Dam’s financial support, 
and help Iraq to establish radio services to counter Egyptian propaganda in the 
Arabian Gulf region.  In short, the plan aimed at Nasser’s isolation from within the 
Arab World and at lessening his status domestically.606   
 In Britain, Eden before the adoption of the Omega Plan, had urged 
Eisenhower to make ‘a careful re-examination’ of policy targeted at Egypt’s 
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Nasser.607  The British Foreign Secretary during a meeting of the Cabinet, expressed 
his belief that ‘Nasser was unwilling to work with the Western Powers or to co-
operate in the task of securing peace in the Middle East’.  Hitherto it had been 
imperative for British policy to continue supporting the Baghdad Pact and to 
convince the US to join.  Lloyd further underlined that Britain’s presence in the 
Arabian Gulf must be sustained.608  
A COS Committee memorandum on 23 March confirmed that the situation in 
Bahrain had settled and sought the Minister of Denfense’s approval to return a 
company of armed men to their previous location in Sharjah.609  Fulfilling his part of 
the deal between the Administration and the NUC, Al-Bakir left Bahrain for Lebanon 
on 23 March for a six-month set period.  But ignoring the British diktat he travelled 
on to Cairo.610  He was received by the WIYC’s Kamal Yaqub on 27 March.  He later 
claimed to have stayed in Cairo for some five months but without providing much 
detail to his activities there.  In his absence Al-Shamlan took his place with the title 
of Acting Secretary, given to him by Al Bakir on 21 March.611 
An account by the Residency, based mostly on evidence produced by Gault on 
the NUC and developments in Bahrain, was sent to Lloyd on 26 March.  One of the 
features of the account alluded to the existence of experienced elements from 
Bahrain’s society with good education and knowledge of the outside world who had 
failed to exert their influence on the Adviser, or on the political scene by restraining 
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extremist elements from taking control of the situation, nor on influencing society as 
a whole.  On the contrary these elements had withdrawn from the political scene 
altogether.  When invited by the Government to participate in its committees and 
councils they turned such offers down and did not voice their opinion on current 
events, even to the Ruler.  However they were known to be paying ‘contributions to 
NUC funds for fear of having their windows broken, rather than as an investment in 
political security’.612   
Britain’s Ambassador to Iran, Sir Roger Stevens, warned the FO that the 
cohesiveness of the Baghdad Pact was at stake, undermined by the conflict in 
Bahrain.  He referred to an unspecified Iranian newspaper that had reported that 
Britain sought Iraqi aid in the form of armed troops to be stationed in Bahrain.  The 
publication urged Iraqis not to accept Britain’s request and called for the Bahraini 
issue to be raised at the upcoming Baghdad Pact Council Meeting.613  The Iranians, it 
seemed, were more concerned about the conflict in Bahrain (due to their claim of 
sovereignty over the islands) than they were in supporting the coalition’s own 
interests.614    
Al-Watan of 28 March announced that the Government’s Board of Enquiry 
had launched its first in a series of public investigations into the events that had 
unfolded in Bahrain between 2 to 16 March.  Two of the earliest citizens to come 
forward with testimony (in particular about the Lloyd car-stoning incident) were 
Abdulla Al-Wazzan and Mohammed Al-Shirawi.  According to the newspaper a total 
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of twenty-five statements had been presented by 6 April.615  The Manchester 
Guardian also covered the proceedings of the Board of Enquiry on 7 April but the 
newspaper reported that no witnesses had come forward and that the hearings had 
been adjourned to the following day.616 
Stephen Harper of the Daily Express published an article on 31 March entitled 
‘They all stop for Abdul Aziz’ in reference to Al-Shamlan, the new figurehead of the 
NUC.  The article highlighted Al-Shamlan’s influence on his followers during his 
presence at the Board of Enquiry’s hearings.617  Harper’s editorial caught the 
attention of Eden who demanded more information on the Bahraini nationalist.618  
Eden’s request was based on a letter to the FO by Sir Freddie Bishop the Principal 
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.  The note described the article in Eden’s 
view to have been rather ‘unpleasant’.619   
The British Embassy in Cairo kept a close eye on Al-Bakir’s movement during 
his time in Egypt.  The Embassy informed the FO that based on an editorial 
published in Egypt’s Al-Ahram (The Pyramids), there had been a meeting in late 
March between the Bahraini nationalist leader and Al-Sadat.  Al-Bakir was also due 
to give a press conference on Bahrain, it said, adding that the British had expelled 
Al-Bakir from Bahrain.620   
Trevelyan gave an account to the FO dated 30 March of Al-Bakir’s press 
conference in Cairo.  He said that Al-Bakir had claimed that he had left Bahrain in 
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return for a guarantee by Britain to officially recognise the NUC.  He described 
Bahrain as ‘being governed by steel and fire’ and blamed the ‘British “Inspector”’ 
(meaning Burrows) for interfering in Bahraini affairs and obstructing reform.  He 
went on to assert that the British had purposely ‘defamed’ the nationalist movement 
by describing it as ‘communist’ and by claims that it was funded by Egypt.  He added 
that Britain controlled Bahrain through twenty British firms employing 12,000, of 
which only 2,500 were Bahrainis.621  Following these remarks, Burrows asked the 
British Embassy in Cairo to further investigate the matter and to ask Al-Bakir if he 
had actually made these statements.622   
Audsley, the Labour Counsellor who had earlier met with the Bahraini 
nationalist to discuss labour issues in Bahrain, interviewed Al-Bakir at the British 
Embassy in Cairo on 7 April to discuss reports of his claims in the Egyptian press.  
By Audsley’s account, Al-Bakir had said ‘quite bluntly that it recorded accurately the 
main points of his statement’.  The Bahraini nationalist leader did not hide his 
personal antipathy towards Belgrave and vowed to pursue his removal ‘until he, his 
wife and his son have left for good’.  In Audsley’s view, Al-Bakir blamed Britain for 
his exile and seemed not to have taken the issue too well, as he no longer viewed 
Britain as a friend, but as an enemy.  It was also recorded that Al-Sadat had provided 
him with a flat in Cairo’s upmarket Zamalek district for his stay.623   
Riches informed Burrows on 10 April that an anonymous but ‘reliable source’ 
had reported that Al-Bakir had conducted further meetings with Al-Sadat and other 
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members of the WIYC.  Riches sought the Resident’s opinion about persuading the 
Ruler to allow Al-Bakir to return to Bahrain as he might be doing more damage in 
Egypt than he would be in Bahrain.624  This was discussed with both Burrows and 
Gault to see if the matter should be raised with the Ruler.  They both agreed that it 
would be better not to raise the issue and they thought that the Ruler would be 
reluctant to accept it.625  
 In April the Government of Bahrain offered to arrange a meeting between the 
NUC’s leadership and the newly-appointed Administration Council.  They refused to 
meet the Council.  The Resident also understood and reported in a despatch to the 
FO that a senior unnamed Shi’ite member had resigned from the NUC.  The 
member’s resignation was in opposition to the hardline policy adopted by the Party, 
he said.626  The resignation was confirmed in Belgrave’s memoir, although he did not 
name the individual, saying only that he was one of its eight frontline members.  In 
Belgrave’s opinion the resignation came as a result of the former member’s 
opposition to the Party’s ‘violently anti-British speeches’.627   
 That member was possibly Mohsin Al-Tajir and the raison d’être behind his 
resignation was unearthed in 1957 by WJ Adams of the Political Agency of Dubai in 
the Trucial States.  He had interviewed Al-Tajir’s son, Mehdi.  According to him his 
father’s resignation was based on two issues.  The first was his disapproval of using 
the NUC’s funds to send students to Egypt as he viewed this to be ‘a waste of money’ 
and that their finances should not be spent outside Bahrain.  The second was that 
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the NUC was ‘foolish in trying to attack the Bahrain Government and British Foreign 
Policy at the same time’.628   
On assessing Britain’s Middle East policy, and using Bahrain as an example, 
Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, shared his views with the Prime Minister 
in a letter of 14 April.  Brook started his letter with a quote from one of Eden’s own 
Cabinet papers from 1953 in which the Prime Minister when Foreign Secretary 
proclaimed: ‘In the second half of the 20th century we cannot hope to maintain our 
position in the Middle East by the methods of the last century’.  On nationalist 
movements the paper urged ‘to harness these movements rather than to struggle 
against them’.  Brook later provided Eden with his thoughts as he declared that 
‘These are the principles which should, I believe, guide our policy in the Middle 
East’.  He further warned that since nationalist power was rising in the Middle East, 
supporting their governments would be regarded by such movements as a form of 
occupation.  Although it was essential to sustain law and order, Brook believed that 
Britain might be setting itself up ‘against forces of nationalism which may be the 
Government of tomorrow’.  Brook also feared that, given Britain’s current stance, his 
country might end up ‘backing the wrong horse’.   
The Cabinet Secretary saw Bahrain ‘to be a case in point’ and understood the 
nationalist movement there to be ‘not at present anti-British’.  However if Britain 
continued with its policies in Bahrain he thought that it might force the Movement 
to seek support from elsewhere, from Egypt, for example.  Brook certainly did not 
wish to see ‘another Glubb incident in Bahrain’ and so he advocated a push towards 
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Belgrave’s departure and the swift appointment of another British expert in his 
place.  On Nasser and his influence, Brook warned that ‘He will direct his appeal to 
nationalist and democratic movements’.  A handwritten note was appended to the 
last comment  – an aside, perhaps scratched in by an angry Eden, which reads: ‘but 
he [Nasser] doesn’t practice democracy’.629  Bishop, Eden’s Aide wrote back in 
response to Brook’s letter saying ‘I wish I could say that the Prime Minister received 
your views with delight, or even appreciation’.  Bishop noted that Eden thought that 
the ‘general principle’ could not ‘safely be applied in Bahrain’.630   
A tape recording of the NUC’s appeal ‘to the Arabs and the UN to save them 
from the imperialism of Persia and Sir C Belgrave’ was played to Lloyd, Riches, and 
the Permanent Undersecretary Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick.  This stimulated a debate and 
led them to question the FO’s policy on Bahrain.  Kirkpatrick believed that 
‘pussyfoot methods’ must be adopted by the Ruler in his dealings with the NUC.  In 
other words Kirkpatrick suggested that the Ruler should not commit himself to the 
Movement.  Riches, on the other hand, considered adopting a policy of restraint in 
the Administration’s dealings with the NUC.631  Based on this discussion a telegram 
from the Eastern Department was sent to the Residency in Juffair on 14 April.  The 
telegram instructed the Residency to let it be known to the Ruler that he should not 
take any steps that might cause an ‘unwanted reaction’ by the nationalists.  And 
then, in an apparent volte face, the telegram instructed the Residency to give the 
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Administration freedom to arrest any member of the Party who encouraged others 
towards violence.632 
Lloyd forwarded to Eden a draft copy of a Cabinet paper on the situation in 
Bahrain.633  The paper, dated 14 April, provided an overview of the Movement in 
Bahrain and the complex Sunni-Shi’ite political structure on the islands.  In relation 
to the NUC and Egyptian ties Lloyd said that 
There is no evidence that the reform movement is directly sponsored 
by Egypt, but in the present state of the Middle East, Egypt is looked 
upon as the fount of progressive political ideas and the Bahraini 
leaders undoubtedly seek their inspiration there. 
 
Lloyd also brought to the forefront the NUC’s opposition to the enrolment of Iraqi 
officers in Bahrain’s Police Force.  The Foreign Secretary believed that British policy 
vis-à-vis Bahrain needed ‘to adopt a middle way, pushing the Ruler to go a little 
faster and the reformists a little more slowly along the path of constitutional 
advance’.  The paper was discussed at a Cabinet meeting held on 17 April.  On 
Belgrave’s role, Lloyd maintained that  
Sir Charles Belgrave had held this position for thirty years, but he had 
not lost the confidence of most of his British assistants and of many of 
the people in London who had interests in the Persian Gulf.   
 
Nevertheless Lloyd sealed Belgrave’s fate for the general security of Britain in the 
Arabian Gulf as he ‘recommended that appropriate steps should be taken to secure 
his retirement’.  He was also determined to have a British assistant hired to 
gradually take on the Adviser’s role.  He also cautioned that Belgrave’s dismissal 
only weeks following Glubb’s discharge from service ‘would be a blow to British 
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prestige in the Middle East’ and said it was imperative that Belgrave’s departure 
should be presented as if he ‘was retiring of his own volition in order to give way to 
a younger man’.  Britain, he said, should look for a suitable candidate for the position 
and adopt whatever method was necessary to convince the Ruler.  The Cabinet 
approved the proposal of the Foreign Secretary and suggested that the Minister 
should prepare a list of candidates to meet with Eden.  Furthermore, it agreed to 
seek the best way possible to convince the Ruler to let go of Belgrave.634   
A high-ranked Soviet delegation arrived on a visit to Britain on 19 April, 
invited by Eden in the summer of 1955.635  Prior to the visit, Eden informed 
Eisenhower of what Britain had intended to discuss with the Russians during their 
stay.  The Prime Minister was going to underline to the Soviets ‘that our Middle 
Eastern oil supplies are a vital interest and that any attempt to deny them to us will 
create a most dangerous state of tension’.636  The Soviet delegation included Prime 
Minister Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and 
Nikita Khrushchev a Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.637  
Eden recorded in his memoir that he had informed ‘the Russians that the 
uninterrupted supply of oil were literally vital to our economy’, and, as a result, the 
situation in the Middle East had overshadowed discussions.  Eden went further as 
he declared Britain’s intention vis-à-vis securing oil and that it ‘would fight for it’.  
The Soviets on their part criticised Britain for setting up the Baghdad Pact.638  The 
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Soviet arms deal with the Egyptians in 1955, disturbances in Jordan, and Bahrain 
aided by Egyptian propaganda must have increased Eden’s doubts about Soviet 
penetration of the region and particularly the targeting of the oil-rich Arabian Gulf 
by Nasser. 
The Financial Times issued a summary of developments in Bahrain in an 
article entitled, ‘Anti-British Danger in Bahrein’ on 27 April.  The report said that 
although Bahrain witnessed a phase of ‘serious demonstrations’ a period of calm 
had overtaken the islands.  But the state of serenity was due to expire following the 
end of Ramadan which began on the second week of April and was due to end in 
May.  The newspaper viewed ‘a certain divergence of views between the Ruler of 
Bahrein and his British Adviser’.  The newspaper did not give details on the 
‘divergence’.  The Financial Times also considered ‘the Egypt-inspired’ NUC ‘not to 
represent the views of the most educated and influential part of the Bahrein 
community, the Manama merchants’.  Of the Party’s prime objectives it believed was 
the elimination of ‘British influence in Bahrein’.639  The article caught Eden’s 
attention and he requested that Lloyd provide his comments on it.  Riches answered 
the Prime Minister on Lloyd’s behalf.  Riches saw the newspaper’s assessment that 
the NUC’s goal was to end British authority was wrong.  As for the NUC not 
representing the views of the merchants of Manama as a whole, unsurprisingly that 
view, in the FO’s opinion, was accurate.640 
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Further division between the senior members of the NUC surfaced when 
intelligence reports presented to the FO through the Residency suggested that two 
senior Sunni members of the NUC had sent a private letter to Al-Bakir in Egypt.  The 
letter criticised him for his comments made through the press.  Moreover, the two 
were critical of Al-Bakir ‘aligning the Movement with Egypt’.  Regardless of Al-
Bakir’s activities in Egypt, the Resident believed that with Al-Bakir’s absence the 
Movement had lost its allure in Bahrain.641 
 Rumours once again began to circulate about the possibility that the NUC 
would declare a five-day strike starting on 18 May with the likelihood of violence to 
follow.  More than seven hundred volunteers were ready to take part in the strike.  It 
was hoped that new negotiations between the Administration and the NUC would 
ease the situation.642   
Eden in a short minute on the situation in Bahrain was deeply disturbed at 
events on the islands.  He expressed his frustration at withdrawing the idea of 
having Iraqi police reinforcements on the islands and the Prime Minister exclaimed: 
‘Why did it have to be conducted in this way?’  He later asserted that newspapers’ 
coverage of Bahrain ‘seem[ed] to be justified’.  Eden added: ‘I confess that all this 
shakes my confidence in Burrows and fills me with apprehension for the future 
unless we make a real effort to take matters in hand’.643  A pattern and a motivation 
is beginning to emerge: Eden was concerned at how the press handled the Bahraini 
issue seeing this as a judgement of his own and the Government’s work and policy.   
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The Prime Minister attended a meeting on the situation in Bahrain at the 
request of AD Dodds-Parker of the Foreign Secretary’s office.  Reports of the 
meeting did not list the other attendees but recorded that it had criticised the 
Administration’s approach in neither containing the Movement nor reaching a point 
of conciliation with it.  Eden noted the importance of strengthening Bahrain’s police.  
He also recommended the gradual introduction of Iraqi personnel into the force.  
After Eden had been briefed about the latest developments he experienced a volte-
face about the Resident, recognising ‘Burrows’s extra-ordinary difficult position’ in 
managing the crisis and that he had shown ‘considerable skill and patience’ in doing 
so.644   
Based on the rumours of coming strikes in Bahrain the British Cabinet 
discussed once again the Bahraini dilemma on 10 May.  Faring that strikes might 
lead to disturbances, the Prime Minister recommended that Britain’s Navy should 
take sole responsibility for the area.  Accordingly, the Cabinet invited Sir Walter 
Monckton, the Minister of Defence, to assume responsibility for the stability of 
Arabian Gulf region and the protection of Britain’s oil supplies from there.645 
The Chicago Sun-Times newspaper published reports by American journalist 
Joseph Alsop on current affairs in Bahrain.  Alsop praised Belgrave for his work in 
developing Bahrain over the years by building hospitals, roads, the electricity 
supply, and schools.  Regarding the NUC, Alsop believed that the Party was ‘strongly 
supported by the Egyptian Government of Gamal Abdel Nasser’ and aimed to seize 
power from the Bahraini Administration.  Alsop claimed to have interviewed 
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supporters of the NUC although he gave no details about what was said and shed no 
light onto the views expressed.  He, nevertheless, recalled as he conducted the 
interviews that the NUC spokesmen with whom he spoke ‘were educated and 
polished’ at the schools founded by the Ruler and his Adviser.  The situation to the 
journalist called to mind a line from Shakespeare’s King Lear: ‘“How sharper than a 
serpent’s tooth it is to have a thankless child’”.  Alsop, likewise, saw the situation in 
Bahrain to ‘make good material for the most sardonic sort of political comedy’.646   
In May the Board of Enquiry concluded its investigation into the ‘Month of 
March incidents’ but the findings were not published until June.  Following the 
Board’s conclusion, a pamphlet was issued by the NUC.  It criticised the Board’s 
decision to conclude its work without interviewing all possible witnesses the Party 
believed were involved in the disturbance from the police’s side.647  The claim by the 
NUC was accurate, as a conflict had developed earlier between the Board of Enquiry 
and Colonel Hamersley over the latter’s refusal to have further policemen 
interviewed by the Board.  Hamersley believed that the investigation affected the 
police’s morale and he threatened to resign.  Belgrave suggested having the Board 
interview the officers at the Police Fort instead of the temporary headquarter set up 
for the Board, a matter that was rejected by the Board.  Furthermore, the Board 
wished to have the proceedings open to the public, which also proved to be a point 
of difficulty.648   
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Gault believed that the police felt during their enquiry that they were really 
on trial and were not just being questioned.  Further, verbal threats were made at 
the police from crowds that gathered outside of the Board of Enquiry’s 
headquarters.  It was then that Colonel Hamersley’s decision came not to allow his 
Police Force to be further demoralised by the proceedings.649 
On the second week of May two telegrams from the Residency grabbed 
Eden’s attention.  The first, dated 7 May, included details of a meeting between the 
Resident and the Adviser in which the former discussed Belgrave’s retirement plans.  
According to Burrows the Adviser ‘had expected to stay for another “couple of 
years”’.  When Belgrave enquired about the timetable the Residency had in mind, 
Burrows informed him that he would discuss the matter with him on a different 
occasion.650  The other telegram of 9 May reported on a follow-up meeting in which 
Belgrave was said to have expressed his concern about the effects his exit would 
have on the Ruler in light of Sheikh Salman’s ‘general doubts about our support’.  
Nonetheless the Resident urged Belgrave to proceed and raise the topic of his 
departure with the Ruler.651  Eden noted in a personal minute to Lloyd how 
‘disturbed’ he was with the two telegrams.  He referred to the Cabinet’s paper 
presented by Lloyd in April in which it was decided that the initial move was to find 
a replacement to Belgrave before taking any further steps.  But Eden’s biggest 
concern was that ‘the Ruler is beginning to lose confidence in us’.  He furthermore 
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feared that a situation much worse than Glubb’s was heading its way if they lost 
‘both the Ruler and Belgrave’.652   
 The Foreign Secretary submitted a situation paper to the Cabinet on 14 May 
on Britain’s position in the Gulf.  In it Lloyd asserted that the NUC does ‘not openly 
attack the British connection’ and that the Movement was directed against 
Belgrave’s centralisation of powers and not ‘against him as an Englishman’.  He 
expressed his concern that the anger with Belgrave will be turned against HMG.653   
 With the threat of strikes persisting by the NUC, the Ruler established a 
direct contact point with the Party.  On 15 May Sheikh Salman met with four 
members of the NUC at his palace and this was to develop into a series of meetings 
between the two sides.  The meeting started with the NUC’s objection towards the 
presence of Belgrave at the meeting.  During the meeting an agreement was reached 
to the formation of Health and Education Councils with half appointed and half 
elected members, a matter that had been agreed upon the previous year.  However 
the new arrangement was to exclude members of the ruling family as appointed 
members on the Councils and for Councils to have the right to nominate their own 
Chairmen.  The NUC also objected to the formation of the Administration Council 
since it did not include elected members.  The Ruler during the meeting agreed to 
the NUC’s cris de coeur to relax censorship laws by adopting new print regulations.  
Further discussions were postponed to 20 May.654  Al-Shamlan, E Fakhroo, Kamal-
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el-Deen, and Al-Alaiwat attended the meeting on behalf of the NUC.  Minutes of the 
meeting were recorded by Yusuf Al-Shirawi on behalf of the Government.655 
On the same day that the Ruler met with the NUC, a discussion took place in 
the British Cabinet regarding Belgrave’s future and Nutting updated them.  He 
believed that there existed a growing sense of distrust aimed at Belgrave in Bahrain.  
Nutting feared that the Ruler would eventually give in to public pressure and 
dispense with Belgrave before a successor could be appointed.  Therefore, it was 
essential to secure a deputy to the Adviser while Belgrave was still active in his 
position.  However the Minister cautioned that ‘the Ruler’s confidence in us should 
not be shaken by any premature disclosure of our intentions’.  After a deputy had 
been chosen, Belgrave must be approached and persuaded to accept a deputy to aid 
him and he must then aim to win over the Ruler to influence him in allowing him to 
takeover all of Belgrave’s duties.656  An early list of candidates to replace Belgrave 
was proposed by Riches.  They were: Duncan Weir, Geoffery Hawkesworth the 
former Sudanese Provincial Governor, Lord Oxford and Asquith the former Adviser 
to the Libyan Prime Minister, and a JS Hewitt who worked for the Saudi Arabian 
anti-locust mission.  At the very beginning of the process of candidate selection, 
Weir and Hawkesworth on personal grounds withdrew their names.657   
On the mere thought of having JH Belgrave, the Adviser’s son, replace his 
father, Lloyd commented: ‘The son is not fit to “inherit” Belgrave’s position’.658  In 
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addition to the list of possible candidates to replace Belgrave (according to a 
conversation between Kirkpatrick and Lloyd), the former informed the Foreign 
Secretary of the Residency’s recommendation to promote GWR Smith, the Director 
of Customs, who had worked as acting Adviser during Belgrave’s absence on leave, 
to succeed him and take up some of his duties.659 
 In Egypt, in a move that would further alienate Nasser from the West, the 
Egyptian leader announced his country’s recognition of communist China on 16 
May.660  Nutting considered the move by Nasser as a response to the fear that an 
arms embargo might be placed on the Middle East by the Western powers.661  Also 
in Egypt Al-Bakir met again with Audsley for the second time in the third week of 
May.  The nationalist informed Audsley that the demand to remove Belgrave from 
power was ‘unalterable’.  The Secretary of the NUC produced a telegram to the 
British official from members of his Party in Bahrain that proposed the 
announcement of a general strike with an undisclosed time period with another 
demand for Belgrave’s removal.  Al-Bakir claimed to have opposed taking such 
measures, but its purpose was to inform the British that the NUC was capable of its 
execution.  As for Al-Sanhouri, Al-Bakir believed his delay in travelling to Bahrain to 
work on editing the Penal Code was due to the expert’s connections with the former 
regime of King Farouk.  Al-Sadat saw him to be the best selection to take on the 
responsibility of rewriting the code but, Al Bakir said, the choice was not favoured 
by Nasser.  The Bahraini nationalist believed that Al-Sanhouri would not be allowed 
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to travel to Bahrain before July.662  This confirmed The Economist’s account that the 
Egyptian legal expert was purposely not allowed out of Egypt since ‘apparently he 
was not in the junta’s good books’.663  The reason why he might not have been on 
good terms with the regime was that he had stood for a return to a ‘constitutional 
government in 1954’, thus opposing Nasser during the crisis that overtook Egypt in 
1954.664   
 During Al-Bakir’s stay in Egypt he also met with the General Secretary of the 
Arab Lawyers Union headquartered in Cairo.  The aim of the meeting was to 
convince the General Secretary to raise the issue of Bahrain with the UN Human 
Rights Committee.665   
By the month of May the Bahraini Health and Education Councils had started 
to take shape.  The Council elections that were due to be held in March were put off 
until April.  All six candidates who ran for the Health Council were selected as no 
other candidates had been nominated.666  Then followed the Administration’s 
announcement on 19 May of its appointed members of the two councils.  In the 
Health Council the following were nominated: Ahmed Ali Kanoo, Rashid Abdul-
Rahman Al-Zayani, Abdul-Razeq Khunji, Mohammed Al-Mahroos, Hamad Mubarak 
Al-Fadhel, and Abdul-Aziz Al-Janussani.  For the Education Council: Abdul-Rahman 
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Abdul-Wahab Al-Zayani, Mohammed Yusuf Jalal, Abdulla Yusuf Ali Akhber, Ahmed 
Hassan Kanoo, Saleh Abdulla Al-Saleh, and Hassan Abdul-Rasool were chosen.667   
The Government had fulfilled a request by the Movement to re-appoint the 
two Councils excluding members of the ruling family.  That was followed in May 
with the Government’s announcement to end censorship and establish a free press 
in Bahrain, effective from 21 May.668  The law also allowed for the freedom to 
publish pamphlets and circulars locally.669   
A new round of discussions between the Ruler and the NUC was conducted 
on 20 May.  The meeting lasted for three hours and was of no consequence due to a 
dispute among the NUC’s members.  According to the Residency the NUC’s 
delegation renewed topics which had already been discussed and agreed and had 
refused to approve the minutes of the last meeting.  The meeting was adjourned 
until 27 May.670  The NUC issued a new circular on 26 May renewing its demand for 
the dismissal of Belgrave.  In the circular they declared that ‘thousands of letters’ 
had reached them from Bahrainis pressing them to dismiss the Adviser.671   
The next round of talks between the Administration and the NUC took place 
on 27 May.  The Ruler informed the NUC’s representatives of his desire to discuss 
the Health and Education Councils before proceeding to review other issues.  This 
was rejected by the NUC as they wished to have all points of discussion concluded 
before a final agreement was reached.  The issue regarding the Administration 
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Council was reopened as the NUC wished to have elected members on the Council.  
The Party also criticised the Administration on the conclusion of the Board of 
Enquiry’s investigation.  The next meeting was scheduled for 2 June.672 
 Lloyd informed the British Cabinet on 29 May that he had given further 
consideration to the Bahraini conflict.  He declared that a new approach must be 
adopted to solve the Belgrave question.  Instead of focusing on the Adviser’s 
replacement ‘an independent enquiry should first be held into the general structure 
of the Administration’ he suggested.  Should such an enquiry be accepted by the 
Ruler and his Adviser, the public would then be informed that Belgrave was soon 
‘expected to relinquish his position’.  The measure would secure public opinion and 
reduce general apprehension.  The Cabinet agreed with Lloyd’s proposal and 
requested him to seek the necessary steps to achieve it.673  
 With pressure mounting on the Adviser and the fear of more trouble, the 
Foreign Secretary recommended to the Residency that they arrange a dignified exit 
for Belgrave from Bahrain.  Lloyd followed the line he had proposed and which had 
been accepted by the Cabinet.  The Bahraini Administration was to hire an expert to 
review its work and an effort must be made to effect Belgrave’s retirement.  A public 
announcement would then be made that, due to Belgrave’s forthcoming retirement, 
an expert would be appointed to review the Government’s operations.  It was hoped 
that this move would ease tensions in Bahrain.674   
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 Nonetheless, the Foreign Secretary intended to keep the role of the Adviser 
but with a different title.  Lloyd adopted on 30 May Burrows’ earlier proposal of 
promoting Smith, Bahrain’s Director of Customs.  Lloyd’s plan was to appoint Smith 
as the Director of Finance and, following Belgrave’s departure, he would be granted 
greater authority over administrative affairs in Bahrain.  On the Arabian Gulf as a 
whole, Lloyd further recommended that in the future no British official was to be 
placed in influential positions and those that were in place should keep a low 
profile.675   
On receiving these recommendations, Burrows immediately met with the 
Ruler and suggested Smith for the position of overseeing the financial affairs of the 
state.  The Ruler objected to the idea as it might displease Sayed Mahmood, a Shi’ite 
who ran the Accounts Department, since it would imply that Smith would have a 
bigger role than his.  The Ruler’s objection was not against having Smith take over 
some of Belgrave’s responsibilities as such, but on his suggested title.676 
The BBC's Panorama television programme visited Bahrain on 30 May to 
conduct interviews vis-à-vis developments in Bahrain as part of a feature on the 
Arab Gulf that included Kuwait.677  The Panorama ‘Special’ was presented by British 
politician and journalist Woodrow Wyatt.  Al-Shamlan was featured in the 
programme as Wyatt interviewed him with other prominent members of the NUC 
surrounded by the new Party’s Acting Secretary.  In the interview Al-Shamlan spoke 
authoritatively with a good command of the English language.  He was highly critical 
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of Belgrave and his work in Bahrain, saying he had no expertise in administrative 
work.  He also harshly criticised Belgrave, saying that the Adviser had done nothing 
to improve the country for over three decades.  Additionally, Al-Shamlan regarded 
Belgrave as too old and that he had concentrated all power on himself.  When asked 
about the riot that had greeted Lloyd during his visit to Bahrain, Al-Shamlan 
proclaimed that the riot did not target Lloyd but was an expression of dissatisfaction 
aimed at Belgrave.  On the subject of Egyptian influence, Al-Shamlan stated that 
although they loved Egypt as a result of common traits shared by both states the 
Movement was not influenced by any external power.  On cooperation with the 
Government of Bahrain, the Bahraini nationalist said that he wished to have all the 
NUC’s demands met at one time and not in installments.  This, he said, included 
Belgrave’s departure.   
 Wyatt further interviewed random people on the streets of Manama, which 
gave a rare insight into Bahrainis’ outlook on local developments and the Adviser.  
All those featured in the report overwhelmingly demanded in basic English that 
Belgrave leave the country immediately, one of them even wanted him to go ‘in 
twenty-four hours’.  The BBC special also featured an interview with Burrows.  In 
the film the Resident explained the structure and work of the Residency and 
Political Agencies throughout the Gulf.  On the policy adopted in internal politics of 
these states, Burrows explained that the Residency did not interfere in local politics 
unless it was asked for advice or when the Residency felt that the situation called for 
them to provide advice to the Rulers.  Hussain Yateem, a Bahraini Sunni merchant, 
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when interviewed about Bahrain’s economy and what merchants in Bahrain sought 
from the Government, answered simply: ‘stability’.   
Scenes from inside the Police Fort headquarters in Manama and the outside 
structure of the Ruler’s palace in Riffa were shown.  The final segment of the 
programme included a short interview with Belgrave on the local conflict.  The 
report is the only known live interview with the Adviser on film.  During the 
interview, Belgrave seemed rather nervous and uncomfortable.  He said he thought 
that some of the demands forwarded by the NUC were reasonable but others were 
not.  He also pointed to Wyatt that discussions with the NUC were still ongoing.678  
Wyatt later described his stay in Bahrain in his own memoir and saying that 
he had become ‘persona non grata’ on the islands.  He went on to allege that when 
his interviews with locals was made known, a unit from Bahrain’s ‘local Army’ 
(possibly he meant the police) sought to stop his activities.  But by then he had 
managed to conclude all his interviews.  Belgrave then asked Wyatt to leave the 
country.679  His diary entry of 2 June expressed his frustration at Wyatt’s behaviour 
and his further knowledge of the NUC interviews.680  Wyatt would later play role in 
collecting funds to help with the defence of the exiled members of the Movement in 
St Helena as is described in Chapter Nine. 
In early June a letter written by Hassan Al-Mahmood, a Bahraini from 
Muharraq was published in Al-Watan, criticising local cinemas for showing a pro-
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Baghdad Pact newsreel,681 a testimony to the influence of Egyptian propaganda on 
Bahraini nationalists which argued that it was in their general interest to attack the 
anti-Soviet Pact. 
On 3 June the Resident met Belgrave and advised him to review the country’s 
administrative system according to the FO’s instructions, a matter that was 
approved by the Adviser.  Based on the proposal Belgrave met with the Ruler and 
provided the Residency his account of the proceedings.  The Adviser informed the 
Ruler of his opinion that an overall review of the Administration must take place, 
paving the way for his exit.  In reply the Ruler asked the Adviser whether the idea 
was his or was put to him.  Belgrave acknowledged that the idea was proposed to 
him but that he himself genuinely wished to retire.  On the conclusion of the meeting 
between the two, the Ruler proposed to Belgrave, based on Burrows’ 
recommendation, to meet Smith and seek his views regarding the proposal that he 
take over the Adviser’s duties.   
Following on these developments Burrows recommended a new structure to 
the Government following Belgrave’s departure.  The hierarchy would consist of 
Smith as the Ruler’s ‘Head of his personal office’, to be followed by the 
Administration Council, the Government’s main operational body.  Burrows further 
proposed to have Smith’s appointment made following the end of summer after he 
was scheduled to return from a three-month holiday starting in June with an official 
announcement by the Ruler about his promotion.  That announcement would 
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coincide with the hiring of an expert to review the Administration.682  Later, on 5 
June, Lloyd approved Burrows’ recommendations and further advised that Smith’s 
new post was to be known as the ‘Secretary to the Government of Bahrain’.683   
A meeting was arranged between the Ruler and the NUC on 3 June to 
continue their dialogue.  The parties discussed the inaugural sessions of the Health 
and Education Councils and why the NUC had failed to attend them, despite the 
Government’s invitation to.  They answered by informing the Ruler ‘that other more 
important matters had to be settled first’.  The NUC further questioned the Ruler 
about the Board of Enquiry’s report, which had been presented to the 
Administration but not yet made public.  According to the Residency’s intelligence, 
the overall attitude of the NUC had recently been negative, due largely to internal 
divisions.  The latest division within the political party came about when local 
merchants were ‘trying to exercise a restraining influence’ on the NUC.  Burrows 
saw the NUC in clear opposition to the Administration Council.  The reason for the 
Party’s objection was due (in the Resident’s opinion) to the Council’s ‘success in 
dealing with administrative problems and personal complaints’.684  Gault confirmed 
the Resident’s views of the Administration Council’s work since its establishment 
earlier in the year.  In Gault’s opinion the Council had ‘fully justified its creation and 
has, in fact, served as a receiving agency and forum for discussing suggestions and 
requests from the public’.  Additionally Gault associated previous disturbances in 
Muharraq to Muharraqis’ general feeling that the Adviser had neglected them as he 
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had failed to provide the island with the range of services seen in other regions of 
Bahrain, such as piped water.  The Council for its part adopted the plan to improve 
conditions in Muharraq and a scheme to build a fresh-water supply system.685  
 In a striking development the NUC in a new circular announced publically the 
formation of a Scouts organisation.  Regulations of enrollment included a fee of 5 
Rupees and a monthly subscription of 2 Rupees.  Application was open to all Arabs 
with a minimum age set at sixteen.686  Al-Watan declared in June that the Scouts 
organisation established by the NUC had already reached a total of five hundred 
subscribers and that their numbers were expected to double.687  
The Resident saw the objective of the Scouts organisation was to form a body 
able ‘to control its followers or oppose the police, as it may decide at the time’.  Even 
if the presence of such a force was genuine for the Party to control its supporters 
during strikes and rallies, to the Resident it was ‘a serious threat to the authority of 
the State’.688  He doubted the Movement’s motives as it seemed to be imitating 
dictators such as Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, who both formed paramilitary 
units for their parties.  Jassim Murad, a former member of the NUC, asserted that the 
Scouts movement was the brainchild of a party supporter named Mohammed Kamal 
Al-Shehabi.  Murad also said that Al-Shehabi was influenced by Mussolini’s Fascist 
Black Shirts organisation.689   
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The Board of Enquiry’s report was made public on the afternoon of 8 June.  
No immediate trouble was reported as a result of the report’s issue.  The NUC sent a 
letter to the Ruler informing him that they would not attend the scheduled meeting 
due on 9 June, but did not explain whether further meetings were expected to take 
place.690  Burrows explained that the NUC’s decision to discontinue negotiations 
with the Ruler was decided on 7 June prior to the issue of the Board of Enquiry’s 
report.  The intention behind suspending negotiations was to force the Government 
to accept their proposals regarding the Administration Council, only then would 
discussions resume.691  The main objection of the NUC to the Council centered upon 
the idea that its members would, at the same time be representing other 
government departments bringing into question transparency issues when 
evaluating these departments.692 
 The Board of Enquiry’s report offered further details about the events that 
had unfolded in March.  As to the origins of disturbances on 11 March the account 
laid the blame on a trivial dispute between a vegetable-seller and an inspector.  The 
argument started between 9.30 am to 10.00 am.  The vegetable-seller failed to come 
forward to present his testimony.  The quarrel escalated when a policeman of 
Yemeni origin interfered.  The policeman told the enquiry that he had been struck 
by the seller and had slapped him back.  Crowds gathered at the scene and that 
prompted the policeman and three others on duty in the market to seek refuge at 
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the Municipality’s Offices nearby.  The policemen remained at the offices until after 
3.15 pm when the police started to shoot at the besieging mob.  The crowd was 
estimated at between four hundred and five hundred.  The Board also believed that 
‘There is evidence that a section of the crowd was excited and was being urged by 
one particular unidentified man to affect an entrance into the Municipal Offices’.  At 
3.15 pm shots were heard that resulted in the police firing back.  The shots later 
were identified to be possibly the use of fire ‘crackers or squibs’.  In the Board’s view 
this level of reaction by the police was ‘grossly excessive’.   
 The Board was not satisfied with both claims that the initial shots were fired 
from either the crowd or the police, as it was ‘unable to solve the mystery’.  
Regarding the bullet retrieved from one of the victims’ body, which was not used by 
the police, it was said to have struck the victim near to Ahmedi’s Factory, which is 
some distance from the site of the actual incident.  Most of the firing by the police 
was into the air.  Had it been directed at the crowd, it could have resulted in a 
substantial number of causalities, the Board concluded.  As for the Lloyd car-stoning 
incident in Muharraq, the Board was unable to identify any individual guilty of 
orchestrating the event.693 
 The Residency continued with its arrangements to promote Smith to his new 
post through the local administration.  It was decided that Smith was to leave on 16 
June and upon his return he would be appointed Secretary to the Government.  
Sayed Mahmood would travel to Britain in July to interview candidates to work in 
his department and meet an expert who would be assigned to review the country’s 
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Administration.694  An official announcement on the matter was made by Bahrain’s 
Administration on 9 June.695  With the new arrangement the title of Adviser to the 
Government of Bahrain following Belgrave’s retirement would cease to exist. 
 Nothing was said about Belgrave’s status.  Lloyd expected, however, that the 
‘announcement of Mr. Smith’s promotion will be interpreted in Bahrain as heralding 
retirement of Sir Charles Belgrave’.696  The Minister’s expectations turned to be 
accurate as a scornful report on the front-page of Al-Watan declared that an 
unnamed senior government employee’s papers were being extracted in one of the 
country’s departments in preparation to bring his long tenure to an end.  It also 
claimed that it was believed that another government employee currently employed 
in a prestigious position (Director of Customs) would take his position.697  The Times 
additionally covered Smith’s appointment but did not link his promotion to 
Belgrave’s removal.698 
The Egyptian legal expert Al-Sanhouri visited the Oriental Counsellor Trevor 
Evans at the British Embassy in Cairo on 9 June, and told him that he had met with 
Al-Bakir who said that, although he believed in general Arab unity, he was realistic 
in his approach, as he only wished for internal political reform and did not intend 
for the British to leave at this stage.  In return Al-Sanhouri suggested to Al Bakir that 
he should visit London to raise his issue of reform personally with HMG.  Al-
Sanhouri believed ‘that perhaps Al-Bakir was not so much in favour with the 
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Egyptian authorities as might be supposed’.  Furthermore Al-Bakir had requested 
weeks ago to have a private meeting with Nasser but this had not yet been granted.  
The British Chancery in Egypt gave a cautious review of the embassy’s meeting with 
Al-Sanhouri and his thoughts about Al-Bakir as they knew that Nasser was very 
busy and ‘it may be that it suits his present policy better to avoid giving us the 
impression that he is interfering in the affairs of Bahrain’.699  
Egypt celebrated on 18 and 19 June the evacuation of the remaining troops in 
the Suez Canal Zone.  Nasser gave a speech in which he vowed ‘Egypt’s adherence to 
complete neutrality’.  The Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov, attended 
Nasser’s speech.700   Bahrainis celebrated the evacuation, the Adviser wrote in his 
diary, noting that on the island of Muharraq flags were seen and people danced in 
celebration.701 
 Bahrain was due again to be visited by yet another high-ranking 
international figure, this time it was India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who 
was scheduled to stop over en route to London on 21 June.  Intelligence reached the 
Resident indicating that the NUC had cabled Nehru prior to his visit to either ask 
him to support their political demands or mediate in negotiations with the Ruler.  
The Residency feared that demonstrations might take place on the occasion of the 
visit.  Burrows deplored the idea of forwarding a letter to the Indian Government 
through the FO prior to the visit in an attempt to provide it with its overview of the 
political scene in Bahrain.  What surprised the Resident in relation to the NUC’s 
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contact with Nehru was the nationalists’ negative stance on the employment of 
Indian workers in Bahrain as perceived through their press.702  Al-Watan’s article 
‘Who are our Enemies?’ aggressively condemned companies in Bahrain for hiring 
Indian and Pakistani labourers as an example of the nationalists’ policy about 
foreigners gaining employment in Bahrain.703   
The Administration expressed to Gault its fear that Nehru’s visit would be 
greeted by a local demonstration and asked that the Indian plane be diverted to a 
different airport.  It was also feared that Indians coming out to greet Nehru might 
clash with NUC sympathisers in Muharraq.704  The plane was not diverted as 
Britain’s High Commissioner in India Sir Malcolm MacDonald decided to continue 
with the scheduled journey after consultation with Burrows who was at the time in 
London.705   
The night before Nehru’s arrival, Gault sent a firm warning through an 
unnamed Agency employee to the NUC to exercise restraint with their members and 
not to allow matters to get out of hand.  Furthermore, as Egypt had just celebrated 
Britain’s troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, it was feared that crowds 
might express their excitement on the occasion of Nehru’s visit.706  The much-
anticipated visit of Nehru went on without any incidents.  Approximately a thousand 
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Arabs and Indians came to see the Indian leader during his short stop at Bahrain’s 
Muharraq airport.707  
Referring to past visits by Nasser, Al-Sadat, Lloyd, and Nehru; Gault 
expressed his fear to the FO that Nasser might be tempted to visit Bahrain.  Though 
the Egyptian now had the capability of traveling directly from Egypt to locations like 
India and Pakistan, but the Political Agent feared that Nasser might ‘seek to do so 
deliberately just to “show” us and to symbolise Egyptian penetration of the Persian 
Gulf’.708  However Nasser’s short visit to Bahrain in 1955 proved to be his first and 
last. 
The NUC celebrated the second anniversary of those who had fallen during 
the Police Fort clash in 1954 on 15 June at the Mu’min Mosque in Manama.  Two 
thousand people attended the meeting.  Al-Shamlan gave a speech in which he 
described the NUC’s meetings with the Ruler.  He said: 
Our four meetings with the Ruler were absolutely fruitless and we 
have been unable to reach any result because, during the course of the 
conversation, the authority has not shown any good-will and real 
intention to fulfill our demands.709  
   
Fearing an escalation by the NUC the Adviserate responded with a swift 
public statement about recent events.  It declared that the Government had 
presented to the Party the names of its nominees to both the Health and Education 
Councils to which the NUC had objected.  The Government then requested the Party 
to provide reasons for their objection in the following meeting, but the NUC failed to 
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do so.  On the issue of the Administration Council and the insistence of the NUC to 
have public representatives on the Council, the announcement declared that the 
Ruler had informed the Party that the Council had been established on his own 
initiative and not via public demand as a body to assist his Administration’s work.  
The announcement was concluded by the following statement: ‘The door to 
discussions which the Committee has shut, is as far as the Government is concerned, 
still open’.710   
One of the problems of the meetings between the two sides was that there 
was no mutually-agreed agenda prior to the meetings, since both where relatively 
new at holding political discussions.  Thus the topics of the meetings seemed to have 
arisen on the spot.  Additionally the NUC displayed a poor sense of political tactics 
by insisting on presenting all their reform proposals in one unified package.  The 
Party should have adopted a more flexible approach in its dealings with the 
Administration and taking its successes step by step.   
Alarmed at the growth and development of the NUC’s Scouts movement the 
Resident on 19 June asked the FO for its opinion regarding the organisation.711  
Based on the request Riches forwarded to Kirkpatrick a document regarding the 
Scouts in Bahrain.  Riches saw the organisation to be a threat that required 
immediate action before matters developed even further.  He recommended that 
British officials warn the NUC about their recent activities.712  On the Scouts, the 
Foreign Secretary believed ‘that a quasi-military organisation of this kind cannot be 
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tolerated’.  He stressed the need to make illegal the ‘wearing of unauthorised 
uniforms’ and activities carried by the organisation.713  Riches later informed the 
Political Agent Gault that legal advisers were consulted on the issue of the Scouts 
movement and had pointed out that the Public Order Act of 1936 prohibited the use 
of uniforms for political motives.  It further outlawed the formation of quasi-military 
organisations and for groups to obtain for themselves the power to run their own 
police force.  Riches advised Gault to bring the law to the Ruler’s attention and, 
accordingly, to draft an order.714      
In late June Al-Watan celebrated Nasser’s election as Egypt’s second 
republican President and the approval of the new Egyptian constitution.715  Nasser 
was the only candidate who ran for election and people were required to either 
approve, or disapprove, of his nomination.  The new President of Egypt won the 
elections according to The Times with a ninety-eight per cent vote,716 which set a 
precedent for republican regimes throughout the Arab World.   
 With the conclusion of this time period in this thesis, three features are 
emerging.  First, the British Government seemed to be indecisive early on the 
Belgrave question as it tried to seek the best method to navigate safely through the 
crisis until an approach was devised for the Adviser’s eventual exit.  Second was 
Britain’s understanding that the NUC was not an anti-British movement, although 
Egyptian influence could not be overlooked.  Third was Burrows’ deft political 
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manoeuvering during the crisis that had twice saved Bahrain from taking direct 
British military intervention and a possible catastrophe following the Lloyd and the 
Municipal Incidents of March.  
 The second-half of the year would see major developments on a regional 
scale that would have a direct influence on Bahrain.  These events and the local 
response to it would bring an end to Bahrain’s nationalist political party, and a long 
legal battle would begin for its exiled members in St Helena. 
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Part IV: The Imminent Clash and Downfall 
 
Chapter Eight 
Belgrave’s Resignation, the Ghosts of Past Appeasers,  
the Suez War, and Anti-British Riots in Bahrain 
 July to November 1956  
 
 The period between July and November 1956 proved decisive in the life of 
the NUC.  Political tensions rose again between the Administration and the 
Movement.  As war later erupted in Egypt the NUC’s declaration to opt for a strike 
and its aftermath sealed the Party’s fate.  The first major clash between the two was 
the indefinite suspension in July of Al-Watan following an article it published 
attacking a regional state the newspaper did not specify by name.  The Residency’s 
report for the month of July stated that the newspaper published the article in 
defiance of recommendations not to do so.  The account, however, failed to identify 
the authorities that had told the newspaper’s editor to avoid publishing the 
article.717  
 In order for the Councils to commence operation the Bahraini Administration 
decided to hold a meeting of the Health Council, with or without the NUC’s 
members, on 8 July.  With the announcement to convene the Councils by the 
Government the Party invited all of its one hundred and twenty founding members 
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and the general public to attend a meeting to discuss the affair.  According to 
Burrows only about a hundred attended of which a minority represented the Party’s 
founding members.  The NUC decided in the meeting to boycott all of the 
Government’s Councils.718 
  All members of the Health Council, including the nominated ones, failed to 
attend the meeting initiated by the Administration as they were ‘intimidated from 
doing so by the Committee of National Union’ as Gault concluded.  Based on the 
current situation the Political Agent advised the Ruler ‘to let the Health Council and 
the Education Council be for the time being’.  The Ruler complained to Gault that, 
whenever he concluded an issue with the NUC, the Party would later go back in its 
word and new challenges would arise thus affecting the Administration’s 
developmental programme.  Moreover the Ruler told Gault that the NUC should not 
be encouraged by Britain and that ‘the door of his house was always open if they 
wished to discuss things with him’.719  To the Agent the priority for the meantime 
was the protection and safety of the lives of approximately seven hundred 
Europeans and five thousand Indians and Pakistanis residing on the islands should a 
serious strike take place, as (in his view) it was very likely to escalate into violent 
demonstrations.720   
Rumours of the NUC calling a strike as discussed in the previous chapter 
materalised into actual threats by early July.  Gault told the FO that the NUC on 8 July 
threatened the Ruler to strike if their demands to dismiss Belgrave and participation 
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in the Administration Council were not accepted.  The Party gave the Ruler ten days 
to reply.  Gault blamed the new strike on rumours in the souq to the effect that 
Belgrave was to be retained.721  The Political Agent reiterated his belief that the 
main reason for the NUC’s opposition to the Administration Council as he saw it was 
that it had ‘done good work’ and that the Party ‘cannot claim any credit for what it 
does’.  Additionally, he pointed out, the NUC had been ‘under attack by its more 
extreme followers for failure to produce results’.722  
On the issue of the postponement of council meetings boycotted by the NUC 
the Political Agent minuted a heated tête-à-tête he had with the Adviser.  Belgrave 
attacked HMG’s approach with the NUC and in response Gault explained his position 
to the Adviser saying that   
the advice we were giving [to the Administration] was to appease the 
Committee of National Union because we felt that it was necessary to 
do so in order to gain time for the reorganisation and development of 
the police force and to prevent a complete breakdown in the 
meantime as between the Ruler and his Government and the 
Committee of National Union but we saw no other way.723 
 
Gault notified Riches that he suspected that Belgrave seemed to wish to remain in 
Bahrain during the upcoming winter.724  Riches blamed Belgrave for upsetting the 
‘delicate compromise’ that was reached earlier to ease his exit and to allow Smith to 
take over.  It was mainly due to the Adviser’s ‘bungling’ and ‘his apparent intention 
not to retire till next year’ as Riches observed.  Based on a conversation Riches 
alluded to between Burrows and Sir Harold Beeley, the Assistant Under-Secretary 
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for the Middle East affairs, the two believed that a showdown with the NUC would 
be a foolish thing, as the Party would enjoy massive support on the issue of 
Belgrave’s dismissal.725 
 Gault thought that both sides of the affair were to be blamed: the NUC was 
stubborn in its demands on the Administration Council and so was the Ruler on the 
issue of Belgrave’s leaving.  With the success the Residency and Political Agency 
seemed to have accomplished over the process of easing Belgrave out, it now 
seemed to be suffering a setback.   
 The Ruler had informed the Editor-in-Chief of the suspended Al-Watan, 
newspaper that, until things have settled down in Bahrain, ‘he could not let him 
[Belgrave] go’.  Gault added: ‘now that Belgrave’s personal position has become 
involved, he will stiffen the Ruler’s resistance to what we may say’.726  To the Agent 
the matter had reached a point that ‘far from Belgrave’s going being a blow to 
British influence in this area, his remaining becomes a far greater liability to us’.727 
 On 11 July a British Cabinet meeting discussed the status of Belgrave and 
developments in Bahrain.  The Foreign Secretary said that although steps were 
being made to appoint a new British official to take on Belgrave’s duties, the Adviser 
seemed to be having second thoughts about his retirement.  Lloyd feared that a 
decision to retain Belgrave would push the NUC to call for a national strike.  He thus 
                                                        
725 TNA, FO 371/120547, D.H.M. Riches’ Confidential on Bahrain, 10 July 1956. 
726 TNA, FO 371/120547, Despatch 614, Gault to FO, 10 July 1956. 
727 TNA, FO 371/120547, Gault to FO, 11 July 1956. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 235 
recommended that a clear official announcement on Belgrave’s retirement must be 
issued and that he should go before the end of 1956.728 
Without knowledge of the Cabinet’s conclusions a personal letter was sent on 
13 July to Lloyd by the Ruler of Bahrain in which he criticised what he considered to 
be Britain’s interference in Bahrain’s local affairs, viewed by the Ruler to be an 
adopted policy by HMG for the last two years adding:  
The Committee of National Union are always in communication with 
the British Authorities in Bahrain and are fully informed of all that 
takes place between us and the British Authorities. Sometimes the 
British Government policy regarding local affairs is made known to 
the Committee before it is made known to us.  
 
The letter’s objective was to defend Belgrave as the Sheikh refused comparisons 
between his Adviser and to Glubb Pasha.  The letter concluded (regarding Belgrave’s 
status) by saying: ‘it is not our intention to dispense with his services’.729  
  The letter was sent before the Ruler had known that on the same day an 
unsigned document from the FO’s Eastern Department to the Residency proposed to 
the Ruler to hold a private meeting with the NUC and issue a stern warning to them 
that he would not submit to their threats and would not publically announce 
Belgrave’s dismissal since he felt honoured not to shame the man who had assisted 
him and his father for thirty years.  The Eastern Department believed that ‘If the 
Committee try to hasten Belgrave’s retirement, the Ruler would feel inclined to 
postpone it’.  It further warned that ‘it would be foolish of the Committee to make an 
issue of something which is already on the way to a solution’.730   
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The NUC submitted an official written demand on 14 July to the Sheikh for 
elected seats on the Administration Council and for Belgrave’s removal.  
Surprisingly the demands were not attached to any threats of strikes as had been 
feared.  One possible explanation as to why the NUC did not threaten a strike was 
that Bahraini villagers were awaiting their date harvest (according to the Agency) 
and a strike would curtail sales of the crop.731  Based on the Eastern Department’s 
suggestion on 13 July the Ruler invited the NUC on 22 July to his palace to discuss 
their latest set of demands.732   
As the new meeting between the Ruler and the NUC was about to begin the 
Americans considered formally withdrawing their offer to assist in the construction 
of the Aswan High Dam.  The US National Security Council’s memorandum of 
Discussion offered an insight into American views of the project.  George M 
Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury, wished that Egypt would agree to the 
Soviet offer to build the dam.  Dulles believed that in the short-term an Egyptian 
agreement with the Soviets to have the latter finance the dam might reflect 
negatively on the US but in the long term it would be seen positively.  Dulles noted 
that the loan for the dam would be a heavy burden on Egypt’s economy and that the 
Egyptians would then blame their creditor for their suffering.733  In July the British 
Embassy sent a memorandum to the US Department of State in which it stated its 
concern that a deal between Nasser and Moscow on the finance of the Aswan High 
Dam was imminent.  It was concerned that Nasser’s entanglement with the Soviets 
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was not only political but also economic.  It was then suggested to announce a 
withdrawal of the West’s offer to help finance the dam.734   
A meeting on 19 July was conducted between Dr Ahmed Hussein the 
Egyptian Ambassador to the US and Dulles.  As was expected by the Americans the 
Egyptians announced their acceptance of the West’s offer to finance the dam.  
However Dulles in the meeting informed Hussein that the offer to finance the dam 
had been withdrawn.735  The US’s official withdrawal was followed, on 20 July, by 
Britain’s own cancellation of its offer to finance the project.736  Within less than a 
week these fateful decisions would provoke Nasser to take revenge by nationalising 
the mainly British-and-French-owned Suez Canal Company. 
A day before the scheduled meeting on 22 July between the Ruler and the 
NUC, Colonel EF Henderson of the Residency held a tête-à-tête with Al-Shamlan, who 
said he did not believe that the Ruler would set a date for Belgrave’s departure nor 
would he agree to the Party’s demand concerning the Administration Council.  The 
Acting Secretary believed that then the NUC would call for a long-standing strike, 
which would likely be a bluff.  To that Henderson replied that the Belgrave question 
to his own knowledge had been resolved.  In relation to the Administration Council 
the Residency’s official pointed out that the Council was due to run until the end of 
its term in a year’s time.  Henderson also pointed out the political gains they had 
managed to achieve over time and had manifested in the establishment of the Health 
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and Education Councils.  The official challenged the NUC’s member, saying that his 
Party had boycotted all Government Councils and had thus far ‘obstructed the first 
opportunity of the Bahrain people to participate in the Government’.  He further 
recommended to him and his Party to abort the idea of going on strike, he  
reminded him of the help he and his committee had received in the 
past, and that which H.M.G. had often shown sympathy with C.N.U. 
[NUC] objectives, they were not always in agreement with their 
methods.   
 
As to the reason for the NUC’s boycott of the Health and Education Councils Al-
Shamlan explained that, had they participated, their other demands would not be 
met and Belgrave would have had the ability to overrule the two Councils’ 
decisions.737  
Al-Shamlan was the only member of the NUC who attended the meeting with 
the Ruler on the 22 July.  The Acting Secretary excused the rest from coming as he 
claimed that they did not know the reason for the latest meeting, a matter Gault 
believed that even Al-Shamlan felt to be a poor excuse.  A statement was made by 
the Ruler and an official written response was submitted to the NUC.738  
The response by the Sheikh to the NUC was based on two points.  The first 
being the Administration Council as the Ruler notified members of the Party that it 
was his intention to have the Council continue its work through its current format.  
The second point was on the position of the Government’s Adviser.  In that regard 
the Ruler proclaimed:  
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He is a faithful servant who has obeyed our orders for a long period 
and in doing so has been an example in straight dealing and loyalty, 
and there is no doubt that he has carried out his task with probity and 
we will not terminate his services in this way.  
  
The Ruler further reminded the NUC that the reform steps initiated would take time 
for their implementation.  The most striking feature of the letter was the Ruler’s 
announcement to the Party that his Government ‘will never yield to threats of 
strikes’ as he had been advised by the FO’s Eastern Department.  He concluded the 
letter by saying that the door for dialogue from his part was still open and that it 
was the NUC who had broken off the talks.739  The New York Times covered the news 
of Sheikh Salman’s decision not to dismiss his Adviser, but did not add any further 
information.740   
Objecting to the Ruler’s statements on Belgrave, the NUC in its proclamation 
numbered sixty-four replied,  
It is quite possible that the Adviser has been a loyal servant to the 
Sheikh himself whereas to the people he has been an arrogant tyrant 
and a hangman who has been playing with the vital affairs of this 
country as he wished and without anybody to check him.741  
 
An official response to the Ruler’s original letter on 13 July from the Foreign 
Secretary came on 26 July.  Lloyd asserted in the letter Britain’s long-standing 
friendship with Bahrain.  He later drew to the Ruler’s attention that political 
movements, like the one in Bahrain, were bound to rise sooner or later.  He further 
pointed to HMG’s experience in dealing with such movements in other regions and 
believed that the best methodology to adopt was to enable cooperation between 
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these movements and their Governments.  The Foreign Secretary informed the 
Sheikh of his original conviction that Belgrave would not stay in office beyond the 
end of the year.  He reminded Sheikh Salman of the steps taken earlier that involved 
the appointment of Smith, as that was an indicator to the public that Belgrave was 
on his way out.  Lloyd observed that the best policy to be adopted by the Bahraini 
Government was winning over public support and strengthening its Police Force to 
assure public safety and welfare.742 
In response to the offer to withdraw finance of the Aswan High Dam and in 
his usual rhetorical manner Nasser delivered a long speech on 26 July in Alexandria.  
The name of the French Suez Canal developer Ferdinand de Lesseps was the signal 
Nasser gave via his broadcasted speech for his army to take over the Suez Canal 
Company.743  The speech concluded with Nasser’s proclamation that the company 
had been nationalised by Egypt.744  Lloyd recalled in his memoir that he was at a 
banquet hosted by Eden in honour of King Faisal II of Iraq and Prime Minister Nuri 
when the news of the company’s nationalisation arrived.  Nuri advised him, as Lloyd 
noted, to ‘hit Nasser hard and quickly’.745  Nasser intended to compensate the 
foreign shareholders and then use the company’s income to build the dam.746  Hugh 
Gaitskell, the Leader of the UK’s Labour Opposition Party, noted what he perceived 
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as the lack of logic behind the nationalisation of the company and financing through 
its revenue the Aswan High Dam in his address to the House of Commons, 
How can he [Nasser] at one and the same time both keep the Canal 
going, spend the necessary money on the repairs, extensions and re-
construction, pay the compensation or service the compensation loan 
to the shareholders, and also find money for the Aswan Dam?747 
 
 When emotions run high in the Middle East, logic seemed take a back seat.  
Additionally to that argument, the Suez Canal Company’s contract was due to expire 
in 1968,748 and Egypt would then obtain full control of the company without risking 
possible Western retaliation.  Nasser eventually sought Soviet loans for the 
construction of the dam, as he had failed to use the revenue from the Canal’s 
company to finance the project.749 
 To Britain the Suez Canal Company and the control of the passage of ships 
through the canal was vital for the maintenance of the Empire.  It was feared that 
with Nasser’s control of the Canal the freedom of passage through it would be 
jeopardised in defiance of the treaty signed in Constantinople in 1888.750  The Suez 
Canal was Britain’s ‘jugular vein’,751 and as Clark noted ‘Nasser could not be allowed, 
in Eden’s phrase, “to have his hand on our windpipe”’.752  The Prime Minister feared 
(as he explained to Eisenhower) that if Nasser got away with it, his stock would rise 
throughout the Arab World enticing other military juntas to overthrow their 
governments.  Such new governments would, Eden explained: 
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in effect be Egyptian satellites if not Russian ones.  They will have to 
place their united oil resources under the control of united Arabia led 
by Egypt and under Russian influence.  When that moment comes 
Nasser can deny oil to Western Europe and here we shall all be at his 
mercy.753 
 
Even prior to the crisis, Eisenhower understood the importance of oil to Europe, as 
‘The economy of European countries would collapse if those oil supplies were cut 
off’.754  Likewise, as Macmillan illustrated in his diary, the dilemma Britain was in, as 
Western Europe relied eighty to ninety per cent of its oil supplies on Middle Eastern 
oil.  He, moreover, feared that action against Nasser would close the Canal and result 
in revolts in the Arabian Gulf States.  But if Nasser was left unchecked, the next 
possible step in the Arab World would be the nationalisation of oil production.755 
The new conflict must have brought back to Eden memories of his stance in 
1938 against Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement with European dictators 
like Hitler and Mussolini.  Eden, who was then the Foreign Secretary, had resigned 
from his post in 1938 in opposition to Chamberlain’s policy.756  The Prime Minister’s 
memoir compared Nasser’s takeover of the Canal to that of Hitler’s seizure of the 
Rhineland and Stalin’s suppression of liberty in Czechoslovakia.757  Although in 
Egypt’s case the Suez Canal lay within its own boundaries and was not a separate 
entity outside of its borders.  Nevertheless Eden refused to be haunted by the ghosts 
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of past appeasers.  Trevelyan viewed that ‘appeasement of a dictator was the most 
serious danger to reputation and career’.758   
In the British Cabinet’s meeting following Nasser’s nationalisation held on 27 
July, Eden informed the Cabinet that he had made it clear to the US’s Charge 
d’Affaires and the French Ambassador that 
any failure on the part of the Western Powers to take the necessary 
steps to regain control over the Canal would have disastrous 
consequences for the economic life of the Western Powers for their 
standing and influence in the Middle East.  
 
More information on the economic importance of the Canal was presented to the 
Cabinet detailing that sixty million tons of oil from the Arabian Gulf region (of a total 
of seventy million tons) passed through the Canal en route to Western Europe.  
Furthermore any threat to the Canal would also obstruct Britain’s trade routes to 
the East.759  Britain’s first step at retaliating was its freeze of Egypt’s sterling 
balances, estimated to be around £110 million.760  The crisis would be the start of 
frantic international diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution. 
Following up on the desire to reshuffle Bahrain’s Administration Gault met 
with the Ruler on 5 August.  The Sheikh informed the Agent that he had agreed to 
Belgrave’s retirement but that he did not envision that he would leave Bahrain 
immediately.  The Agent reminded the Ruler that it was arranged for Smith to take 
over the Adviser’s duties as Secretary to the Bahraini Government upon his 
expected return in October and that it would not be possible for both to carry out 
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the same responsibilities.  The Agent also advised the Ruler to issue a clear public 
statement vis-à-vis Belgrave’s retirement to avoid any possible disturbances based 
on any misunderstandings of the matter.  On the issue of British troops stationed in 
Bahrain in case of major disturbances the Agent reported that ‘The Ruler 
commented that it was no more his wish than ours that British troops should be 
used and I think he sees objection to do so as clearly as we do’.761   
The Ruler called once again on Gault on 7 August to inform him that he was 
willing to make a public announcement on Belgrave’s retirement but without any 
commitment as to the timing.762  The Adviser then officially resigned from his post 
on 13 August.  The written announcement was made by Belgrave himself, saying 
that ‘The Ruler has very reluctantly accepted’ his request to resign.  The Adviser 
further proclaimed that he would complete a gradual hand-over of his duties by the 
early part of 1957.763   
Fears about Bahraini public’s reaction to the news of Belgrave’s long-awaited 
retirement were unfounded as Bahrainis had been completely engaged by the news 
of the Suez Canal Company’s nationalisation which overshadowed everything 
else.764  Riches of the FO’s Eastern Department viewed Belgrave’s retirement to be 
‘somewhat disappointing’ since the Administration would be retaining the Adviser’s 
services until early 1957.  Nonetheless, Riches believed that the announcement had 
now committed the Government to let him go and within a specific time period.765   
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The New York Times covered the news of Belgrave’s resignation in its 15 
August edition.  In an interview with the newspaper, Belgrave insisted that ‘It is not 
a second Glubb affair’.766  The Daily Mail additionally produced an article by Vincent 
Mulchrone on the Adviser’s resignation.  The article was labeled ‘Charles of the Gulf 
is sacked’.  Mulchrone added that the Adviser was not sacked by the Ruler of 
Bahrain but by pressure from the FO.767  RB Tillotson who described himself as a 
friend of the Foreign Secretary’s sister Doris and her husband Howard Shone 
expressed his concern to Lloyd regarding Britain’s position in the Gulf after reading 
the Daily Mail’s article.  Lloyd responded in a short letter to Tillotson and informed 
the family’s acquaintance that ‘we are not going to surrender our position in 
Bahrain to any Committee’.768  Interestingly, the British diplomatic stance towards 
Belgrave did not change following Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company.  Regardless of the crisis in Egypt, the British wished to see the Adviser out 
of the Bahraini political scene as soon as possible, certainly making no attempt to 
retain him for reasons of British prestige. 
As for Al-Bakir, by late July he had returned to Lebanon from Cairo and from 
there he was active in Beirut and other Arab capitals, accepting invitations from 
dignitaries and holding press conferences.  In Beirut he was invited to a luncheon 
party organised by the Lebanese journalist Riyad Taha at the Bristol Hotel.  Al-Massa 
(The Evening) Lebanese publication covered the luncheon which the British 
                                                        
766 ‘Bahrein Adviser Quits: Briton had become Target of Nationalist Elements’, New York Times, 15 
August 1956, 2. 
767 TNA, FO 1016/468, V. Mulchrone, ‘Charles of the Gulf is sacked’, Daily Mail. 
768 TNA, FO 371/120573, Tillotson to Lloyd, 18 August 1956; and TNA, FO 371/120573, Lloyd to 
Tilloston, 27 August 1956. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 246 
Embassy in Beirut sent to the Residency in Manama.  The publication described Al-
Bakir as being ‘one of the leaders of Bahrain’.769    
Al-Ahram covered in August a press conference held by Al-Bakir in 
Damascus.  It claimed that, according to Al Bakir, Bahrain’s trade union, (or the 
NUC’s version of the union consisting of 8,700 workers) had ‘decided to destroy 
completely, within 48 hours of any attack on Egypt, refinery and oil pipes’.  Al-
Ahram further claimed that Al-Bakir had indicated that the US and Britain were 
working together on establishing bases in Bahrain ‘which will be used for atomic 
planes’.  When the nationalist was asked about his reaction to the West’s threats 
aimed at Egypt, Al-Bakir replied: ‘If any aggression is carried out against Egypt by 
anyone, we will immediately destroy the oil refinery, air and naval bases, and all 
other British and American establishments’.  Another account within the same issue 
of the newspaper proclaimed Al-Bakir’s announcement in Damascus of the 
establishment of a liberation coalition with the objective of ‘liberating Arab States 
from the clutches of Imperialism’.770   
Al-Bakir revealed more about this coalition in his memoir.  The objective of 
the Movement was to unite other nationalist personalities from other states in the 
Arabian Gulf and Peninsula under the umbrella of a ‘Revolutionary Pact’.  The 
personalities Al-Bakir met were from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and South 
Yemen.  An office was established for this mission in Damascus and was named as 
the ‘Gulf and South Arabia’.771   
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Further to the news coverage by Al-Ahram the British Embassy in Damascus 
forwarded a despatch to the Residency in Bahrain on Al-Bakir’s activities and the 
Syrian press coverage of his work.  The Syrian press’ version added that Al-Bakir 
viewed ‘that the British authorities in Bahrain, Sir Charles Belgrave in particular, 
opposed all nationalist and liberation political activities’.772  Burrows, surprised at 
Al-Bakir’s claims, requested the British Chancery in Beirut to contact Al-Bakir and 
enquire as to: ‘the reason for his changed attitude towards us’.773  
The Bahraini nationalist leader had come a long way since his days as a 
merchant in Doha in 1952.  The attention, publicity, and status he earned during his 
stay away from Bahrain had possibly given him overconfidence and might have 
encouraged him to make daring and outrageous claims, regardless of their validity, 
as the more bold the claims were the bigger the challenge was perceived by the 
public. 
On the developments of the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower suggested to Eden the 
assembly of an international conference that included the nations that signed the 
Constantinople Convention in 1888.774  Based on the proposal a Suez Canal 
Conference was scheduled between 16 to 23 August in London.  It consisted of 
twenty-two nations.  Egypt and Greece declined to participate, the latter due to its 
stance towards the conflict in Cyprus.775  
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Calls went out in Bahrain to go on a strike on 16 August, purposely coinciding 
with the London conference and in support of Egypt.  It was feared that the Scouts 
movement might be mobilised for the event.  Nonetheless the Bahraini 
Administration decided to postpone any declaration in relation to outlawing private 
armies till after the strike was over.  By doing so it aimed to avoid further trouble by 
the NUC and was practical in wanting to see the NUC Scouts movement on display 
with the objective of recognising its leaders.776   
 To add further complications to the proposed strike, it would coincide with 
the first day of the annual Shi’ite festival of Muharram, mourning the death of 
Hussein which was due to take place on 16 and 17 August.  Prior to the start of the 
festivities it was noticed that the NUC’s Scouts’ team had appeared publically on the 
evenings of 14 and 15 August in a meeting organised by the Party at a Shi’ite 
mosque.  The Scouts numbered around fifty.  They had fitted themselves out in 
khaki coloured shirts and trousers, together with the Arab head attire, and a badge.  
The Scouts were mostly responsible for regulating traffic.777  On the first day of the 
Shi’ite festival, which coincided with the declared strike, the Scouts were seen again 
regulating traffic and Gault noted his account of Scouts being drilled by former 
Bahraini policemen.  It was believed that the NUC’s Scouts had wanted to participate 
in overseeing the organisation of the Muharram processions, but this request was 
rejected by the Shi’ite procession leaders.778  No incidents were observed on the day 
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of the strike that was mainly due to the fact that it occurred on a religious and public 
holiday.  On the second day of the festivities the Scouts were not seen again.   
 Referring to the Scouts Burrows said to the FO that it had ‘become clear that 
the Bahrain Government must now take determined action to stop the existence of 
this private army’.779  It was estimated by the Residency that the Scouts organisation 
had reached a thousand members who were called the Suez Canal Troop and that 
the NUC was working on organising another troop consisting of an additional one 
thousand to be named the Palestine Troop.  The uniforms worn by the Scouts 
certainly got Burrows’ attention as he commended the ‘beautiful uniform[s]’ for 
their design.  Interestingly he further viewed the Scouts to be ‘the foundation of the 
future Bahrain national army’.780  The statement by Burrows highlighted the 
Resident’s view of the future of Bahrain, seeing through the Scouts the future of 
Bahrain as an independent nation with its own defence force.    
 Based on the information provided, the only concern at the time to the FO in 
relation to the Scouts organisation was reflected in a FO document by SH 
Hebblethwaite in which he asked the Residency: ‘Can you tell us who supplied the 
beautiful uniforms to the Scouts?’781  In response the Residency replied that the 
Scouts’ uniforms were made at different tailors in Bahrain and each Scout was 
responsible for the purchase of his own uniform.  Each uniform cost the equivalent 
of about £3.00.782 
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Taking on the issue of the Scouts from a legal standpoint, the Administration 
issued a public ordinance derived from Britain’s 1936 Public Order Act.783  The 
ordinance was issued on 20 August banning the NUC’s Scouts movement.  Following 
the ban Al-Shamlan met with Colonel Anderson from the Residency to discuss the 
matter.  Gault specified, that according to Anderson’s account, the Acting Secretary 
of the NUC ‘appeared to have no clear idea of what the correct definition of a Scout 
was’.  The Party in response issued a circular objecting to the proclamation.  Gault 
also noted that the NUC’s popularity seemed to have waned and that they were 
short of money and unable to collect further donations from local merchants.   
In Manama and other villages the support for the NUC was seen to have 
decreased the most, mainly due to their continued call for strikes and its adverse 
effect on general public welfare.784  After the issue of the Administration’s public 
ordinance on the Scouts movement, the organisation gradually faded away not to be 
seen publicly again.785 
Three notable events occurred in August.  The first was the arrival of six 
British officers who joined Bahrain’s Police Force, increasing the total number of 
British officers in the force to twelve.  Additionally, without much publicity, two 
Iraqi officers were transferred from Iraq to Bahrain.786  The second was the Ruler’s 
approval to appoint, on a temporary basis, an Adviser for Bahrain’s Public Relations 
Department based on a recommendation by the Residency.  The Ruler requested 
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that the candidate for the position would be employed part-time for two months.  
The candidate chosen for the position was William Buchan.787  Buchan had worked 
previously as a public relations consultant and was the brother of Lord 
Tweedamuir.788  The third was the Bahraini Government’s choice of selecting JW 
Cummins to review the Administration’s work and departments.  Cummins had 
previously reviewed the work of the Qatari Government.  He was due to arrive in 
Bahrain later in 1956.789   
For its part, in August, the NUC sent a new batch of students to further their 
studies in Egypt.  The Egyptians awarded about thirteen Bahraini students 
scholarships.790  According to Belgrave, the families of those who were sent to Egypt 
complained to him later that, although their children received free education there 
and their travel fares were covered by the NUC, they were not assisted financially 
with monthly or daily allowances.791 
The Suez Canal Conference concluded in London on 23 August with the 
agreement of eighteen participating states (out of the original twenty-two) to send a 
delegation in September to meet with Nasser.  The delegation was to be headed by 
the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Menzies.792  The Conference also concluded 
with a proposal to establish an international authority for the Canal.  The authority 
would run the Canal’s operations, ensure the passage of ships through the Canal in 
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accordance with the Convention of 1888, secure payments to the Canal Company, 
and ensure Egyptian rights.793   
The day following the conclusion of the Conference a new Bahraini weekly 
newspaper named Al-Shula (The Torch) appeared for the first time.  However its 
first edition proved to be its last as it was banned from publication following an 
anti-Iraqi article in its inaugural issue.794  No known copies of it exist today.  Al-
Shula was an attempt initiated by Al-Mardi and Ebrahim M Al-Moayyed to revive Al-
Watan newspaper under a different title.795  
Concerned with the developments in Bahrain, two leading figures from 
Bahrain’s community, Ahmed Fakhroo and Mansoor Al-Arrayed (a Sunni and a 
Shi’ite respectively), visited the Residency where they met with both the Resident 
and the Political Agent on 27 August.  The minutes of the meeting provided insight 
into how a sample of the population, non-aligned to the NUC viewed the political 
situation.  The two men feared a further deterioration was imminent of Bahrain’s 
political scene and wished to see matters come to a resolution.  A Fakhroo and Al-
Arrayed believed that the NUC had achieved a great deal of its original aims and they 
felt that there was no reason for them to further complicate the situation by 
insisting that the Government accept every one of their political demands.   A 
Fakhroo testified that his son Qassim ran for the Education Council on behalf of the 
NUC in February.  He said that he had spoken to his son in order further understand 
the NUC’s point-of-view in its objection to cooperating with the Administration and 
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utilising the channels of expression they had already gained.  In response Qassim 
had agreed with his father in questioning the Party for its refusal to take advantage 
of the political gains it had made.  To that Qassim added, that ‘he had been elected 
by people who, in fact, were very ignorant and he could not go against their 
mandate’.  A Fakhroo added that Bahrainis ‘as a whole were frightened that if they 
stood out against the Committee the Government would not or could not support 
them’.  Al-Arrayed felt that the public had grown tired of the NUC’s continuous call 
for strikes and that the Party had so far ‘achieved nothing’.796    
Meanwhile Menzies, as head of the delegation meeting with Nasser, 
understood that any lessening of the Egyptian leader’s stance towards the Suez 
Canal Company’s nationalisation would undermine his prestige regionally.  
Therefore, Menzies sumrised, Nasser had no other alternative but to carry on.  The 
Australian Prime Minister met with Nasser on 3 September to present him with the 
conference’s proposals.797  Menzies failed to convince Nasser to accept the 
conference’s proposals and the Australian Prime Minister was sent an official reply 
from Nasser confirming this.798   
Following Britain’s threat to take the issue to the UN Security Council, Dulles 
proposed the formation of ‘a Canal Users’ Club’.799  The name of the club that was 
formed based on Dulles’ proposal was, in fact, the Suez Canal Users’ Association 
(SCUA).800  It was publically proposed during the Suez Canal Conference’s second 
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meeting, also held in London, between 19 to 21 September and was officially formed 
on 1 October.801  The Association’s resolutions can be summarised as follows: to aim 
towards a solution to end the crisis; to support secure and safe transit in the Canal; 
to collect and distribute the Canal’s revenues; to deal with problems that might arise 
from failure of managing the Canal; and to reach a conclusion to the conflict which 
should be adopted by the UN among others.802  The American suggestion to first 
organise a conference and then form a users’ club might have been a ploy intended 
to delay (or even stop) military action against Egypt. 
On 26 September during the Shi’ite celebrations marking the passing of forty 
days following the anniversary of the death of Hussein and a day before Al-Bakir’s 
return to Bahrain, the NUC held a public meeting.  Only a thousand people attended 
the meeting, an indication of the NUC’s loss of popularity when compared to 
previous attendance numbers.  In an intelligence tour d’horizon by the Acting 
Political Agent D Blelloch he compared the recent figure with the five thousand that 
had attended a similar occasion in 1955.  A speech was delivered by Al-Shamlan 
who criticised the Government for the Egyptian legal expert’s delay in coming to 
Bahrain to review the Penal Code, although the delay, in fact, was from the Egyptian 
side.  He additionally criticised the Administration for not introducing new trained 
judges and for press censorship.  The meeting was also the Party’s first-known 
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public meeting in which the NUC’s President Kamal-el-Deen had presented a speech 
since he had assumed the position the year before.803 
Al-Bakir returned to Bahrain on 27 September after approximately six 
months away.  Hundreds of admirers gathered to greet the nationalist leader.  Upon 
his arrival Al-Bakir made no speech, saying that he wished to speak to people on an 
individual basis.  One of the earliest claims that Al-Bakir made to Bahrainis was his 
denial of the comments that were attributed to him in the press.  Burrows expected 
that one of the criticisms Al-Bakir would face locally was ‘expenditure of funds 
collected in Bahrain and failure to publish accounts’.   
Burrows predicted Al-Bakir’s possible behaviour following his return saying 
that he would either exercise a more moderate influence on his Party, or would 
resort to trouble and/or would join with other elements in their disapproval of the 
Party’s policies.  The Resident was concerned that should any action where to be 
taken against Al-Bakir by the Administration at this point it would turn him locally 
into ‘a martyr and a hero’.  The biggest change in the Residency’s attitude towards 
Al-Bakir following his return was Burrows’ intention not to resume contact with 
him.804  One of the most striking features that Al-Bakir noted in his memoir upon his 
return was what he viewed as general antipathy towards the Movement from the 
public.  It was then that the nationalist leader considered the establishment of a new 
organisation, but that plan was not destined to take shape.805 
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Anxious to know of Al-Bakir’s initial reaction upon his arrival in Bahrain the 
Residency advanced to the FO a translated transcript of Al-Bakir’s first public 
speech delivered in a gathering on the occasion of the anniversary of Prophet 
Mohammed’s birthday on 17 October.  The transcript of the speech was translated 
from Arabic as it had been featured in its entirety in Al-Mizan newspaper published 
on 19 October.  Translation of the article is available among Bahraini records at 
TNA.  Al-Bakir had praised Nasser’s measures in nationalising the Suez Canal 
Company and explained that he saw this to be a part of the greater picture of Arab 
nationalism reaching a state ‘of resolution’.  He went on: ‘We here declare that the 
imperialist should pick up his stuff and go’ and ‘If the imperialist wants to remain in 
Bahrain, which is now a vital artery to him, he ought to change his policy’.  Al-Bakir, 
moreover, claimed that the NUC was ‘regarded by the Arab leaders [whom he did 
not specify] as the pivot of the liberation of the Gulf’.  He reiterated the Party’s policy 
in boycotting the Administration Council even if it caused an impediment to the 
departmental services in Bahrain, it was for the sake of the greater nationalist cause.  
The head of the NUC further criticised those who blamed the Party’s policies to have 
caused the employment of more British citizens and a stronger presence of military 
personnel in Bahrain.806  
Another article in Al-Mizan newspaper featured an interview with Al-Bakir of 
which the Residency forwarded a translated copy to the FO.  Unfortunately the 
original issue of the newspaper is not now available for public viewing.  The 
interview was conducted by Al-Mizan’s Editor-in-Chief, Abdulla Al-Wazzan.  The 
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translated interview obtained at TNA suggested that the interviewer took a bold 
line.  One of the features of the interview that interested the Residency ‘was the 
public airing of the rumour that he [Al-Bakir] had squandered Committee funds in 
the Lebanon’.  In the interview the NUC’s leader rejected the accusations that 
claimed him to have lived an extravagant life in Lebanon.  He proclaimed that he 
gained his finances from his work as a merchant and from his work as a Secretary 
for the local insurance company he helped to establish.  Although it is not clear 
whether Al-Bakir meant that he had saved money from his salary before his 
departure or he was paid by the company during his six-month absence.   
Al-Mizan also presented a further accusation to Al-Bakir, challenging him that 
he had received a salary of 3,000 Rupees from the British.  Al-Bakir rejected these 
claims and accused opponents of the NUC for spreading unfounded accusations.  The 
nationalist was also asked about Al-Sanhouri’s status.  He responded that he had 
met the Egyptian law expert a number of times in Egypt and that the reason for his 
delay was ‘not connected with the Government of Bahrain’.  This is a claim that 
agrees with the British Embassy in Cairo’s reports featured in Chapter Seven.  Al-
Bakir, furthermore, pointed out his submission of ‘Bahrain’s case’ to the Arab 
League.   
Finally Al-Bakir was asked about the answer he had given at a press 
conference in Damascus in relation to the action Bahrainis would take if an attack on 
Egypt occurred.  The Arab press stated that Al-Bakir had replied with a call to 
murder all British citizens in Bahrain within twenty-four hours.  The nationalist 
leader rejected the newspapers’ accounts.  Al-Bakir informed Al-Mizan that he had 
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‘replied that the necessary measures would be taken in time’.  He claimed that the 
statement attributed to him was an addition by the French News Agency.  In return 
Al-Hayat (The Life) newspaper in Lebanon picked it up and other Arab newspapers 
followed.807  On the accusation that Al-Bakir had received finances from the British, 
Belgrave seemed to believe that this was indeed the case.  In his diary he noted that 
the Bahraini nationalist had received 5,000 Rupees from the Residency to persuade 
him to leave Bahrain in late March.808   There are no FO documents at TNA to 
support the allegation.  
The coming of October witnessed the completion of the draft Labour Law 
Code on which work had begun in 1955.  A copy of the draft was officially submitted 
to the Government of Bahrain on 10 October for its review and translation.  
Additionally in October a representative from the Bahraini Government traveled to 
Egypt to meet Al-Sanhouri to discuss his status on the Penal Code’s review.  Al-
Sanhouri, due to constraints placed on him by his own Government, would never 
make the journey to Bahrain.809  Also in October, in its attempt to reach out to the 
Arab Gulf masses a new pro-British Arabic language newspaper publication 
published three trial issues.  The newspaper was named as Al-Khaleej (The Gulf 
Times).  The company that sponsored the new publication also ran the Iraq Times.  
Burrows hoped that with the arrival of a new linotype machine and operator, it 
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would become the very first daily newspaper in the Arab States of the Gulf and 
would be distributed throughout the region.810 
Concurrent to these events, Britain and France submitted a draft resolution 
to the UN Security Council on 13 October consisting of six principles on the issue of 
the Suez Crisis: the free passage of ships through the Canal; the acknowledgement of 
Egypt’s sovereignty; that the politics of any country must not interfere with the 
Canal’s operation; the tolls for passage shall be decided between the users of the 
Canal and Egypt; part of the Canal’s revenue would be assigned for developmental 
projects; and an arbitration body would be set up to handle disputes should they 
arise between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt.811  The resolution was vetoed by 
Russia and Yugoslavia.812   
With these ongoing developments the Israelis and the French were making 
plans to launch military action against Egypt.  The Israelis hoped to use the attack to 
create a buffer zone between them and the Egyptians and have the Gulf of Aqaba 
open for shipping.  The French had shares in the Suez Canal Company and were 
fighting the Algerian resistance movement known as the National Liberation Front 
(FLN) supported by Nasser, so (as they saw it) they had a score to settle with the 
Egyptian leader.  After France had made Britain aware of its plans a meeting was 
held by the French, British, and Israelis in Sévres in France.  The three sides devised 
a plan that would enable them to take over the Suez Canal.  The agreement would 
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have Israel invade the Sinai Peninsula then the British and French would invade the 
Suez Canal on the pretext of separating the combatants after an ultimatum was 
issued and refused (as they expected it would be) by the Egyptian side.  The plan 
was signed on 24 October and came to be known as the Protocol of Sévres.813  
According to Wilbur Crane Eveland of the CIA, the Agency notified Egypt’s 
Ambassador to the US that a possible Anglo-French attack was forthcoming.814   
As the Protocol was in its final stages Hungarians rose in revolt against their 
Soviet masters and demanded the return of Imre Nagy with neutralist inclinations to 
the position of Prime Minister.  The rebels succeeded in restoring Nagy to power.  
The Soviets responded by marching their troops into the heart of Budapest on 24 
October and fierce fighting ensued between the rebels and Soviets aided by the pro-
Soviet Hungarian State Protection Authority.815  Although the Soviets initially 
withdrew, the Suez War provided them with the perfect distraction that enabled 
them to launch a new attack to quell the Hungarian revolution on 4 November.  The 
attack on Egypt would overshadow the Hungarian people’s struggle for freedom 
from the Soviet-Communist grip.816 
A strike in Bahrain was called upon on 28 October in solidarity with a group 
of North African nationalists.  The strike took place between 6.00 am to 6.00 pm,817 
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and, according to Bahrain’s annual report for the year 1956, ‘few people knew what 
it was about except that it was ordered from Egypt’.818  The North African 
nationalists the strike was organised for were likely to be headed by the Algerian 
resistance leader Ahmed bin Bella (one of the founders of the FLN), who was 
arrested along with four others when the French intercepted his plane as he flew 
from Morocco to Tunisia on 22 October.819  Al-Bakir confessed in his memoir that 
the strike had become violent in Muharraq and feared that violence might spread to 
Manama.820  It was surely a sign to Al-Bakir of things to come when the NUC once 
again took the initiative to call for a strike.   
Military operations against Egypt started on 29 October 1956 when Israel 
invaded Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.  In a short period of time the Israelis managed to 
advance to within fifty miles of the Suez Canal.821  A statement by Eden was made on 
30 October in the House of Commons with the Prime Minister declaring that both 
the British and French Governments had communicated to both the Israelis and 
Egyptians ordering them to cease fire and withdraw ten miles from the Suez Canal.  
Then, he said, Anglo-French military units would seize key positions throughout the 
Canal in order to separate the warring factions and secure safe passage for all 
ships.822 
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No disturbances were recorded in Bahrain on 31 October.  Burrows, unaware 
of the prearrangement between Britain, France, and Israel, feared that a reaction 
might erupt in Bahrain as a result of Britain’s probable announcement to re-occupy 
strategic posts in the Suez Canal Zone or the insistence that both the Egyptians and 
Israelis should withdraw from the area.  Burrows made the point that, should events 
call for British military intervention (boots on the Egyptian ground), it would be 
interpreted in Bahrain that Britain was taking the Israeli side of the conflict.  His 
advice (from his role in Bahrain) was that Britain should broker a ceasefire and 
force Israel to withdraw.823  As the day progressed Burrows realised that Bahrainis 
firmly believed that both Britain and France had instigated the Israeli attack in 
order to give itself a casus belli and a bona fide raison d’etre to take over the Canal.824  
The Bahrain Government Annual Report noted that a small demonstration by 
schoolboys and girls took place on 31 October led by Al-Bakir’s son.825 
 As anticipated, Nasser rejected the Anglo-French ultimatum.826  The bombing 
of Egyptian targets by British and French aircrafts followed.  The following day, 1 
November, a reaction in Bahrain started to take shape, as Belgrave noted in his 
diary.  Problems started with a demonstration by local schoolboys which escalated 
in Muharraq as demonstrators blocked roads, stoned cars, and attacked 
government-owned flats.827   
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 Gault was out of Bahrain on leave until 6 November, but the Political Agency 
recorded that on the first day of November the Agency had evacuated European and 
American citizens from Manama.  The Westerners were transferred to the BAPCO 
housing compound in Awali where the company provided them with temporary 
housing.  Moreover the Agency’s report confirmed Belgrave’s diary entry that 
students had taken part in the demonstrations, adding that the demonstrators 
attempted to surround the Adviserate, Political Agency, and buildings owned by the 
BOAC.  Bahrain’s police managed to successfully contain the demonstration.  On the 
same day, the NUC issued a circular in which it called for a general strike and held 
the British responsible for its outcome.  The NUC further requested the Bahraini 
Administration to allow it to organise a protest on Friday 2 November with a 
predetermined route agreed by both sides.  Permission to organise the procession 
was granted by the Bahraini Administration.828 
Bahrain’s Government Annual Report for 1956 prepared by Belgrave 
established that Al-Bakir had met with the Adviser and decided on the route of the 
demonstration.  It also established that the Adviser had received assurances from 
the NUC’s Secretary that the demonstration ‘would be peaceful and orderly’.829  
Belgrave further added in his memoir that the meeting took place at his home.830  Al-
Bakir did not mention any such meeting in his memoir.831 
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 Following his meeting with Al-Bakir, Belgrave sent a message informing the 
Police Commandant Colonel Hamersley regarding the Administration’s agreement 
with the NUC for the latter to hold a procession.  It was agreed that the procession 
would start from a mosque in Hoora in Manama at 10.00 am, most likely Al-
Awadhiyah Mosque, known today as Al-Farooq Mosque.  The streets and the order 
of the procession were clearly identified by Belgrave.  The Adviser requested the 
police to ‘provide two or three [police] jeeps, with radios, to precede the procession’ 
and to update the Police’s headquarters on its progress.  Belgrave, furthermore, 
gave instructions that if the procession became disorderly the police may deploy 
officers from the Police Fort in Manama to control the crowd and arrest the 
agitators.832  As a further precaution British soldiers of the Cameron Highlanders 
from Aden had stationed themselves in Bahrain, together with two units of the 
Gloucestershire Regiment.833 
The demonstration on 2 November did not keep to the agreed route and 
hundreds of youths broke away and marched close to the Political Agency.  In the 
afternoon events deteriorated rapidly as crowds of demonstrators flooded 
Government Avenue in the heart of Manama, the gateway to the main souq.  Al-
Zayani’s Petrol Station was set on fire, the African and Eastern bank offices were 
damaged, Yateem’s Petrol Station was attacked, Gray Mackenzie’s windows were 
broken, and other buildings were damaged during what had turned into a riot.  The 
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police were unable to deal with the riots in Muharraq and withdrew.  The BOAC’s 
flats were robbed and set on fire.834   
According to Al-Bakir the first frontline member of the NUC to be arrested 
was E Fakhroo.  He was held with a group of other protestors as they attempted to 
rescue a young boy who had been arrested by a British police officer.  The officer 
then informed Belgrave that E Fakhroo was among the protestors close to 
Muharraq’s police station and that he had attacked the police.  The Adviser then 
ordered his arrest.835  FO documents from the tribunal that was held later in 
December against a number of the NUC’s frontline members gave similar accounts 
about E Fakhroo’s arrest, saying inter alia that he had tried to help a man who was 
being apprehended without giving further details of his age nor did it specify 
whether or not Belgrave had ordered his arrest.836  Sir Edward Boyle the Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury and Nutting resigned from the British Cabinet in protest at 
Britain’s involvement in the Suez invasion.837 
Patricia Thomas, the wife of Captain T Thomas of the Gulf Aviation Company 
in Bahrain, posted a letter to Buckingham Palace on 7 November.  She was living in 
Muharraq during the attacks of 2 November and had sent a letter to complain 
directly to HM Queen Elizabeth II.  The letter provides a rare neutral eyewitness 
account of events on Muharraq Island during that time as the captain’s wife lived in 
the BOAC’s flats that came under attack.  P Thomas said that the island had been 
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infiltrated ‘by Egyptian propagandists’ and had become ‘a hotbed of anti-British 
sentiment’.  She criticised the assurances made by British officials in Bahrain that 
disturbances similar to the ones witnessed in March would not be allowed to occur 
again.  The earliest attack P Thomas recalled was when a stone was thrown at her 
apartment’s window.  Although the police were contacted it was of no use as further 
windows were broken and a mob of demonstrators gathered outside the apartment 
building which was occupied by some fifteen Europeans, including seven children 
and six women.  During the riot one apartment was completely burnt out.  After 
further calls to the police an anti-riot squad finally arrived and dispersed the mob 
with tear gas.  P Thomas and others were carried away in a RAF truck to safety at 
the air force’s base.  She was later informed that, following the police’s departure, 
the apartments were looted by the mob and then set on fire.  P Thomas claimed that 
she and her husband, as a result, had lost all their possessions.838   
On the regional scale the UN’s General Assembly issued a resolution in which 
it called on Israel and Egypt to accept a ceasefire.  It additionally urged other states 
involved in the war to bring military activities to an end.839  On the morning of 3 
November a number of representatives from various British-owned businesses 
complained to the Agency about the local authority’s lack of capability in protecting 
their businesses.  In the early hours of 3 November it seemed that disturbances had 
decreased on the streets.  However violence quickly returned later in the day.  An 
attempt was made to burn the Bahrain Slipway Company and the Public Works 
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Department building close to the Muharraq causeway was set on fire.  In Manama 
Al-Khaleej newspaper’s premises were destroyed and attacks were also reported at 
the Roman Catholic Church and School,840 a shameful act quite against Bahrain’s 
long tradition of openness and tolerance of religious minorities.   
As fires raged in Manama a request to the Residency came at 12.30 pm from 
Belgrave on behalf of the Ruler asking for British troops to help in restoring law and 
order.  The British were asked to take control of the outskirts of Manama while 
Bahraini police attempted to control the souq.  Another operation was launched to 
re-open the Muharraq causeway.841  British military reinforcements first landed in 
Bahrain after 1.15 pm and their first task was patrolling Manama.  Patrols were 
deployed from Manama all the way to Awali Road to the south of the main island.  As 
the British units were taking up their positions a curfew was imposed at 2.30 pm, 
about which the Administration used its radio service, loud speakers, and 
distributed leaflets to inform the general public.  RAF operated helicopters dropped 
some of the leaflets.  News in English was broadcasted for the first time on Bahrain 
Radio at 9.00 am, 1.00 pm, 4.00 pm, and 7.30 pm.   
On 4 November a circular was issued by the NUC calling for a boycott of all 
British and French goods, not to assist in the process of loading or unloading tankers 
owned by Britain or France, to refuse to supply fuel to planes operated by Britain or 
France, and not supply food to British army personnel.842  In Burrows’ memoir he 
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claimed that the process of dispersing leaflets from the air was later aborted as 
some failed to scatter properly and were a danger to the demonstrators.843  These 
eventful days also witnessed, as the Administration’s Annual Report for 1956 
recorded, the first use by the demonstrators, of Molotov Cocktails.844 
The Manchester Guardian claimed that two people were injured on 4 
November as a group of five hundred demonstrators defied the curfew.845  Al-Ahad 
(The Covenant, a Lebanese magazine) published exaggerated stories about British 
troops’ intervention in Bahrain, saying inter alia that the intervention took place 
when demonstrators blew up the road leading to Muharraq’s airport.  During the 
head-to-head clash between protestors and the British four Bahrainis and three 
British military personnel were killed.  British troops later occupied Gudaibiya in 
Manama as its headquarters, having driven out all the Bahrainis.846 
Belgrave met with Burrows, EF Henderson, Benn who worked for the Police 
Force’s intelligence unit in Bahrain, and an unidentified Cypriot.  During the 
meeting, which he noted in his diary, it seemed that the idea of arresting the NUC’s 
frontline members was broached.  The operation was codenamed Operation Pepsi 
Cola, but Belgrave gave no more details in his diary.  The Ruler was notified on 5 
November that the NUC’s leading members were to be arrested.  Belgrave described 
in his diary his emotions on the night before the arrests, comparing them to ‘the 
feeling of the dance before Waterloo’.847  Details of the arrests and of the steps taken 
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to detain the Party’s members were not noted in the Residency’s archive at TNA, but 
Burrows did say: 
we had for a long time been advising against the arrest of members of 
the Committee but on this occasion it was we who took the initiative 
in proposing action against them and in fact the plans were drawn up 
mainly in our office with considerable help being given to the Bahrain 
police by my staff and a representative of the Security Services.848 
 
The constant threat of strikes which at times turned violent, failure to cooperate 
with the Government, failure to build on its political gains, the establishment of a 
paramilitary organisation, and Al-Bakir’s press conferences abroad (whether 
covered accurately or not by the international press) must have all played a part 
towards the Residency’s decisive decision in November. 
Since Belgrave was no longer the Commandant of the Police he did not take 
part personally in the arrests.  Al-Bakir recalled in his memoir that he was arrested 
at 2.00 am on 6 November from his home in Manama.  A British officer and a Cypriot 
headed the police unit sent to arrest the NUC’s leader.  Al-Bakir claimed that the 
police handled him ‘roughly’.  The other members arrested on that night included 
Al-Shamlan and Al-Alaiwat.  All three were later transferred from the main island of 
Bahrain to the island prison of Jidda.849  A fourth frontline member, Ibn Musa, was 
arrested later that day,850 bringing the total number of frontline members arrested 
to five out of the original eight founders of the Party. 
It was publically announced on 6 November that arrests had taken place of 
Al-Bakir, Al-Shamlan, Al-Alaiwat, and Ibn Musa and that the NUC was officially 
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dissolved in consequence of its ‘failure to observe the assurances given with regard 
to the previous Friday’s procession and of the damage done as a result thereof’.  The 
homes of those arrested were searched and police seized a number of documents at 
their premises.851  In addition to these arrests, fifty other members of the Party -- 
described by Burrows as ‘trouble-makers’ -- were also apprehended.852  Other 
members of the NUC left Bahrain of their own free will to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Kuwait waiting to return when the situation had calmed down.  The Administration 
also announced the implementation of the new Penal Code without any further 
delay or review.853   
As for the war in Egypt, all of the possible scenarios that it was feared would 
come after Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company occurred during the 
war and not in peacetime.  The Canal was blocked, ships sunk, oil denied, Syria 
sabotaged oil pipelines, and Saudi Arabia broke off ties and placed an oil embargo 
on both Britain and France.  Nasser’s stock rose considerably throughout the Arab 
World as result of this miscalculated adventure.854  The Baghdad Pact lay in 
shambles.  The Soviets warned Britain and France about its continued aggression in 
Egypt.855  The Americans, preoccupied with presidential elections, pressured Britain 
and France to cease military operations in Egypt on 6 November.856  Britain and 
France later in December agreed to withdraw from Egypt.  Israel, however, had 
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succeeded in occupying the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula refused initially to 
withdraw.857  But with Americans threatening economic sanctions against the 
Israelis, the latter withdrew its troops in 1957.858  
In Bahrain, law and order gradually returned to the islands and employees 
resumed work both in the public and private sectors and no deaths were recorded 
as a consequence to the riots.  No major incidents followed the arrests, except an 
attempt on 25 November by a lone Bahraini to set the Adviserate on fire.  The 
perpetrator was arrested.859  As for the expenses incurred during the process of 
transporting and landing British troops in Bahrain, the FO Grants and Services Vote 
was to be charged.860 
In the House of Commons, Labour MP William Warbey enquired on 12 
November if there would be a statement on developments in Bahrain.  Dodds-
Parker replied on behalf of the FO.  He provided an overview to the history of the 
NUC and the demonstrations that had turned violent in early November.  On the 
dissolution of the NUC he concluded that he hoped that it would help to open the 
way for moderate elements in Bahrain’s society to participate in their country’s 
political evolution, as they would no longer be ‘intimidated by the Committee’.861 
Lord Glyn asked the Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords on 20 November 
about the current state of affairs in Bahrain.  Lloyd replied that the NUC had 
‘assumed to itself the right to act as the mouthpiece of the people of Bahrain’ and 
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that the Administration had exercised patience in its dealing with them.  The 
ultimate aim was to allow the Party to contribute in the development of 
constitutional government.  But the Foreign Secretary believed that the NUC had 
refused to cooperate and had ‘turned to more extreme courses’.  As a result of the 
violence that ensued during the November riots the Government of Bahrain had 
detained five of the Party’s frontline members, Lloyd explained.  The Foreign 
Secretary concealed that the order to arrest the NUC’s members actually came from 
the Residency and not the Administration.862  An interesting feature of this period in 
Bahrain was that Smith did not play any role following his return from leave.   
Power remained firmly in the hands of Belgrave, the Adviser. 
The idea of exiling some of the members of the NUC was first entertained in 
late November.  In a meeting between the Ruler, Belgrave, and Gault, it was felt by 
Gault that the Administration wanted to have two or three members of the Party 
exiled to a secure British possession.  The Adviser suggested that the soon-to-be 
exiled prisoners be sent with a single journey travel passport to the Seychelles.  
There they would receive during their exile allowances from the Bahraini 
Government.  The idea was for the prisoners to live a normal life and be granted 
mobility throughout the islands but without being able to leave the country.863  The 
choice to have the prisoners sent to the Seychelles was chosen because Archbishop 
Makarios of Cyprus was already serving his banishment on the islands.864 
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Both Al-Bakir and Belgrave accused Britain of collaboration or sympathising 
with the other party.  Al-Bakir in his memoir claimed that, on his return to Bahrain 
in late September, the Administration offered an open door for negotiations only to 
gain time to implement its grand scheme of eliminating the NUC in due course.  Al-
Bakir further claimed that the plan to dismantle the Party was devised by the British 
Foreign Office itself and that he was misled during negotiations and he had failed to 
understand the true intentions of the Administration and Britain.865  No FO 
documents at TNA survive of a grand plot to eliminate the NUC.  On the other hand 
the Bahrain Government Annual Report for 1956 prepared by Belgrave claimed that 
the NUC’s  
actions were approved and supported by the British Government and 
this impression deterred many of the responsible Arabs who 
supported the Government from indicating their disapproved of the 
H.E.C.866 
 
 Burrows explained the Residency’s stance towards the two sides in Bahrain 
in the Residency’s Annual Report, saying that his policy was to find ‘some common 
ground’ between the factions likening the Bahraini Movement to those seen in other 
territories under British colonial rule.  The intention was to bridge the gap between 
the Administration and the reformists ‘using our experience of constitutional 
development and administration to guide in the direction of gradual rather than 
violent change’.  Unfortunately the attempt at holding both the Administration and 
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the Reformers’ hands in an attempt at conciliation for the betterment of all had 
suffered a setback as the Movement in Bahrain had ‘gone too far’.867 
 Due to the Suez War, the Hungarian uprising, and the US’s presidential 
elections that took place between late October and early November, the coverage of 
Bahrain’s disturbances in Western newspapers did not receive the attention that 
past conflicts on the islands had done.  However with the trial of members of the 
NUC and the exile of three others, the world’s press kept a close eye on their fate and 
a campaign was launched to help them.  As for Belgrave, the following months 
would mark the end of his long tenure in Bahrain. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Trials, Exile, and Belgrave’s Departure 
 December 1956 to April 1957  
 
With the fall of the NUC the Government of Bahrain sought to re-organise its 
Administration.  One of the earliest moves was the appointment of new councils for 
Diving, Trade, Minors, Waqf (religious endowments), Agriculture, and Water.  The 
appointed members were presented to the Ruler on 10 December.  During the 
presentations the Sheikh said that, although the councils had been elected in the 
past, it was advisable at this point and under current circumstances that they be 
appointed and for a one-year period only.868  On the same day the councils were 
presented to the Ruler interrogation began of the five frontline members of the NUC, 
according to Al-Bakir’s memoir.869  Since, the interrogation was carried by Bahrain’s 
Police Force, there are no documents that exist in TNA on the details of the 
interrogation process, nor did Al-Bakir’s memoir provide much information.   
Based on the Administration’s desire to have some of the NUC’s prisoners 
exiled as presented in the previous chapter, the British Cabinet discussed briefly the 
Ruler’s request to move some of the Party’s members in custody abroad.  In the 
discussion Lloyd asked for suggestions about places of their imprisonment and Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, responded by putting forward 
the island of St Helena.870  The Foreign Secretary then instructed the Residency to 
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guide the Administration regarding the steps required to achieve that goal.  Lloyd 
pointed out to the Residency that in order for such a move to take place an Order in 
Council must be issued applying the Colonial Prisoners’ Removal Act of 1869 to 
Bahrain.  The Ruler would then be able to appeal for a sanction to arrange for the 
handover of the prisoners to St Helena.  A second Order in Council would be needed 
to complete the second sanction.  But before any process was to be made, the Ruler 
was required to write a request to HM Queen Elizabeth II.  Lloyd further wished to 
add a clause to the Administration’s request to transfer the prisoners saying that 
they would be entitled to a remission of one-third of their sentences, if they were 
send to St Helena.871  A letter was sent to HM Queen Elizabeth II from the Ruler of 
Bahrain on 18 December seeking the permission of HMG to remove the sentenced 
prisoners to St Helena to serve their sentences.872  The Queen’s approval through 
her Court at Buckingham Palace granted permission that both the Government of 
Bahrain and St Helena ‘enter into an agreement for the removal of prisoners’ based 
on the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act of 1869 which extended to Bahrain through 
its removal of prisoners order of 1956.873  Prior to the trial Bahrain’s Administration 
considered whether to have all five frontline members deported or just a few of 
them.  The Resident replied ‘that five may be too many’, as it might not be accepted 
by St Helena or onboard the frigate which would transport them there.874   
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A special tribunal was appointed under the instructions of the Ruler of 
Bahrain.  The tribunal consisted of Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Duaij 
bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and Sheikh Ali bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa as judges.  The 
defendants consisted of the five arrested frontline members of the NUC being Al-
Bakir, Al-Shamlan, Al-Alaiwat, E Fakhroo, and Ibn Musa.  The tribunal was held at 
Budaiya village to the north west of the main island of Bahrain.  A room in the 
village’s Police Station was setup for the court.  The decision to have the trial held in 
Budaiya and not in the Manama Court was for security reasons, as it was feared that 
having the court assemble in the capital would invite trouble.  The trial opened on 
22 December and lasted for two days.   
The accusations against the defendants were that they had planned the 
assassination of the Ruler, his Adviser and members of the ruling family, the 
destruction of the palace, airport, and other buildings and an attempt to overthrow 
the Government and deprive the Ruler of his authority.  The defendants were also 
accused of deliberate defiance of the agreement between them and the 
Administration on the route decided upon in relation to the demonstration that 
resulted in violence and destruction.  Al-Bakir, who spoke on behalf of the 
defendants, demanded the trial be held in Manama and further criticised the 
accusations brought forward against him and his fellow Party members.  Moreover 
he asked the court to supply the defendants with written copies of the accusations 
and documentary evidence to support them.  The tribunal agreed to his request but 
his demand to have the trial held in Manama was rejected.  Al-Bakir later asserted 
that, as his request to have the tribunal in Manama had not been met, the defendants 
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would not speak.  As a result, all the defendants refused to defend themselves 
throughout the trial.   
The documents collected to form the basis of the accusations were found at 
the homes of the defendants, other members of the NUC, and the Party’s offices in 
Manama.  Setting up the Scouts movement and its activities were used in the 
indictment of the five members of the Movement.  The tribunal also brought 
forward the press accounts of Al-Bakir’s statements abroad and circulars produced 
by the NUC in which it had called those who had collaborated with the 
Administration ‘traitors’.  Letters from Al-Shamlan to Al-Sadat on local affairs were 
produced in evidence that attempted to serve as pièce justificative against Al-
Shamlan.   
Belgrave was present at the tribunal to testify against Al-Bakir vis-à-vis the 
latter’s promise to conduct a peaceful and orderly procession.  The tribunal also 
used a letter submitted by the Ruler on 22 July 1956 to the NUC holding the Party 
responsible for disturbances that would result from their calls to go on strike.875  A 
British officer from Bahrain’s police represented the prosecution.  The verdict was a 
fait accompli and was reached on 23 December.  It called for the imprisonment of Al-
Bakir, Al-Shamlan, and Al-Alaiwat for fourteen years and E Fakhroo and Ibn Musa 
for ten years.  According to Gault villagers from Budaiya were granted permission to 
witness the trial but locals from Manama and Muharraq were not permitted entry.  
As for the other fifty members and or supporters who had been arrested, eight were 
released and twelve more followed.  Some of those released were banished to up to 
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two years abroad and others remained in Bahrain on the promise of good 
behaviour.  The remaining imprisoned Party supporters were sent from Rumaitha 
south of Bahrain to the prison island of Jidda.876   
The Administration decided on 24 December that it wished to exile to St 
Helena: Al-Bakir, Al-Shamlan, and Al-Alaiwat.  The Administration planned to keep 
the remaining two frontline members (E Fakhroo and Ibn Musa) in custody in 
Bahrain with the objective of reducing their sentences later.  The ship scheduled to 
carry the prisoners onboard was HMS Loch Insh, it called on two destinations en 
route to St Helena, Mombasa and Simonstown.  Travel expenses and 
accommodation costs were to be paid by the Bahraini Government.877  A letter from 
the Admiralty to the Residency pointed out that it was inadvisable to have HMS Loch 
Insh arrive on 22 January 1957 as HRH the Duke of Edinburgh was scheduled to 
visit St Helena on board HM Yacht Britannia on that date.  The ship carrying the 
prisoners should arrive after 27 January, it said.878   
 In the wake of sentencing an attempt was made on the life of a British 
employee of Bahrain’s International Aeradio named Plummer on 27 December.  
Since the assailant escaped and Plummer was not known to have enemies, Burrows 
concluded that the attempt on Plummer’s life must have been politically motivated 
following the sentences.  The Resident recommended that the incident be given as 
‘little publicity as possible’.879   
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The exiled prisoners departed on HMS Loch Insh on 28 December and were 
not initially informed of their final destination, nor was it publically known.  The 
majority of ordinary Bahrainis believed that the prisoners were headed to the 
Seychelles.880   
In the wider world, the Omega Plan’s death certificate was proclaimed on 5 
January 1957 when American President Eisenhower announced to Congress his 
initiative to counter Soviet penetration in the Middle East that came to be known as 
the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’.881  The President’s plan was to contain Nasser’s 
ambitions through the Soviet Union and to assist in the economic development of 
Middle Eastern nations in order to sustain their independence, to offer military 
assistance, and the utilisation of American armed forces in the Middle East, to 
defend it from ‘armed aggression from any nation controlled by International 
Communism’.882  On 9 January Eden submitted his resignation to HM the Queen, 
sighting ill-health as the cause.883  Macmillan succeeded Eden as Prime Minister.884 
The three Bahraini prisoners reached St Helena on 27 January.885  Sir James D 
Harford the Governor of the island, proposed keeping the prisoners confined to one 
location and for them not to be held incommunicado.  The three asked for pocket 
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money, their laundry to be taken care of, refused to undertake any labour tasks, and 
requested access to a radio.886  
In the early part of 1957 the Ruler of Bahrain considered once again 
retaining Belgrave as a Personal Adviser or as a representative of the Government in 
London, and making regular visits to Bahrain.  The Resident felt that such a proposal 
was unacceptable and instructed the Political Agent to notify the Sheikh on 27 
March with the Residency’s views.  Although Burrows did not mind having Belgrave 
represent the Ruler in London and to visit Bahrain only on an annual basis, he 
rejected any arrangement to further involve Belgrave in the Government’s work or 
for him to make a series of visits to the islands throughout the year.887  The Adviser 
was now expected to finally retire by summer but fate intervened to hasten his 
departure.  After a medical examination on 11 April a growth on the Adviser’s 
bladder was detected.  Because of his medical condition he was to leave Bahrain as 
soon as possible to seek treatment in Britain.  Bahrain Radio announced Belgrave’s 
departure but did not say whether he was going to return.  The Ruler wished to see 
the Adviser back before his expected retirement in the summer of 1957.888   
Before Belgrave’s departure he met with the Resident, who asked him his 
thoughts on the political party and whether it should have been left to run.  
Belgrave’s reply was typically devious, saying that it might have been better to have 
been left to its own devices so ‘that people could see for themselves what were the 
result of political controversy here’.  Burrows agreed with Belgrave’s view and the 
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Resident seemed to be having second thoughts about his decision to arrest the 
Party’s leading members.889   
Belgrave left Bahrain with his wife at 6.00 am on 18 April stopping at Kuwait, 
Baghdad, Istanbul, and Rome until they finally reached London.890  His medical 
condition prevented the Adviser from an immediate return to Bahrain and he would 
only come again in 1965 as a visitor.891  
 Smith was appointed Secretary to the Government upon his return from a 
three-month leave in June 1956 did not have much of a role until Belgrave’s 
departure.  Following the Adviser’s sudden return to Britain, Smith worked as 
Acting Adviser.  He finally gained official recognition by the Ruler for the first time 
on 1 June when a letter was forwarded to him by Sheikh Salman that addressed him 
with the title of Secretary to the Government of Bahrain.  Based later on Smith’s 
recommendation, the Adviserate was converted into the Secretariat.892   
In a discussion between Gault and Ahmed Fakhroo on affairs in Bahrain after 
Belgrave’s departure and Smith’s takeover, A Fakhroo described the Administration 
as disorganised.  The Political Agent further declared regarding A Fakhroo’s opinion, 
‘He now regretted Sir Charles Belgrave’s departure’.  During Belgrave’s tenure it was 
the Adviser who held heads of departments reliable for their department’s work and 
held those who mismanaged accountable, a trait that was not seen in Smith.893  On 
this issue Mapp noted in his memoir quoting a Bahraini taxi driver, ‘The people got 
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Belgrave out, but two or three years after he went they were crying to have him 
back’.894  
 Although the NUC had ceased to exist as a movement by the end of 1956, the 
effects it had on constitutional developments, both directly and indirectly continued 
to be felt.895  The Penal Code was implemented in November 1956.  The Health and 
Education Councils continued work but through appointed members.  On 21 
February the two Councils were restructured, each one consisting of eight members, 
five of whom were selected by the four municipalities of Manama, Muharraq, Riffa, 
and Hidd.  The Ruler appointed the remaining three members.896  The 
Administration Council continued its work,897 and work on the Labour Ordinance 
was completed by 29 July to come into effect officially on 1 January 1958.898  
Municipal elections had been held before the rise of the NUC, but a return to public 
elections for the municipalities was declared in early 1958.899   
According to Burrows there were two driving forces to the NUC.  The first 
was the resentment felt by some Bahraini Shi’ites’ (from a sectarian standpoint) 
towards the Sunni ruling family.  The second was a ‘genuine wish for reform, partly 
by half-backed Arab nationalism of the usual kind’.900  As to the Party’s failure, 
Mehdi Al-Tajir, the son of Mohsin Al-Tajir one of the frontline members of the NUC, 
blamed the policies adopted by Al-Bakir and Al-Shamlan.  In Mehdi’s view the two 
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were unable to avoid the ‘allure of Egypt’.  As to the reason for the two’s attraction 
to the Egyptian sphere, Mehdi believed was ‘because “they wanted to be heroes in 
the fight against Imperialism and loved to have their photographs in the Nationalist 
magazines”’.901  
In St Helena a long legal battle to free the prisoners ensued.  On 10 June 1958 
Bernard Sheridan’s law firm on behalf of Al-Bakir submitted an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus.902  A document among TNA CO’s papers unnamed and 
undated but archived among the records for the year 1958, suggested upon 
acknowledgement that a writ of habeas corpus was applied by the prisoners that  
It is important politically that the application should be rejected and 
should not, therefore, be held in conditions in which it is likely to 
succeed through inadequate defence.   
 
Furthermore it was recommended that little publicity to the hearing was to be given 
and ‘to avoid proceeding in such a way as to make the Colonial judicial system the 
subject of legitimate attack’.  It was also expected according to the paper that an 
appeal to the verdict would be made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.903      
Nonetheless one of the earliest attempts to bring public awareness in Britain 
to the plight of the three prisoners was when British filmmaker John Tunstall, hired 
by the French Government to produce a film on St Helena, Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
final place of exile, met the three men on the island.  The meeting and first call to 
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free the men was chronicled in Reynold’s News weekly newspaper of 7 September 
1958 in an article with several images of the prisoners in St Helena.  Interestingly, 
the newspaper reported that the initial habeas corpus application was unsuccessful 
because of a technical issue: one of the relatives of the prisoners’ had failed to sign it 
on their behalf.904  This report corresponded with a claim made by Murad that early 
in the process of defending the three, signatures were collected on behalf of the 
three exiled men’s families, in order to allow for lawyers to represent them.  
However one of the prisoners’ sons (whom he did not specify) had refused to sign it 
for reasons unknown.  There was no other choice left then but to forge his signature 
to allow lawyers to represent his father and for the case to proceed.905 
The case proceeded and affidavits were collected from witnesses.  Affidavits 
were made by Al-Bakir on 15 October, Salem Al-Arrayed the Registrar of the 
Bahrain Law Courts on 23 February 1959, Sir James D Harford (former Governor of 
St Helena) on 26 February, Belgrave on 27 February, Patrick Truebody (the Senior 
Sergeant of Police in St Helena) on 17 March, and Sir Robert Edmund Alford 
(Governor of St Helena since 12 February 1958) on 17 March.  On behalf of Sheridan 
Ronald GM Brown was appointed to defend Al-Bakir.   
The defence argued that Al-Bakir was unlawfully detained in St Helena.  It 
based its key points of defence on the following arguments: first that the prisoner 
‘was never convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction’, despite having the Act 
extended to include Bahrain ‘it cannot apply to the applicant because he was not 
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convicted in the exercise of any jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s in Bahrain’, and that the 
warrant that was delivered to HMS Loch Insh was not valid under the Act ‘because it 
was executed by the Ruler of Bahrain before the Order sanctioning the agreement 
had come into force in Bahrain’.  The hearing lasted from 17 to 20 March 1959.  
Unfortunately for Al-Bakir, the court’s Chief Justice, Justice Lionel Brett, dismissed 
the summons.  Al-Bakir then appealed to the Privy Council’s Judicial Committee on 
12 August 1959.906  The appeal was yet again unsuccessful as it was declared on 1 
June 1960.907 
The internal pressure in Britain to release the prisoners was feared, Richard 
A Beaumont at the Arabian Department of the FO (formerly the Eastern 
Department), noted, however, that on the prisoners in St Helena issue, ‘No Arab 
diplomatic missions in London have (to the best of my knowledge) taken up this 
question with us’.  Nevertheless, to relieve the Government from pressure at home 
Beaumont proposed three possible solutions: to ‘ride out the political storm in the 
House of Commons’; to convince the Ruler to pardon the prisoners; and/or to return 
the men to Bahrain were they would serve out the remainder of their prison 
sentences.908  A new development transpired vis-à-vis the prisoners’ case in the 
second-half of 1960.  A letter from Sheridan to JC McPetrie at the Colonial Office on 
24 October 1960 found at TNA suggested that the ship that carried the prisoners to 
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St Helena had sailed at 4.00 am before the Order in Council was published that 
would provide authority to the warrant.909   
At about this time the new Resident Sir George H Middleton (Burrows’ 
successor, appointed in 1958), recommended that the best course of action to take 
would be for ‘the Ruler to commute the sentences to one of exile’.  Middleton hoped 
that, if this course of action was implemented, the damage the prisoners would do 
through the media ‘would be short-lived’.910  However instead he sent the Ruler a 
letter on 15 December seeking his approval to return the prisoners to Bahrain 
where they would resume their sentences.911  The British Government’s eagerness 
to have the prisoners returned was probably due to the knowledge that new 
evidence by Sheridan would be introduced and the fear of a public backlash.   
The Ruler replied by accepting the Resident’s request to return the prisoners 
to Bahrain.912  Replying to a question in the House of Commons on 19 December 
about the status of the prisoners on St Helena by John Stonehouse Labour MP, the 
Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath replied that the Ruler wished to have them complete 
their sentences in Bahrain.913  A debate followed on the following day and Labour 
MP Denis Healy exclaimed,  
The Lord Privy Seal has given no assurance that if these men are 
returned to the custody of the Ruler, their sentence will not be 
doubled or that their heads will not be cut off the moment they step 
ashore at Bahrain.914 
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Commenting on Healy’s remarks, Belgrave wrote to The Times citing a Bahraini 
friend, whom he alleged had bellowed in shock at the statement, saying ‘Do these 
people think that Bahrain is a savage country, like the Yemen?’915 
On the issue between the choice of living freely in exile or returning to 
Bahrain as a prisoner Al-Bakir wrote in his memoir of 21 December that ‘it is better 
for me to be imprisoned, even with shackles, in my country, to share my fellow 
friends their suffering in jail’.916  However the Governor of St Helena on 3 January 
1961 contradicted Al-Bakir’s statement reporting ‘that Abdul Rahman al Bakr says 
he would prefer to remain in St Helena rather than be returned to Bahrain if he 
cannot be released’.917 
The Lord Privy Seal Sir Edward Heath visited Bahrain on 15 January for two 
and a half days.  With permission from the Ruler, he visited the two frontline 
members who remained imprisoned on the island of Jidda in order to inspect the 
conditions of imprisonment on the island.  Heath claimed to have spoken with the 
two prisoners, he later told the House of Commons that the ‘two men are living in 
reasonable conditions, with a considerable degree of freedom on the island’.918  The 
Observer covered Heath’s visit to Bahrain and Jidda Island.  In conclusion of the visit 
Heath noted: ‘What I saw completely disproves the wild, exaggerated accusations 
made about the way these men would be treated if they were returned to 
Bahrein’.919     
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Bernard Levin, one of the most vocal journalists on the Conservatives’ The 
Spectator magazine on the issue of the three prisoners, attacked Heath’s statements 
in the House of Commons, as in his view the prisoners had been unable to express 
their opinions freely in the presence of the local Police Chief.920  E Fakhroo 
recollected in an interview with Al-Wasat newspaper a visit by a British official he 
did not name.  He further recalled of the official that he ‘did not hear from him a 
thing and did not see him again’.  Hassan Al-Jowdar, who worked for the police on 
Jidda Island, indicated in the same interview that two frontline members of the NUC 
were well-respected by the Public Security Chief, Sheikh Khalifa bin Mohammed Al-
Khalifa who used to call the two to his office whenever he visited the island.  Other 
prisoners were required to assist them in cooking and cleaning.921  
According to Al-Bakir he received a letter from Sheridan’s law firm on 21 
January 1961 that informed him that new facts had been revealed in relation to the 
time the prisoners were brought onto the HMS Loch Insh, but no further 
information was relayed to him at that point.  A new habeas corpus application was 
made, this time under Al-Shamlan’s name.922  The affidavit of Al-Shamlan confirmed 
that he was arrested on 6 November 1956 and was later trialed in Bahrain and 
deported.  Al-Shamlan appealed that the order sanctioning his removal and the 
other two prisoners did not take effect at the time of deportation since it was not 
posted on the Political Agency’s board.923     
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Proceedings for the new appeal were announced to start on 30 January 
1961.924  During the proceedings a letter by Smith, Bahrain’s Secretary to the 
Government, officially requested the Political Agency on 7 March that the prisoners 
be returned to Bahrain.925  The request was not granted and the three prisoners 
were ordered to be freed by Justice Myles John Abbott the Acting Chief Justice of St 
Helena on 13 June 1961.  Since Al-Shamlan’s application for habeas corpus was 
upheld the other two prisoners were granted the same ruling.  The hearing for the 
case was held for three days in what The Guardian described was a crowded 
Supreme Court.   
The loophole that was applied to free the prisoners on their second appeal 
was that the men were handed over to the Captain of the HMS Loch Insh at 6.00 am, 
and not at 4.00 am as had been stated in Sheridan’s letter, with a warrant that 
authroised their deportation.  However the Order in Council that provided authority 
for the warrant was published on the Political Agency announcements’ board at 8.00 
am, two hours after they had been taken aboard the ship.  A copy of the pro forma 
that was submitted to the Captain of the ship, according to the newspaper, was 
retrieved.  It was then used as the primary evidence to free the prisoners.926  
According to Murad, a former member of the NUC, the document had been retrieved 
by an unnamed friend from the Adviserate, later the Secretariat, who copied the 
document that was submitted to HMS Loch Insh and it had included the time at 
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which the prisoners had been handed over.927  In Gault’s affidavit he claimed to have 
received the order to remove the prisoners from Bahrain from Burrows following 
the former’s working hours on 27 December at the Agency as he worked from 8.00 
am to 1.30 pm.  He did not see the point of publishing the order on the Agency’s 
notice board in non-office hours and had published it on the following day at 8.05 
am.928  The Commander of the HMS Loch Insh was revealed to be Robert Barcham.  
In his affidavit he claimed to have been informed via the Senior Naval Officer on 
either the 26 or 27 December 1956 that his ship was to carry three prisoners to St 
Helena.  He confirmed to have received the prisoners at around 6.00 am.929 
In order to help sponsor the prisoners’ defense team, Bernard Levin claimed 
in an article in The Spectator that a committee was set up to help in raising the 
necessary funds.  The committee consisted of Woodrow Wyatt MP, Jeremy Thorpe 
MP, John Stonehouse MP, Donald Chesworth, and Bernard Levin.  The committee 
contributed to past funds, though it is unknown the date on which the committee 
was first formed for the prisoners and in 1961 a new appeal was proclaimed in The 
Spectator to help the three Bahrainis due to the ‘sheer lack of funds’.  Levin urged 
the readers to forward their donations to the magazine.930  When the case concluded 
with the release of the prisoners, Levin referred to ‘the considerable debts incurred’ 
for the cases, which some remained outstanding.  Thus the committee announced 
that it would withhold donations that had not been spent yet until further proposals 
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were made to the donators, as it was not yet clear what the final charges for the 
legal procedure would be.  Levin thanked all those who contributed as people sent 
varying donations; even clergymen who were poorly paid as Levin stated 
contributed to the cause.931  
Prime Minister Macmillan decided that an appeal should not be made against 
the freeing of the three prisoners and that their solicitors be consulted on the topic 
of settlement.932  In 1962 it was decided that the three Bahrainis would receive 
compensation by the British Government worth £15,000.  Additionally other 
unspecified costs incurred by the three men would also be compensated by the 
government, worth £5,000.933   
 Upon the three prisoners’ release they were taken onboard the Warwick 
Castle to London.  They arrived on 14 July 1961.  A press conference was given by 
the three chaired by J Stonehouse.  In the conference Al-Bakir expressed his 
gratitude to the people of Britain and singled out the British Government as The 
Guardian noted.934   
The Ruler of Bahrain Sheikh Salman passed away on 2 November 1961.  His 
oldest son and heir apparent HH Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa became Bahrain’s 
new Ruler.935  As for the former Adviser, he spent the remainder of his life in 
retirement in Britain.  As a member of the Royal Central Asian Society he was 
awarded in 1967 with the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Award, for his services to 
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the Arab World.  A special ceremony was held for the award at the Hyde Park Hotel 
on 7 December and was attended by dignitaries from around the world.936  Belgrave 
died on 28 February 1969 in Kensington at the age of seventy-four.  A memorial 
service was held in his owner on 10 March.937    
Obituaries were placed in The Times and The Guardian as it recalled the 
services of the Adviser to the government and people of Bahrain.938  British 
historian Elizabeth Monroe author of Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 
wrote remembering Belgrave as she illustrated in The Times, that it was the 
Adviser’s, 
ill-luck to leave Bahrain at a moment when the anti-British tide was 
running high, and so never heard the applause that he deserved for 
the steady and devoted way in which he helped with the island’s slow 
but solid development into a modern state.939 
 
Dr RHB Snow, who worked in Bahrain’s medical department, further added 
in a separate obituary to Belgrave as he noted Belgrave’s virtues of ‘extreme 
patience, courage and courtesy’.940  Even past Bahraini foes like Sayyar testified 
decades after his passing that,  
Justice requires us to give Charles Belgrave his right in managing his 
responsibilities assigned to him.  He was the one who established 
administrative systems and did all he could do in order for Bahrain to 
become distinctive among the Gulf States.941 
 
Al-Mardi’s Al-Adwha’a determined vis-à-vis the Adviser that, 
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no matter how much we differed with him and the policies he 
instituted or the methods he followed, he was clean hand and honest 
during all the time he worked.  He did not exploit his wide authority 
during that long period to himself or to his own personal gains.942     
 
Belgrave’s home in Manama no longer exists as it was demolished and 
fenced.  The road that carried his name was changed to Sheikh Isa Al-Kabir (the 
Great) Road.  Today there are no artifacts related to Belgrave in Bahrain’s museums 
with the exception of him appearing in the background of various photographs 
featuring local dignitaries.  A question arises as to why there is virtually no mention 
of Belgrave’s work or presence in Bahrain.  The answer to that is found in Belgrave’s 
publications, in particular his Personal Column and in his diary.  The content 
featured in his work that contained local gossip, personal attacks on various local 
and British figures, mockery, and history of the humble and at times controversial 
beginnings of various known local families resulted in him burning all bridges 
amongst the locals.  Hence, there is virtually no artifacts left of him. 
Al-Bakir, after a short stay in Britain traveled to Lebanon where he arrived 
on 22 July 1961.943  Lebanon turned to be his final home as he lived there until his 
death on 8 July 1971.  His body was buried in Qatar.  Al-Alaiwat after his release 
from St Helena lived in Syria and Iraq.  He died on 14 January 1969 and was buried 
in the city of Najaf in Iraq.944  As for the two frontline members Ibn Musa and E 
Fakhroo who were imprisoned in Bahrain, they were less fortunate than the first 
three, as the two were freed on 8 August 1964.  Ibn Musa died approximately forty 
                                                        
942 ‘Wafat Al-Sir Charles Belgrave’ [The Death of Sir Charles Belgrave], Al-Adwha’a, 6 March 1969, 3. 
943 Al-Bakir, From Bahrain to Exile, 457. 
944 ‘Aham Al-Shakhsiyat alti Asrat “Al-Hay’eh’ [Contemporary Personalities that Witnessed the 
Committee], Abwab Al-Wasat, 13 October 2004, 13. 
 © Hamad E. Abdulla 295 
days following his release.945  E Fakhroo resumed his political career.  After 
Bahrain’s independence in 1971, he was elected to participate in the establishment 
of the country’s constitution as a member of Bahrain’s General Assembly in 1973 
and was also elected as an MP in 1974.  He died on 20 February 2005.946  Kamal-el-
Deen according to Belgrave’s diary entry on 16 January 1957, asked the cleric to 
travel away from Bahrain to Iraq for an unspecified period of time.947  He later 
returned to Bahrain and died in 1974 and was buried in Manama.948  
 Of all the frontline members of the NUC the most fortunate was Al-Shamlan.  
After his release from St Helena and departure to London, he lived in Damascus until 
1971 when he returned to Bahrain.  He was elected to Bahrain’s General Assembly 
in 1973.  Al-Shamlan was appointed by the government as ambassador to Egypt and 
subsequently to Tunisia.  He suffered from hemiplegia and was sent to Britain and 
the US for treatment.  Following his return he was visited by the Ruler of Bahrain.  
On 30 December 1988, Al-Shamlan suffered a stroke that led to his death.  He was 
buried in Muharraq.949  An avenue in Umm Al-Hassam in Manama was named after 
the former NUC’s frontline member. 
As for the Baghdad Pact, the alliance that tore the Middle East apart, the 
Iraqis eventually withdrew from the Pact in 1959 following the bloody overthrow of 
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the monarchy in 1958.950  The Pact became known as the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) following the Iraqis’ departure.951  Concerning Nasser the 
destructive outcome of the 1967 Six Days War, participation in the 1962-70 Yemeni 
Civil War, the short-lived union with Syria, poor economy, and centralisation of 
power led the Egyptian writer Al-Hakim who once labeled the Free Officers’ 
Movement as the ‘blessed movement’ to reassess his position.  After Nasser’s death 
and in 1972, Al-Hakim published the Return of Consciousness, in which he expressed 
his disappointment in Nasser’s rule and policy.952 
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Conclusion 
 
 
British policy manifested itself through the Residency’s work in Bahrain.  The 
Resident, Burrows, offered to mediate between the two conflicting parties in 
Bahrain being the local Administration and the nationalist movement.  The 
Government of Bahrain suspiciously looked at the process of mediation, which at 
times took on the form of private meetings with a member or members of the NUC.  
Nevertheless, negotiations with the Movement were key in the Residency’s policy to 
reach a compromise between the two sides.  The Residency was probably inclined to 
show sympathy to the Movement based on Western ideals of democracy and 
development of constitutional government.  Constraints were also placed on the two 
sides to prevent one from overtaking the other.  
British policy up to a late stage in the development of the Bahraini movement 
in 1956 did not view the opposition to be that of an anti-British nature.  Despite 
attacks on British interests, allies, and policies in nationalist press.  Following the 
stoning of Lloyd’s car in Bahrain and the events that followed in March 1956 there 
seemed to be a division amongst British policy makers on how to deal with the 
Movement.  Eden wanted to adopt a firm stance against the NUC and if it weren’t for 
Burrows’ maneuvering and understanding with the FO the Movement would have 
been suppressed in March.  Burrows adopted a more lenient approach with the 
Party in accordance to his understanding first hand of the situation on the ground.   
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Though it was Burrows who helped the Party remain intact, it was him who 
sealed its fate in November of that year.  A number of possible factors affected the 
Residency’s decision to suppress the Movement those being its constant call for 
strikes some of which led to violence having a negative impact on the economy, the 
statements attributed to Al-Bakir abroad, the creation of a paramilitary organisation 
in the form of a Scouts movement, failure to cooperate with the government, failure 
to take advantage of the political concessions awarded to them, and the riots of 
November 1956.  
The position of Belgrave presented British policy makers with a dilemma.  
The Residency understood that part of the local agitation was the position of the 
Adviser.  Since the Adviser was not an employee for Britain and did not receive 
orders from it, policy makers had to convince both the Ruler of Bahrain and 
Belgrave that the latter had to go.  The tactics employed by the British dealt 
sensitively with the issue, as they feared that an insistence on their part for Belgrave 
to depart might lead to instability in the Administration and force the Ruler to 
abdicate.  That position relatively changed following the sacking of Glubb Pasha in 
Jordan and the stoning of Lloyd in Bahrain.  The new policy adopted then was to 
allow Belgrave to remain temporarily and not to impose the issue on the 
Administration as British prestige was on stake if a sudden departure of the Adviser 
were to take place.  A long-term plan was devised to ease Belgrave out by 
persuading the Ruler to adopt that line.  The plan after thorough consideration 
involved convincing the Ruler to hire a British secretary to the government who 
would eventually ease out the Adviser.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
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Belgrave served at the time British imperial interests, as a matter of fact his 
presence at the head of the Administration in Bahrain turned into a heavy burden 
on Britain.  Nor is there any evidence to suggest that Belgrave’s work was dictated 
to him by Britain’s FO through the Residency.  Moreover, there is no evidence to 
suggest that neither he nor the Residency purposely sought sectarian division in 
Bahrain. 
Though Egyptian influence on the nationalists was apparent as seen through 
their press and some of the prominent members of the NUC’s actions.  It is hard to 
determine whether Egyptian influence affected the Party as a whole since those who 
contributed to press publications and spoke in rallies were but a few.  Those whose 
influence by Egypt’s Nasser seemed apparent, there existed no proof to suggest that 
they were controlled by the Egyptians though the influence was reasonably high.   
In order to better understand the Party and its driving force it is essential to 
dissect the Movement.  The NUC consisted of a two-headed complex structure each 
driven by its political motives.  The first being the Shi’ite element of the Party which 
some of it supporters were driven by their traditional sectarian feud with the 
Administration’s Sunni ruling family.  Though the Movement was not of a religious 
nature, it heavily relied on religious platforms and occasions for its political 
gatherings, in particular Shi’ite celebrations which were held throughout the year.  
Though such gatherings promised to assemble thousands it probably gave a false 
impression to some Shi’ites, as they thought the Movement stood in support to their 
religious practices.  Further, there was noticeable objection from an element within 
Bahrain’s Shi’ite community towards the Party’s hardline stance and Egyptian 
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influence as was noted through Mohsin Al-Tajir’s resignation.  This, however, does 
not rule out the possibility that some of the NUC’s Shi’ite supporters genuinely 
revered Nasser and his version of Arab nationalism. 
The other element in the Movement represented the Sunnis; the driving force 
of this element was Al-Bakir and Al-Shamlan.  Al-Bakir seemed to have a dual 
personality from 1953 up to his departure in March 1956.  The personality seen in 
his memoir and nationalist press differed to that in British papers found at TNA.  
Though he was a self-proclaimed nationalist, he blamed in a secret meeting with the 
British two other members of the Party for its radicalisation following their return 
from Egypt as presented in chapter five.  Furthermore, he seemed not to mind 
additional British domination of the Administration when he suggested with 
another frontline member of the NUC in relation to the establishment of a 
commission to investigate the government’s performance that three of its six 
members be chosen by HMG, as presented in chapter three.  Al-Shamlan on the 
other hand seemed to be genuinely inspired by nationalist ideals.  He, however, 
lacked political maneuvering as his insistence during Al-Bakir’s absence on having 
all of the Party’s demands met in one go rather than in installments proved 
detrimental.  Additionally it was during his presence as Acting Secretary that the 
Scouts movement was publically established, another act that harmed the NUC.  
Likewise to parts of the Shi’ite community Sunnis and in particular the merchants of 
Manama resented the Party for its hardline policy.  However this section of society 
seemed shaken and unable to vocalise its disapproval. 
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The Party’s focus on international affairs and alignment through nationalist 
press and circulars with Egyptian politics whether by knowledge or ignorance, saw 
the Movement thrust itself into Cold War politics.  The scale of the Cold War, its 
complexities, and covert operations was far more multifaceted for the inexperienced 
politicians to comprehend, as they were new to this terra incognita.  Instead they 
should have focused purely on local political and social development.  There was no 
maltreatment, however, in showing sympathy with other nations in distress or 
under aggression through peaceful means.   
One of the NUC’s noticeable failures was its insistence to rid Bahrain of a 
single British man being Belgrave.  That determination resulted in the recruitment 
of many other British experts on a part-time or full-time basis throughout the 
Administration to relieve the Adviser from his duties or develop governmental 
work.  The failure was compounded in November 1956 when Bahrain was run over 
by British military units.  
The NUC exerted much effort in the organisation of political rallies, speeches, 
and publication of countless long circulars and pamphlets.  The Movement had a 
golden opportunity of dominating public opinion if they had served and served well 
in the Health and Education Councils.  Additionally the NUC failed to recognise the 
complexity and reality of its surroundings as further concessions would be looked 
upon unfavorably regionally.  It is also ironic that although the Party called upon a 
form of democratic representation, some of it supporter’s looked on to Nasser as a 
political model though he did not adopt democratic values.   
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As for the Administration, Belgrave’s stubbornness and insistence on 
remaining in his position awarded nationalists with the perfect scapegoat to pour 
their wrath and frustration on.  Furthermore, the failure of Belgrave and the 
Administration in improving the local Police Force haunted Bahrain as policemen 
failed to control riots that resulted in terrible outcomes.  The Adviser further failed 
to keep up with the times, as he did not make use of modern channels of 
communication early like the radio, press, and film to highlight to locals the 
Administration’s work and achievements over the years.  If such channels were 
utilised early it could have deflated support from the nationalists.   
It is unfortunate that Bahrain’s political party of the 1950s ended on the note 
it did.  If the opposition had adopted a more flexible approach and managed to build 
on to its political gains, it would have turned into an early watchdog to the 
Administration and contributed to the political and social development of Bahrain. 
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